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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
At times it is rather difficult in a dissertation to say
things in a straightforward manner--without footnotes, without the
numerous qualifications that inevitably come to mind for each sentence.

It becomes especially difficult when, instead of advancing

and defending a thesis, one attempts to express and explore the personal significance of an idea.

Comments on such matters simply do

not tend to fit into the structure of the dissertation.

Thus in

this Introduction I would like to discuss some of the problems involved in this dissertation, some of the issues which can be touched
upon only in a peripheral manner in the body. of the work but which
are, at least for me, highly significant.
Before doing that, it is nonetheless in order to introduce
the main themes of the dissertation, for such an introduction will
establish the context for the remarks which follow in this Introduction.
tation.

I am basically concerned with two things in the disserThe first of these is to show, not only that Nietzsche does

have a philosophy of play, but also that his philosophy is a philosophy of play.

This involves an explication of the category of

play in Nietzsche's philosophy and an interpretation of the main
1
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tenets of his thought in terms of the category of play.

In doing

this, I have considered the writings centering around The Birth of

Tragedy as a distinct group.

In discussing the writings after that,

specific topics have been approached thematically.

In so doing, I

am not implying that there is no significant development in Nietzsche 'is
philosophy after the period of The Birth of Tragedy, but rather am
confining any discussion of development to the framework of specific
issues.
In addition to this, I have drawn freely upon Nietzsche's
posthumously published manuscripts and notebooks.

While it is cer-

tainly inappropriate to give them equal weight with the published
works, they do in fact offer valuable insights into Nietzsche's own
thinking and it would be inappropriate to ignore them.

This is par-

ticularly true where they expand and deepen the positions presented
in the works Nietzsche approved for publication.

As a general guide

to their use, I have tried to follow this principle:

where they

stand in direct conflict with his public position, they must be used
with great caution; where the notebooks expand and deepen insight
into positions found in the works he published, their use is entirely
appropriate.

However, this can serve only as a general principle in

approaching the question.

In specific instances, questions of con-

text and interpretation arise and a judgment must be made in relation
to that specific case.

In ambiguous cases, it becomes necessary to

draw attention to the difference between Nietzsche's published and
his unpublished positions and to label them as such.

3

In approaching the writings which center around The Birth of

Tragedy, I have argued that these present themselves as a developed
philosophy of play, a coherent whole on the conceotual level.

The

category of play is the fundamental one in terms of which Nietzsche's
other categories for understanding existence--the Dionysian, the
Apollinian, and the tragic--are to be understood.

The adequacy of

this category of play is questioned, both in terms of its ontological
background of the primordial contradiction and pain of existence and
in terms of the social background of slavery which it presupposes.
What is at stake here is the relationship between play and what one
might call the real world--more specifically, the relationship between play and work, a topic to which I shall return in this Introduction.
Taking up the writings which follow ~he Birth of Tragedy and
which constitute Nietzsche's developed philosophy, I have argued that
his position leads him inevitably to a philosophy of human activity
as play.

This is evident in a positive sense when one examines "The

Three Metamorphoses" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the notion of the
free spirit, and the doctrine of the order of rank.

In each of these

cases some form of play becomes the highest activity for man.

It is

also true in a negative sense that Nietzsche is led inevitably to a
philosophy of human activity as play.

He destroys the conditions of

the possibility of any type of meaningful human activity except play.
The consideration of nihilism and the critique of morality give evidence of this, as does his analysis of the traditional notion of the

4

self.

Finally 1 a consideration of the concepts of the will to power

and the overman conclude the investigation of human activity and provide in both cases a transition to the more fundamental type of play
in Nietzsche's thought:

the play of forces which constitutes the

world as such.
The final chapter considers in detail the category of play on
a cosmic level, showing the way in which the doctrine of the eternal
recurrence of the same gives ultimate expression to this cosmic play
of forces and serves as an integrating category within Nietzsche's
vision of _.the universe.
My purpose here is not, however, merely to explicate Nietzsche's category of play, but also to offer a critique of it.
critique takes place on two levels.

This

First, there is a critique of

the internal consistency of his position.

This includes, for example,

questions about whether the emphasis on the individual is compatible
with his critique of the self, whether the notion of the will to power
is contradicted by the critique of the will, and whether the notion
of the overman and that of the eternal recurrence are compatible.

The

main thrust of this internal criticism is to show that Nietzsche's
own critical philosophy, if valid, is not so devastating as to call
into question the very grounds of his own positive philosophy.

The

tension in Nietzsche's position between his critical thought and his
positive philosophy can best be understood and resolved in terms of
the category of play.
There is a second type of criticism present in the following

5

chapters, one which centers specifically around the adequacy of the
category of play itself as Nietzsche develops it.

In this respect,

my concern with Nietzsche is somewhat incidental to my interest in
the category itself.

Is this particular philosophy of play adequate?

If not, what are its shortcomings?
philosophy of play?

What would constitute an adequate

It is not my intention to try to provide a full

--or even adequate--answer to this final question, but rather simply
to raise the question itself and to explore some of its dimensions.
To answer that question adequately would require yet another dissertation, hardly an enticing thought at this particular time;

but in a

sense, this dissertation is the first step toward such a second work
in which an adequate philosophy of play can be developed.
Granting that it is impossible to develop such a philosophy of
play in this dissertation, I would like to take the opportunity here
to sketch some of the dimensions of such a philosophy.
reasons for doing so.

There are two

First, these remarks may give the reader some

hint about the presuppositions with which I approach this analysis of
Nietzsche's philosophy.

Second, I hope that they may be of sufficient

interest to the reader to stimulate him or her to further thought on
this subject.
The first difficulty one encounters here is arriving at a
definition of play.

I shall take the description given by Johan Hui-

zinga as a point of departure, since in fact it was my own startingpoint several years ago when I began reflecting upon the problem of
play.

6

Sununing up the formal characteristics of play we might call
it a free activity standing quite consciously outside "ordinary"
life as being "not serious," but at the same time absorbing the
player utterly and intensely. It is an activity connected with
no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own boundaries of time and space according to
fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation
of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy
and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise
or other means.l
While this tends to be a good working definition, problems with it do
arise.

These problems can be grouped into two categories:

difficul-

ties with the applicability of the specific characteristics and problems with the general category of play as such.
A number of problems falling into this first category can be
enumerated here.

First, in what sense is play a free activity?

It is

clear that one cannot be forced to play by some external power or
authority, but is not play often so spontaneous as to be initiated
without the player's thinking about it?

Moreover, 1s this a char-

acteristic which applies to play alone?

Are we to understand that

whatever is the opposite of play 1s an unfree activity?

Second, is

it necessary to presuppose a "real" world to which the world of play
is juxtaposed?

Would it be possible to conceive of existence merely

as a multiplicity of play worlds, none of which has any ontological
superiority over the others?

If play does become connected with some

material interest, does it cease to be play?

Is the essential factor

1

Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in
Beacon Press, 1966), p. 13.

Culture (Boston:
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the intent of the player, or is play to be defined in more objective
terms?

Is a child, for example, who is participating in play therapy

really playing?

While it is clear that play has its own spatial and

temporal boundaries, is this not also the case for other activities?
Does not work, for example, have its own special time and place?
Does play always lead to the formation of social groupings, or may it
not be a very individual activity?

To what degree can it be said that

the play world overflows into the non-play worlds, goes beyond its
fixed boundaries and reshapes the world out of which it originally
springs?

To what extent is the reverse also true:

to what degree does

the non-play world actually permeate the world of play?

To what extent

is the world of play to be explained in terms of the contradictions
and tensions of the non-play world?
I

While it is not possible to carry out this list of questions

aa

infinitwn, it is clear that it could be extended substantially to show
the numerous ambiguities in the concept of play.

It has in fact been

maintained that the concept of play is characterized by an ontological
ambivalence that "means first of all that play eludes a univocal definition. 112

Yet I find myself wondering whether the ambivalence one

uncovers in the concept of play is attributable to the ontological
ambivalence of play itself or to some other source.

More specifically,

I wonder if the ambivalence of the concept of play is not located in

2 Ingeborg Heidemann, Ver Begriff des Spieles und das aesthetische
Weltbild in der Philosophie der GegenJ.iJart (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1968), p. 10.
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the specific contradictions of the contemporary experience of work.
In an essay which I found to be rather thought-provoking,
Helmuth Plessner suggested that the fact "that play in general has
been made into a problem is something new and is connected with the
development of industrial work."3

Is it possible to go even further

here and to suggest that the ambiguities and ambivalence one finds in
the concept of play can be traced back to the corresponding ambiguities
and contradictions in the contemporary experience of work?

While I

am not certain that each and every aspect of the ambiguity of the
concept of play can be traced back to the experience of work within
our society, this line of investigation appears to be a rather fruitful
one.
Consider, for example, the following problem.
theorists would agree that play is a free ac.tivi ty.

Most play
Schiller main-

tains this quite strongly when he argues that, "man plays only when
he is in the full sense of the word a man, and he is only wholly man

when he is playing. 11 4 Even if one does not want to go as far as
Schiller has gone, it is quite difficult in most instances not to
maintain that play is a pre-eminently free activity.

This becomes

problematic, however, when one recognizes another characteristic of

3

Helmuth Plessner, "Spiel und Sport," Diesseits der Utopie
(Diisseldorf: Diederichs, 1966), p. 160.
4 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a
Series of Letters, translated with an Introduction by Reginald Snell
(New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965), p. 80.
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play.

The separate time and place of play, the particular social

groupings which grow up around it serve to underscore this point:
the world of play is separate from that of everyday reality.

Insofar

as freedom is identified with the world of play, and insofar as play
constitutes a world quite separate from everyday reality, then man's
freedom is made ineffectual and the everyday world is absolved to that
degree from the demand that it be made into a progressively freer
world.

-

Indeed, if one wanted to construct a world in which lip ser-

vice was paid to the ideas of freedom and personal creativity, and
yet in which at the same time such freedom and creativity could be
controlled in a very practical way in order to prevent them from disturbing the social order, then one could hardly come up with a better
idea than such a concept of play.
Another problematic aspect of play reveals itself when we consider this:

many of the specific games we play tend to reinforce

strongly the values of our own society.
of this.5

It may do this in two ways.

explicitly encouraged in the game:

Sport offers a prime example
First, these values may be

sportsmanship, honesty, competive-

ness, unquestioning acceptance of the rules, etc.

Second, undesirable

qualities may be relegated to the sphere of play, which then functions
as a safety-valve for certain emotions.
example of this:

Aggression would be a prime

one is supposed to let out one's aggressive ten-

dencies in sports in order to avoid letting them manifest themselves

5cf. Bero Rigauer, Sport und Arbeit. Soziologische Zusammenhaenge und ideologische Tmplikationen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Verlag, 1969).
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in the everyday world.6

This seems to take place where the appear-

ance of the unwanted emotion or trait is considered inevitable.

Yet

if this is to be the case, how then are we to understand the idea that
play must be done for no material interest or profit?

While the in-

dividual participating in the activity may not be directly motivated
by such material interest or profit, the society in which the games
take place clearly has a material interest in maintaining precisely
those games which do tend to reinforce the values which it already
holds and provide a safe outlet for undesirable emotions.

This gives

rise to a rather peculiar situation in which the individual's play,
perhaps without his or her knowledge, may be used for ulterior purposes.
Thus play does have a very definite social function which ineludes, but is not exhausted by, the following aspects:

giving the

individual a realm of freedom and creativity outside of the everyday
world, lessening the demands that the everyday world itself become
freer and more creative, and inculcating in the players the values
of the society in which they live, and providing a safe outlet for
the expression of unwanted emotions.
One of the things I find most problematic about this situation is that freedom tends to become meaningless.

Here I clearly pre-

suppose that the world of everyday experience is of primary importance

6cf. Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (New York:
1967), pp. 267 ff. for a suggestion of this nature.

Bantam Books,
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and that the innnediate task before man is the improvement of that
world.

Given these two premises, I would maintain that the freedom

which one discovers in the world of play is substantially a meaningless freedom for this reason:

it cannot change the world of every-

day experience, only temporarily suspend it.

This becomes increas-

ingly problematic as the amount of leisure time increases, for it
puts a peculiar burden on man:

not simply the burden of freedom, but

the burden of meaningless or impotent freedom.

Boredom arises, not

simply where there is an excess of free time, but where the conditions of the possibility of using that free time in a meaningful
manner are not present.
There is some evidence to suggest that the burden of increasing
leisure time has already become a source of problems.

The leisure

time which one encounters upon retirement is often threatening, even
to one's physical health.7

Long vacations, both for workers and

students, are often difficult to cope with for the freedom which they
present to the individual is a freedom which cannot change the world
of their everyday experience in many cases.
The direction in which our economy is moving indicates that we
are going to have an increasingly large amount of leisure time in the
future:

earlier retirement, longer vacations, shorter work weeks,

later entry into the work force.

7cf. Work in America.

In an increasingly technological

Report of a Special Task Force to the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, n.d.), pp. 77 ff.
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society, this movement seems inevitable for two reasons.

First, it

is simply impossible to keep the population busy producing as an everincreasing amount of goods can be produced for the same number of man
hours.

Second, it is necessary to give people more time to consume

these goods, especially as production is turned increasingly toward
luxury products.
consumer time.

In this regard, leisure time must be converted into
Insofar as this does happen, leisure is clearly put

in the service of consumption and such things as expensive vacations,
hobbies requiring elaborate equipment, etc., proliferate.
The final problematic aspect of the category of play to which
I want to call attention here concerns the relation between play and
needs.

At times play is distinguished from

wo~k

by suggesting that

work is done in order to fulfill needs while play is only possible
when one has gone beyond those needs.

This position has some inter-

esting implications, not the least of which is this:
ceived against a background of forced labor.

play is con-

While it is possible to

maintain that work is not forced by someone outside of the worker,
but rather stems from the necessity imposed by his own needs, this
distinction has little force within our own society.

Today it is in-

creasingly difficult to distinguish fundamental human needs (food,
shelter, and clothing) from second level needs, the satisfaction of
which has at times in our own society become as necessary as the satisfaction of fundamental human needs.

There is clearly a distinction

--the need for an automatic ice cube maker is not on the same level
as the need for a minimal amount of nutrition each day.

However, it

13
is not inconceivable that the day will come when the need for automatic ice cube makers will be felt by some to be as strong as their
need for nutrition.

While it is then possible to maintain that the

need for an automatic ice cube maker is a false need, one then introduces a distinction which is most difficult to maintain in light of
the way in which people actually perceive their own needs.
Not only is it difficult to distinguish between primary and
secondary needs, between true and false needs, but the problem is
further complicated by the fact that the satisfaction of one need is
usually a process which results in the creation of new needs.

In

this regard, Marx's thesis that "the creation of needs is the first
historical act 118 is quite relevant.

It suggests an interesting view

of work as becoming progressively freer insofar as it goes beyond
the givenness of fundamental needs and transforms needs themselves
into human creations.

In this case, the restrictions

which man

feels as stemming from his personal needs would in fact have their
foundation in man's social and economic situation.
Thus the concept of need is problematic in two respects.

First,

the distinction between a real and a false need is rather difficult to
draw and appears at best to be a relative one.

Second, most needs

are in a very real sense a human creation, in no way fixed or immutable in themselves but rather the product of human labor.

It

8 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche IdeoZogie in
Werke, Volume III (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1969), p. 28.
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seems possible that play takes place when human needs have been satisfied only if one adopts a very narrow and non-dialectical notion of
human needs, one which ignores the difficulties raised in the previous
two paragraphs.

Play is not beyond the realm of human needs.

It is

not at all unreasonable to suggest that we even have a need to play,
remembering that such a need can be a human creation.

Moreover, play

itself can create new needs by exploring new dimensions of human
activities which, when they are found satisfying, become an increasingly important and necessary part of human life.
to needs in a two-fold sense:

Thus play is related

we create a human need to play, and in

playing we create new needs.
Play, if it is to be understood fully, must be seen within
the context of its societal dimensions, one aspect of which is its
relation to needs.

To treat play apart from its network of societal

relations is to reify the phenomenon of play, to give it a false and
independent meaning which it does not possess in the situation.

As

one begins to see play within this larger context, it becomes evident
that, just as the contemporary situation is characterized by the ex-

.

perience of alienated labor, so too the notion of play that arises
out of this situation is one of alienated play.

More specifically,

we find in play precisely those elements of human activity which are
missing in alienated labor, but they are present in such a way that
they offer only an unreal, apparent satisfaction.

If the experience

of work is characterized by lack of freedom, then play is a preeminently free activity;

but the freedom one encounters in play is

15
powerless to change the real world of everyday experience,

If work

is always done for a purpose, play is done for its own sake, purposeless but meaningful;

but the created meaning of play is barred from

the everyday world precisely because it is only a game.

If work is

dorie under the pressure of needs, then play takes place in a realm
beyond those needs;

but play is both the product of such needs and,

in turn, helps produce new needs.

Yet it cannot be admitted that it

satisfies those needs fully, for that would then allow play to be on
equal footing with every other aspect of everyday reality.
If one were to state this problem in terms that Marx develops
in the economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844, it would be as
follows.

In alienated labor, man is separated from the product of

his labor, from the activity itself, from his species being, and from
his fellow men.

9

In aiienated play, man is not separated from what-

ever product his play may incidentally produce, but such products are
not given any real meaning or value in the everyday world because
they are only play.

If they do assume any much meaning or value,

then it is as commodities, in which case the product is then an alienated one.

In a similar way, the activity of play is a free one, but

this freedom is confined precisely to that which is unimportant, which
does not change the course of history or alter the everyday world.
While I do not find it particularly fruitful to approach this problem

9
cf. Karl Marx, "Okonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844),"
in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, Supplementary Volume, Part
One (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968), pp. 510-22.
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in terms of the concept of species-being, it could be argued that if
species-being involves active production in the objective world (it
involves much more than this in these manuscripts), then the activity
of play could allow such active production, but it would not be such
that it could enter into the objective world for the same reasons
given for the alienated character of the activity of playing.

Finally,

play does promote the rise of free associations among men, but again
these associations are restricted to the unreal world of play and do
not, properly speaking, involve themselves in the affairs of the everyday world except insofar as this is necessary to prepare for the game.
I hope that these remarks will give the reader some idea of
some of the problems and contradictions' which I find in the idea of
play and why I think that the generally accepted notion of play is
actually one of alienated play.

It has not been my purpose here to

offer in any sense a complete argument on this topic, but rather to
explore the questions themselves and to present the direction in which
I think the answers are to be found.

I suspect that, under what one

might call ideal conditions, work and play would merge into a single
activity.

Since there appears to be no innnediate danger that such

ideal conditions will force themselves on us on a general level in
the immediate future, it is perhaps in order to conclude with a few
words in defense of play.
The main thrust of my criticism in the previous pages has been
against an idea of play in which play is separate from the everyday
world, in which there is, at least on the conceptual level, little or
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no interaction between the play world and the non-play worlds.

While

there is considerable justification in the literature on play theory
for looking at play in this way, this position does not exhaust the
possibilities.

That it is, however, a position which I think is in-

adequate and with which I want to take exception should be abundantly
clear by this point.

An alternative approach to the problem of play

seems to offer much more promise:

by recognizing the continual dia-

lectical interaction between work and play, one can view play as the
leading edge of human activity, continually going beyond the givenness
of the situation in order to give it an openness, a wealth of possibilities, which it might not otherwise possess.

In this context, work

and play do not represent two different worlds, but rather two aspects
or directions of the same world, each of which would be substantially
diminished without the other.

Whereas play without work to concretize

it would be trivial freedom, work without play would be equally alienated, uncreative and forced.

Perhaps such a relationship would even-

tually lead to a situation in which the conditions of the possibility
of a true union- of work and play would arise.

CHAPTER II
PARADIGMATIC FORMS OF PLAY:
THE DIONYSIAN, APOLLINIAN, AND TRAGIC

Introduction
Although Nietzsche's main concern in The Birth of Tragedy and
the writings which form preliminary studies for it 1 was to mark out
the way "through the labyrinth, as we must call it, of the origin of

Greek tragedy, 112 the significance of these works is not limited to
this

topic

alone.

In a preface added in 1886, Nietzsche draws

attention to one of the main problems which. in retrospect, he saw

1of especial importance here is "Die dionysische Weltanschauung," part of which are incorporated word for word into The Birth of
Tragedy, and a revision of this same piece from June, 1870, "Die Geburt des tragischen Gedankens." These are to be found in Nietzsche
Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino
Montinari, Dritte Abteilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), pp. 43-69, 71-91.
Hereafter, all references to the Colli and Montinati edition
of Nietzsche's works will be given with the title of the individual
work (or an abbreviation of it) first, followed by the part number,
then the volume number within that part, and finally the page number.
Thus: "Die dionysische Weltanschauung," III/2, pp. 43-69. A full
list of abbreviations is to be found in the Appendix.

2Die Geburt der Tragodie, §7, III/l, p. 48 =The Birth of
Tragedy, in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, translated
by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 56.

Hereafter,

Die Geburt der TragBdie will be abbreviated as GT and its English
translation as BT.
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himself as confronting:
self,

3

the problematic character of science it-

Indeed, when The Birth of Tragedy is seen in retrospect,

4

many of the major themes of Nietzsche's later philosophy can be found
to be present, especially if one concentrates upon the symbolism of
the Apollinian and the Dionysian.

5

The investigation of the origins

of Greek tragedy becomes the occasion for an inquiry, not only into
the nature of tragedy itself, but also into fundamental questions
about the nature and function of art, and in particular about the
way in which art provides a means for confronting and going beyond
the primordial pain of existence.
In the course of his investigation Nietzsche develops, albeit
only implicitly at times, a notion of artistic activity as play.

In

so doing, he introduces a theme which recurs throughout his writings

3

GT, "Versuch einer Selbstkritik," 2; III/l, pp. 7 f.
"Attempt at a Self-Criticism," 2, pp. 18 f.

= BT,

4
For a collection of essays written without the benefit of
such retrospective distance, see Der Streit wn Nietzsches "Geburt
der Tragodie", edited by Karlfried Grunder (Hildesheim: Georg Olms
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1969). This contains reviews by E. Rohde, R.
Wagner, and U. v. Wilamowitz-Mollendorff.
5
Jean Granier, in Le probZeme de Za Verite dans Za phiZosophie
de Nietzsche (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p. 539, maintains
this thesis: "Nous allon montret, en effet, que toute l'ontologie
nietzscheenne se trouve deja envelopee dans le noyau symbolique qui
est l'ame de son premier ouvrage Za Naissance de Za Tragedie, et que
les progres speculatifs de Nietzsche n'ont fait que sanctionner
l'appropiation de la substance spirituelle qui etait deposee dans
la symbolisme de l'apollinien et du dionysien." Granier is concerned with showing that the comprehension of the duplicity of being
as the play of art and truth is at the heart of Nietzsche's view of
the world and that this comprehension is symbolized later in the
figure of Dionysus and explicated in the notion of the will to power.
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in a most elusive manner:

the category of play.

Present in some of

the most crucial passages he has written--indeed, as I shall show
below, at the heart of his description of human existence
world itself--the concept itself remains unanalyzed.

~rid

of the

The elusive-

ness of the category of play, not only in Nietzsche's writings but
also in itself,6 makes analysis and interpretation especially difficult.

The Birth of Tragedy and the related writings from this period
present a good example of this elusiveness.

The word "play" is used

infrequently in the final text, 7 but in "The Dionysian Worldview,"
an earlier formulation of the initial chapters of The Birth of Trag-

edy, it is a key concept for the understanding of both the Dionysian
and the Apollinian worldviews.

However, even where the word is used

frequently, an explicit analysis of its meaning is lacking.

6rn the section of her book dealing with the ontological definition of play, Ingeborg Heidemann has commented on the fundamental
ambivalence of the concept of play:
Die ontologische Ambivalenz bedeutet zunachst, daB das Spiel
sich einer eindeutigen Bestimmung entzieht • . • • Es scheint
etwas zu sein und nicht zu sein im selben Aspekt; es ist real
und es ist nicht real; es ist in der Welt und es ist nicht in
der Welt. Seine Seinsweise ist die eines Unbestimmt-Bestirrnnten.

Der Begriff des Spieles und das asthetische Weltbild in der Philosophie der Gegenwart (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), 10. The
ambivalence of the category of play in Nietzsche's philosophy will
be considered below.
7Exp 1 1c1t
. . use of the word "play" ("Spiel") in The Birth of

Tragedy itself is to be found only in Chapters 23, 24, and 25. At
times, "Spiel" is translated as "game" in the Kaufmann translation.
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In this chapter, I shall elucidate the meaning of the category of
play and show the way in which this category is central to Nietzsche's
understanding of artistic activity and of existence itself insofar as
these questions are considered in The Birth of Tragedy and the related
writings.

In particular, it will be shown that there are five dis-

tinct senses in which the word "play" is used in these writings: (1)
dreaming as a way of playing with the real, (2) the artistic activity
of playing with the dream, (3) intoxication as nature playing with
the person, (4) the artistic activity of playing with intoxication,
and (5) the interplay of the Dionysian and Apollinian forces in the
world as constitutive of tragedy.

The first two senses of play are

Dionysian, and the second two are Apollinian.
These paradigms are significant, not only in that they show that
the category of play was present in Nietzsche's thought even at this
early date, but also because they offer a way of distinguishing
among the various meanings of play, distinctions which become rather
blurred in his later works.

In addition to this, a consideration of

Nietzsche's category of play in relation to his view of the Greek
state gives us an insight into a fundamental problem in Nietzsche's
philosophy:

the relationship between play and work, creativity and

need, freedom and slavery.

In this regard, I shall show that the

category of play is central to the three main categories (the Appollinian, the Dionysian, and the tragic) in terms of which Nietzsche
understands existence, and that this category of play is conceived
against a background of work as slavery.

As a result of this
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dichotomy between creative play and work as slavery, the category of
play in Nietzsche's early writings is, as will be shown

below~

fun-

damentally one of alienated play.

ApoZZinian and Dionysian PZay
In "The Dionysian Worldview" Nietzsche distinguishes between
the Apollinian and the Dionysian by presenting them as two different
types of play.

The art of the Apollinian artist, the creator, is

playing with the dream, and the dream itself is to be understood as
the game or play of the individual man with the real.

8

The creativity

of the Dionysian artist, on the other hand, is to be found in playing
with intoxication, intoxication itself being a game which nature
plays with man.

9

Thus there is a double sense of play within both

the Apollinian and the Dionysian.

This can be represented schem-

atically as follows.

irronediate manifestation

artistic form

Dionysian

intoxication: the game that
nature plays with man

playing with intoxication

ApoZZinian

the dream: the game that
the individual man plays
with the real

playing with the real

811

Die dionysische Weltanschauung," l; III/2, p. 46. "Wahrend
also der Traum das Spiel des einzelnen Menschen mit dem Wirklichen
ist, ist die Kunst des Bildners (im weiteren Sinne) das SpieZ mit dem

Trawn."
9Ibid., p. 47.

"Wenn nun der Rausch das Spiel der Natur mit
dem Menschen ist, so ist das Schaffen des dionysischen Kilnstlers das
Spiel mit dem Rausche." Cf. "Die Geburt des tragischen Gedankens,"
ibid., p. 74: "Die dionysische Kunst dagegen beruht auf dem Spiel mit
dem Rausche, mit der Verzilchung."
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The four basic senses of play follow from this.

The Apollinian artist

plays with the dream, and the dream itself is a way of playing with
the real;

the Dionysian artist plays with intoxication, but the in-

toxication is nature playing with him.
Central to this distinction is the idea of the player.

In

both the Apollinian and Dionysian forms of play, the player has more
control of the game in its artistic form.

Moreover, the Apollinian

player is more clearly in control of the game that he plays than is
the Dionysian player.

Indeed, the difference seems to be fundamental,

for in the Dionysian experience, "the man is no longer artist, he has
become the work of art, 1110 for the artistic power of nature itself is
manifesting itself in the Dionysian artist.

"This man, shaped by the

artist Dionysus, is related to nature as the statue is to the Appollinian artist. 11 11

In this sense, it is more accurate to say that the

Dionysian artist, rather than playing with nature, is played with by
nature.

While both the Apollinian and the Dionysian stem from nature,

their relation to nature differs:
being passive.

the former being active, the latter

However, even this formulation is somewhat misleading

in regard to the status of the Dionysian artist.

Nietzsche likens

l0 11 Die dionysische Weltanschauung," l; III/2, p. 47 = GT, l;
III/l, p. 26 =BT, 1, p. 37: "Der Mensch ist nicht mehr Kilnstler,
er ist Kunstwerk geworden."
1111 Die dionysische Weltanschauung," l; III/2, p. 47: "Dieser
vom Kilnstler geformte Mensch verhalt sich zur Natur, wie die Statue
zum apollinischen Kilnstler."
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his position to that of a person who is dreaming and yet realizes
that he is dreaming:

" • • • so must the disciple of Dionysus be

intoxicated and at the same time lurk behind himself as an observer. 11 12
If this description does not entirely clarify the position of the Dionysian artist, it at least shows the ambiguity of his position and
the need for clarification.

This same ambiguity occurs in Nietzsche's

description of the child playing and in his notion of the self and
constitutes a fundamental tension at the heart of his category of
play and his idea of man.
The ambiguity one encounters in the notion of the Dionysian
player goes beyond its specifically Dionysian character.

It is

rooted in the very nature of being a player, in the ambivalent role
the player has.

Jiirgen Moltmann has described this well.

The creative playing of men is always a playing with something which, in turn, plays with the player. Man plays with the
waves of the ocean and they play with him. He plays with colors,
sounds, and words and also becomes their playmate. He speaks and
responds, is active and passive, giving and receiving at once.
Playing he is neither master nor servant. This is true not only
for games in life but also for the game of life. 13
The difficulties encountered in determining the precise relationship
between the Apollinian or Dionysian player and that with which he
plays stem in part from the fundamental ambivalence of the relation

12Ibid. : "So muB der Dionysosdiener irn Rausche sein und zugleich hinter sich als Beobachter auf der Lauer liegen."
13Jiirgen M6ltmann, Theology of Play, translated by Reinhard
Ultich (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 24.
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which exists between player and plaything:

to be a player involves

being a plaything at the same time.

The Function of Art
Before turning to a more detailed consideration of Dionysian
and Apollinian play, it is necessary to see clearly why they came
into existence.

The background, against which both the Apollinian

and the Dionysian are set in The Birth of Tragedy, is the folk wisdom
of Silenus, the companion of Dionysus.
man's greatest good is, he replied:
beyond your reach:

Asked by King Midas what

"What is best of all is utterly

not to be born, not to be, to be nothing.

the second best for you is--to die soon. 111 4

But

Existence itself is

characterized by horror and terror, by the primordial pain which
gives rise to individuation.

Silenus's wisdom gives this aspect of

existence its highest expression.

In order to be able to live at

all, in order to overcome the terror and pain of existence at least
to a limited degree, the Greeks created their gods and their art.
Art makes life possible by seducing man to live on through illusion.
In this sense, art is a game, a form of playing, which makes it
possible to live on despite the fundamental pain and terror of existence.

14 GT, 3; III/l, p. 31 =BT, 3, p. 42: "Das Allerbeste ist
fiir dich ganzlich unerreichbar: nicht geboren zu sein, nicht zu
sein, nichts zu sein. Das Zweitbeste aber ist flir dich--bald zu
sterben." Also see, "Die dionysische Weltanschauung," 2; III/2,
p. 52.
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There are two fundamentally different ways in which the game
of art can be played out:

the Dionysian and the Apollinian ways.

Both involve the creation of illusion:

the Dionysian illusion is

that of oneness with all of nature and man, while the Apollinian
illusion creates individuation, proportion, harmony in measure and
balance.

Apollinian art covers up the primordial pain of existence,

but that pain remains in the background.

Dionysian art covers up

the individual, but he continues to lurk behind himself.
The basic premise, upon which Nietzsche's view of existence
is founded in these writings, is that existence is at its very heart
contradictory, a primordial pain.

The concept of play is presented

as a way of coming to grips with this primordial contradiction and
pain.

The question which must now be considered is this:

in what

way, and to what degree, does each of these types of play succeed in
overcoming this primordial pain and contradiction?

The meaningful-

ness and validity of the category of play within Nietzsche's early
philosophy depend upon the degree to which it can effectively deal
with this challenge.

In the following sections, it will be shown

to what extent both Apollinian and Dionysian play are caparable of
this and the degree to which it is possible at all within Nietzsche's
early framework.

Dionysian Play
It is necessary, at this point, to make two distinctions in
relation to the notion of the Dionysian in order to clarify the various sense in which Nietzsche uses this word.

First, the Dionysian
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may be considered as either a power of nature or as art;

in both

senses it may be called play, but in the latter case in a double
sense.

As a power of nature, the Dionysian is nature playing with

man in intoxication.

Dionysian art is playing with this intoxica-

tion, that is, playing with the game which nature is playing with
man.

Second, the Diony8ian may appear either in its pure form (of

which the titanic-barbaric may be taken as an example) or in a mediated form, in which case the Dionysian exists in relation to the Apollinian (usually in a struggle against it, but in the case of Attic
tragedy in union with it).

Although there is a conunon element which

unifies these pairs, the differences are significant enough to change
the understanding of play in each instance.
The Dionysian as a natural force manifests itself "either
under the influence of the narcotic draught

or with the potent

coming of spring that penetrates all nature with joy. 11 15

The Bacchic

choruses of the Greeks and the dancers of St. John and St. Vitus are
examples of the Dionysian manifesting itself as a natural force.
They are characterized by the dissolution of everything subjective,
a total eclipse of the self, an overcoming of the principle of individuation which leads to a becoming one, not only with one's fellow
men, but also with nature.

In such instances, the Dionysian arises

15 GT, l; III/l, pp. 24-25 =BT, 1, p. 36: "Entweder <lurch
den Einfluss des narkotischen Getrankes . • . oder bei dem gewaltigen,
die ganze Natur lustvoll durchdringenden Nahen des Friihlings . • . "
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out of nature itself without the mediation of the artist.

It is a

"kllnstlerische" force, 16 force, not in the technical sense of an
"artistic" force, but in the wider sense of a formative force of
nature.

By calling the Dionysian a "natural force" and contrasting

it to "art," I do not wish to deny the formative character of this
force, but am rather reserving the term "art" to those instances
where the mediation of the artist is a significant factor.
In addition to the feeling of intoxication which leads to
self-oblivion and a oneness with other men and nature, the Dionysian
consciousness is also characterized by doubts which arise about the
rational character of expel'ience, both in regard to its validity
and in regard to its value.
doubt.

There are two major aspects to this

First, the principles of causation and sufficient reason

appear to admit of exceptions, and one consequently feels a certain
awe--a mixture of attraction and repulsion--at the unfolding of a
new world, a world no longer completely bound down by the categories
of reason.

Second, this consciousness involves a feeling of glorious

transport which stems from the shattering of the principle of individuation.17

The two are related:

the principle of sufficient

16GT, 2; III/l, p. 26 = BT, 2, p. 38. It should be noted
that both the Apollinian and the Dionysian are regarded as "kunstlerische Machte," but I am concerned here only with the Dionysian.
17

GT, I; III/l, p. 24 =BT, I, p. 36. Although Nietzsche
takes Schopenhauer's position as a starting-point here, he is clearly
presenting his own position as such on the Dionysian.
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allows the world of appearances to be ordered in a causal manner,
thus establishing individual entities as separate from each other;
the principle of causation allows the flux of existence to be stabilized in order to create independent entities.

Once they begin to

admit of exceptions, the experienced world is so radically transformed that it is, quite literally, a new world which unfolds in the
Dionysian consciousness.
The Dionysian experience has another side to it which has not
been considered yet.

Aspects of this side include horribleness,

ugliness, pain, cruelty, destructiveness and sensuality.

There are

two ways in which these characteristics can be attributed to the
Dionysian.

First, when one takes a standpoint outside of the Dio-

nysian framework (for example, the Apollinian standpoint), these
characteristics almost follow by definition..

If the principle of

individuation is central to one's vision of the world, the shattering
of that principle will be a cause of suffering.

If harmony and bal-

ance are the measure of beauty, then the primordial oneness and flux
of existence, which the Dionysian seeks to uncover or create, will
be considered ugly and horrible because they negate that harmony.
All of these aspects of the Dionysian experience will be considered,
at least in an implicit sense, to be destructive insofar as one
looks at them from a non-Dionysian standpoint, since they are the
negation of such standpoints.
There is a second way in which these qualities become an
issue.

Nietzsche distinguishes between the barbaric and the Greek
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forms of the Dionysian.

The former is characterized by a complete

sexual promiscuity which overrides tribal law and by the unleashing
of "the most savage natural instincts . . • including even that horrible mixture of sensuality and cruelty which has always seemed to
me to be the real 'witches' brew'. 1118

This kind of sensuality and

cruelty is overcome in the Greek manifestation of the Dionysian,
for its exposure to the Apollinian influence transforms and tames
it.

The Greeks created the Apollinian vision in order to survive,

and for the Dionysian to survive in its struggle with the Apollinian
it had to transform itself.

It changes from intoxication as the game

that nature plays with man into man's playing with intoxication.
When this happens, there is a fundamental change in the role of the
player:

while in the barbaric Dionysian the player seems to be com-

pletely the plaything of nature. in the Greek Dionvsian the player
assumes a more ambiguous role, simultaneously throwing himself into
the game and yet with a part of himself lurking behind, observing.
Two factors are at play here in the transformation of the
Dionysian from its barbaric form into the Hellenic one.

First,

there is the external threat of the Apollinian, which threatens to
completely overcome the Dionysian.
force which is at work here:

Second, there is an internal

the barbaric Dionysian consciousness,

18GT, 2; III/l, p. 28 =BT, 2, p. 39: " • . • gerade die
wildesten Bestien der Natur wurden hier entfesselt, bis zu Jener
abscheulichen Mischung von Wollust und Grausamkeit, die mir immer
als der eigentliche 'Hexentrank' erschienen ist."
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left to itself, is completely self-destructive.

For it to exist in

its pure form would lead, eventually, to its own negation;
to maintain itself, it has to go beyond itself.

in order

The interplay of

these two factors, the Greek need to create the Apollinian in order
to survive and the internal contradiction of the Dionysian that leads
to its own destruction, leads to the transformation of the barbaric
Dionysian into its Greek, artistic form.
This transfigured form of the Dionysian is usually encountered
in Greek culture in the form of the Dionysian artist, the one who
plays with intoxication rather than the one who lets it completely
overcome him.

The portrait of Archilochus in The Birth of Tragedy

gives a clear picture of Nietzsche's conception of the Dionysian
artist in Pre-Socratic times. 19

The definition of the Dionysian

genius, given from the notebooks of this period, is parallel to the
published formulations, but somewhat more precise.

The Dionysian

genius is, " . • • the man who, in complete self-oblivion, has become
one with the primordial ground of the world, who now creates out of
the primordial pain the reflection of it for his redemption • . • 11 20

19cf. GT, 5-6; III/l, pp. 38-48 ~= BT, 5-6, pp. 48-56.
20This passage is to be found in the posthumously published ·
notebooks from the time of GT in Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der
Trag8die. Der griechische Staat, Kroners Taschenausgabe Band 70,
mit einem Nachwort von Alfred Baeumler (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner
Verlag, 1964), pp. 206-07.
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It is in the creation of a reflection of this primordial pain that
distance is to be achieved and, with that distance, the possibility
of delivering oneself up from the experience, redeeming oneself.
The Dionysian artist, in contrast to the Apollinian, is characterized
by this forgetting of self:

he gives himself over completely to

the fundamental contradictions in existence, in order thereby to
give expression to them.

He himself becomes a mirror.

Moreover, the

nature of that which he is reflecting leads to a preference in regard
to the way in which he communicates this vision:

not in the analytic

fashion to which language almost inevitably leads, but rather in
lyric poetry and music.
Music is an especially appropriate mode of expression for the
Dionysian artist because it is the language of the will, "an immediate copy of the will .itself. 1121

As such, it gives a meaningful-

ness to comparisons which could not otherwise be achieved.

While

it is certainly the case that music is not in each and every case
22 ·
·
·
· is
· a d istinctive
· ·
·
necessari· 1y D.ionysian,
it remains
c 1 ear t h at music

21

GT, 16; III/l, p. 100 = BT, 16, p. 100:
Abbild des Willens selbs t
"

"

• • unmi ttelbar

22

Arthur Danto has suggested this in his Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 50: " • . • music,
after all, originally had Apollo as its patron diety; and Nietzsche
recognized a kind of Apollinian music--'a rhythm of waves beating
the shore, a plastic art'." (The quotation is from GT, 2; III/l,
p. 29 = BT, 2, p. 40.) Mozart's description of a musical experience,
in which he could hear an entire work at one time rather than in a
succession of moments, seems much closer to an Apollinian experience
of music than a Dionysian one. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom
Grund (Pfullingen: Verlag Gunter Neske, 1957), pp. 177 ff., for the
quotation of Mozart's letter and Heidegger's interpretation of it.
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mode of expression for Nietzsche.

It is not susceptible to categor-

ization and manipulation in the same way that language is.

More-

over, in the phenomenon of musical dissonance one encounters the
best mirror of the ugliness and pain of existence.

In discussing

the way in which existence and the world are justified only as an
aesthetic phenomenon, as a game which the will plays with itself,
Nietzsche argues:
In this sense, it is precisely the tragic myth that has to convince us that even the ugly and disharmonic are part of the artistic game which the will in the eternal amplitude of its
pleasure plays with itself. But this primordial phenomenon of
Dionysian art is difficult to grasp, and there is only one direct
way to make it intelligible and grasp it immediately: through the
wonderful significance of musical dissonance. 2 3
It is to this experience that the Dionysian artist brings the listener:

the joyful realization that existence in its totality, even

its ugliness and disharmony, is but a game or a play which the will
plays with itself.

It is through his play that he leads his audi-

ence and fellow participants to the basic play of forces which constitutes existence and through it he justifies this play by his ereative act of joyful affirmation.
Yet how adequate is this justification?
lematic in at least two ways.

It seems to be prob-

First, the Dionysian state of this

23 GT, 24; III/l, p. 148 =BT, 24, p. 141: " . . . in welchem
Sinne uns gerade der tragische Mythus zu ilberzeugen hat, dass selbst
das Hassliche und Disharmonische ein kilnstlerisches Spiel ist, welches
der Wille, in der ewigen Fillle seiner Lust, mit sich selbst spielt.
Dieses schwer zu fassende Urphanomen der dionysische
unst w1
aber auf direktem Wege einzig verstandlich und un · t~~!~r1;:~
in der wunderbaren Bedeutung der musikaZischen Di s~nz . . . "
~
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intoxication is almost by definition a transitory state.

This trans-

itory quality becomes apparent in Nietzsche's description of Dionysian rapture.
For the rapture of the Dionysian state with its annihilation of
the ordinary bounds and limits of existence contains, while it
lasts, a letha.rgic element in which all personal experiences of
the past become innnersed. This chasm of oblivion separates the
worlds of everyday reality and of Dionysian reality. But as
soon as this everyday reality re-enters consciousness, it is
experienced as such, with nausea: ~n ascetic, will-negating
mood is the fruit of these states. 2
Insofar as the Dionysian is necessarily a transitory state, it is impossible for Dionysian play to provide an adequate answer to the
challenge posed by the primordial contradiction of existence.

While

this type of play can offer a few moments of respite, it is in itself
inadequate.

Dionysian play will always be bounded by the world of

everyday reality;

while it is capable of suspending that reality,

it can never finally eliminate it.
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GT, 7; III/l, p. 52 = BT, 7, pp. 59-60. "Die Verzlickung
des dionysischen Zustandes mit seiner Vernichtung der gewohnlichen
Schranken und Grenzen des Daseins enthalt namlich wahrend seiner
Dauer ein letha.rgisches Element, in das sich alles personlich in der
Vergangenheit Erlebte eintaucht. So scheidet sich durch diese Kluft
der Vergessenheit die Welt der alltaglichen und der dionysischen
Wirklichkeit von einander ab. Sobald aber jene alltagliche Wirklichkeit wieder ins Bewusstsein tritt, wird sie mit Ekel als solche
empfunden; eine asketische, willenverneinde Stimmung ist die Frucht
jener Zustande." Hans M. Wolff, in his Friedrich Nietzsche. Der
Weg zwn Nichts (Bern: Franke Verlag, 1956), p. 51, argues on the
basis of this passage that it is no longer possible to speak of Dionysian life or Dionysian humanity, " • . . denn da sich die Ekstase
als zeitlich beschrankt erweist, kann nur noch von 'dionysischen
Zustanden' die Rede sein, denen der Zustand der Ernlichterung als der
Normalzustand gegenlibersteht."
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The second problematic aspect of Dionysian play is based on
this:

the truth which it uncovers is unbearable.

In the paragraph

following the one quoted above, Nietzsche develops this theme with
great power.
In this sense, the Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both
have once looked truly into the essence of things, they have
gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action; for their action
could not change anything in the eternal nature of things; they
feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that they should be
asked to set right a world that is out of joint. Knowledge
kills action; action requires the veils of illusion . . • true
knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any
motive for action, both in Hamlet and in the Dionysian man. 25
This, then, is the second factor which prevents Dionysian play from
being an adequate answer in itself to the challenge posed by the primordial contradiction of existence.

Truth is horrible, and the know-

ledge gained through the Dionysian experience kills action.

The

questioning of the value of knowledge is a theme which is found, not
only in The Birth of Tragedy, but also in Nietzsche's notebooks from
this period.26

It is quite clear that knowledge of the fundamental

25GT, 7; III/l, pp. 52-53 = BT, 7, p. 60. "In dies em Sinne
hat der dionysische Mensch Aehnlichkeit mit Hamlet: beide haben
einmal einen wahren Blick in das Wesen der Dinge gethan, sie haben
erkannt, und es ekelt sie zu handeln; denn ihre Handlung kann nichts
am ewigen Wesen der Dinge andern, sie empfinden es als lacherlich
oder schmachvoll, class ihnen zugemuthet wird, die Welt, die aus den
Fugen ist, wieder einzurichten. Die Erkenntniss todtet das Handeln,
zum Handeln gehort das Umschleiertsein durch die Illusion • • • die
wahre Erkenntniss, der Einblick in die grauenhafte Wahrheit tiberwiegt jedes zum Handeln antreibende Motiv, bei Hamlet sowohl als bei
dem dionysischen Menschen."
26cf. Karl Schlechta and Anni Anders,

Friedrich Nietzsche.
Von den vorborgenen Anfangen seines PhiZosophierens (Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1962), esp. pp. 99-117.
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essence of things is unbearable;

indeed, the goal of knowledge seems

to be the destruction of the world. 27
These two factors, the transitory character of the Dionysian
state and the unbearable quality of the truth which it uncovers, apply
clearly to the Dionysian as such, but Nietzsche does not seem to find
them applicable to Dionysian art in the passages cited above.

When

the Hellene has seen the horrible truth of existence, "art saves him,
and through art--life. 11 28

Art has a healing function, transforming

the nauseating thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence
into notions that one can live with:
. • • these are the sublime as the artistic taming of the horrible, and the comic as the artistic discharge of the nausea of
absurdity. The satyr chorus of the dithyramb is the saving
deed of Greek art; faced with the intermediary world of these
Dionysian companions, the feelings described here exhausted
themselves.29
.

27This view is developed, for example, in the forward to an
unwritten book on the pathos of truth, "Filnf Vorreden. Ueber das
Pathos der Wahrheit," III/2, p. 254: "Die Kunst ist machtiger als
die ErkenntniB, denn sie will das Leben, und jene erreicht als
letztes Ziel nur--die Vernichtung.--" Also see Friedrich Nietzsche,
Nachgelassene Werke aus den Jahren 1869-1872, in Nietzsche's Werke,
Volume IX (Leipzig: Neumann, 1903), p. 72: "Der Zweck der Wissenschaft ist Weltvernichtung."
28 GT. 7; III/l. o. 52 =BT. 7. o. 59: "Ihn rettet die Kunst.
und durch die Kunst rettet ihn sich--das Leben."
29GT. 7: III/l. o. 53 =BT. 7. o. 60. " • . . diese sind das
Erhabene als die kilnstlerische Bandigung des Entsetzlichen und das
Komische als die kilnstlerische Entladung vom Ekel des Absurden. Der
Satyrchor des Dithyrambus ist die rettende That der griechischen
Kunst; an der Mittelwelt dieser dionysischen Begleiter erschopften
sich jene vorhin beschreiben Anwandlungen."
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The transitory character of the Dionysian is overcome to some degree
in Dionysian art in this respect:

by exhausting the feelings which

are aroused in the Dionysian experience, Dionysian art extends its
effect temporally until that point where those feelings begin to
build up again.

Yet, even given this qualification, it seems that

Dionysian art remains temporally limited.

It can suspend time in

the everyday world, but it cannot completely overcome it.
Dionysian art also makes the previously unbearable thoughts
of the Dionysian experience into something bearable by justifying
existence as an aesthetic experience, as a game the will plays with
itself.

Here the sense of self-oblivion characteristic of Dionysian

play seems most important:

the joyful affirmation of existence in

its contradiction and pain is only possible when one completely
forgets oneself.

But this self-oblivion is also bv its very structure

temporallv limited:

it can be extended for a while. but it seems im-

oossible to live for a long period of time in this state.
The Dionysian is, then, a particular type of play characterized by intoxication which leads to self-oblivion, an overcoming of
the principle of individuation, a denial of the rational character
of existence, and a creation of unity between man and man as well as
between man and nature.

In its initial form it is characterized by

cruelty and destructiveness which is transformed into a joyful affirmation by Dionysian art.

Yet as a type of play the Dionysian re-

tains certain limitations, especially a temporal finitude which
prevents it from completely overcoming the challenge posed to it
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by the pain and contradiction of primordial existence.

Indeed, it is

precisely this kind of temporal limitation which is fundamentally
characteristic of play:

it can suspend the time and meaning of the

world out of which it springs, but it is not its purpose to change
that world in any but this temporary sense.

The Dionysian play,

whether in its original form or its artistic form, remains fundamentally play;

insofar as this is the case, it can meet the chal-

lenge posed by the primordial contradiction of existence only in a
temporary way.

Apo ZZinian Play
If Dionysian play gives itself over to intoxication and selfoblivion, there remains another way of dealing with the abyss which
the primordial pain leaves gaping in front of man.
another world, a safer, more clearly

define~

This is to create

and predictable one.

Such a world is necessary if man is to survive. 30

The barbaric form

of Dionysian play, because it leads eventually to the destruction of
life, must be overcome.

A veil of illusion must be drawn across the

horrors of existence revealed by the Dionysian experience.

For the

Greeks, it was a veil composed of the Olympian world of the gods,
the Apollinian sense of beauty, Homeric epic, and later Greek philosophy itself.

But even more fundamental than these

is

the pre-

artistic manifestation of the Apollinian: the dream.

-- ·-------30GT, 3; III/l, p. 32 =BT, 3, p. 42. "Um leben zu konnen,
mussten die Griechen diese Gotter, aus tiefster Nothigung, schaffen.
. • • So rechtfertigen die Gotter das Menschenleben, indem sie es
selbst leben . • . "
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The dream, and the entire Apollinian world, spring forth from
the need for illusion, which itself is felt to be rooted in the very
nature of primordial reality for Nietzsche.
For the more clearly I perceive in nature those omnipotent art
impulses, and in them an ardent longing for illusion, the more
I feel myself impelled to the metaphysical assumption that the
truly existent primal unity, eternally suffering and contradictory, also needs the rapturous vision, the pleasurable illusion. for its continuous redemption.31
In this sense. the creation of illusion. the plaving with the real in
images. which characterizes the Aoollinian consciousness. is felt to
be rooted in the ground of being itself.32
redemption through i.llusion.

All existence cries for

The dream, a natural manifestation of

this urge in human existence, is but an aspect of the larger process
of existence seeking to redeem itself.
In dreams a certain sense of form and measure comes to the

31GT, 4; III/l, p. 34 = BT, 4, pp. 44-45. "Je mehr ich namlich in der Natur jene allgewaltigen Kunsttriebe und in ihnen eine
inbrlinstige Sehnsucht zum Schein, zum Erlostwerden <lurch den Schein
gewahr werde, um so mehr flihle ich mich zu der metaphysischen Annahme gedrangt, dass das Wahrhaft-Seiende und Ur-Eine, als das ewig
Leidende und Widerspruchsvolle, zugleich die entzilckende Vision, den
lustvollen Schein, zu seiner steten Erlosung braucht • • • "
32While Nietzsche mentions here that this is a feeling, it
should be noted that the entirety of The Birth of Tragedy is characterized by a certain absence of argumentation in regard to its
basic position. Eugen Fink is fundamentally correct when he maintains the following:
Wie eine ein?.ige. groBartig in sich geschlossene Vision tritt
uns Nietzsches Kunst-Metaohvsik Qleich zu BeQinn des Buches
entgegen. in den Grundzligen fertig: es gibt hier keinen Versuch,
den Weg zu zeigen, wie er zu seinen Thesen kam; nirgends wird
liberhaupt reflektiert ilber Recht oder Unrecht der tragenden
ontologischen Konzeption.
Nietzsches Philosophie(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960), p. 24.

\
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fore.

In them, "we delight in the immediate understanding of figures;

all forms speak to us;

there is nothing unimportant or superfluous~33

Indeed, the dream is not a mirror image of the primordial contradiction, but a transfiguration of that contradiction.

This is the es-

sence of the Apollinian play with the real on the level of nature:
the transformative redemption of the primordial contradiction of existence through the creation of illusion in dreams.
This transformation is, however, never quite complete, for
there is always the lingering realization that it is a transformation, that something else lurks behind it--in short, that it is an
illusion.

Thus, "even when this dream reality is most intense, we

still have, glinunering through it, the sensation that it is mePe

appeCU'ance.

While it belongs to the very essence of the primordial

contradiction to create these illusions, the illusions themselves
have only that reality proper to appearance.

They are the attempt

of existence to redeem itself in the transformative play of images.
If the Apollinian as a natural force manifesting itself in
dreams is the game which individual men play with the real by the
creation of an alternate world of appearance, Apollinian aPt is

33cT, l; III/l, p. 34. "Wir geniessen im unmittelbaren Verstandnisse der Gestalt, alle Formen sprechen zu uns, es giebt nichts
Gleicngilltiges und Unnothiges."
34 cT, l; III/l, p. 22 =BT, 1, p. 34. "Bei dem hochsten
Leben dieser Traumwirklichkeit haben wir <loch noch die durchschimmernde Empfindung ihres Scheins . . • "
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playing with these dreams:
scious of itself.

the creating of illusion becoming con-

With this, certain rules make their appearance:

harmony, measure, balance and stability beomce most important.

These

arise out of the need to resolve the contradictoriness of primordial
existence and thereby to redeem it, to justify it.

This is not done

by actually changing the ground of being, but rather by giving it
its "complement and consunnnation. 11 35

Insofar as being comes to mean

stability. insofar as it is taken as the opposite of becoming, this
world of appearance finally is taken to be the world of being, while
the primordial oneness and its contradictions become the world of
becoming, of continual change.
The play of the Apollinian artist is not an arbitrary activity,
but rather the extension of nature's own drive toward the creation of
illusion.
If, for the moment, we do not consider the question of our own
'reality,' if we con~eive of our empirical existence, and that
of the world in general, as a continually manifested representation of the primal unity, we shall then have to look upon the
dream as an appearance of an appearance, hence as a still higher
appeasement of the primordial desire for mere appearance. And
that is why the innermost heart of nature feels that ineffable
joy in the naive artist and the naive work of art, which is
likewise only 'mere appearanc~ of mere appearance. r36

35 GT, 3; III/l, p. 32

BT, 3, p. 42.

36GT, 4; III/l, p. 35
BT, 4, p. 45. "Sehen wir also einmal
van unsrer eignen 'Realitat' flir einen Augenblick ab, fassen wir
unser empirisches Dasein, wie das der Welt i.iberhaupt, als eine in
jedem Moment erzeugte Vorstellung des Ur-Einen, so muss uns jetzt der
Traum als der Schein des Scheins, somit als eine noch hohere Befriedigung der Urbegierde nach dem Schein hin gelten. Aus diesem selben
Grunde hat der innerste Kern der Natur jene unbeschreibliche Lust an
dem naiven Klinstler und dem naiven Kunstwerke, das gleichfalls nur
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In this sense Apollinian art represents the consummation of the drive
of existence to redeem itself.
Just as the primitive Dionysian consciousness and Dionysian
art have their limitations, so do the natural Apollinian experience
and Apollinian art.

Dreaming, as playing with reality by trans-

forming it into images, again does not fundamentally change primordial reality or its contradictoriness and pain.
illusion, but it remains just that:

It can create an

an illusion.

This is doubly

true for Apollinian art, which is the appearance of an appearance.
It is still the case, however, that Apollinian consciousness and
Apollinian art are not as temporally limited as their Dionysian
counterparts.

The Apollinian, in fact, appears to pervade much of

what one would call "everyday reality."

Its emphasis on harmony.

measure and proportion contributes to its more permanent character.
There is, however, a more severe limitation upon the Apollinian:

the constant threat stemming from the Dionysian.

This,

perhaps more than any other factor, prevents the Apollinian illusion from ultimately being taken as ,all of reality.

In a similar

manner, the Apollinian stands as a constant threat to the Dionvsian, for the Aoollinian appears to be rooted in a fundamental
longinQ of existence to redeem itself through illusion.

1

Schein des Scheins' is t."
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The Contrast Between the Dionusian and the Avollinian
Both the Anollinian and the D1onysian are types of play
rooted in the nature of primordial existence. in its contradictory
character.

While they exist in a hostile relationship toward each

other. it is clear that they need one another.37

Nevertheless. they

differ radically in a number of respects, the P.lucidation of which
points to the ambivalent role of the concept of play in Nietzsche's
thinking about the Greeks.
Whereas Apollinian art leads to a strengthening of the principle of individuation, 38 the Dionysian intoxication brings about a
reconciliation of man with his fellow man and with nature itself,
thereby bringing about the neg0tion of the principle of individuation.39

In the first case, existence is a game needing its comple-

tion in illusion in an alternate world.

In order to fulfill this

need, the Apollinian artist must in effect live in two worlds: the

37rhe basic interdependence of the Dionysian and the Apollinian is described quite well by Eugen Fink as follows:
• • • sie [the Apollinian and the Dionysian] konnen nicht ohne
einander sein; ihr Streit, ihre Zwietracht ist auch eine gewisse Eintracht, sie sind als die Kampfenden verbunden; die
apollinische Kunstwelt der Griechen, die Entscheidung flir das
MaB und seine Fligun,g, beruht auf dem innner lebendigen, nur
unterdrlickten Grunde titanischer MaBlosigkeit; das Dionysische
ist der Untergrund, auf dem die lichte Welt aufruht . . .
Nietzsches Philosophie. pp. 24-25.
39GT, 4; III/l, p. 35 = BT, 4, p. 45. "Apollo aber tri tt uns
wiederum als die Vergottlichung des principii individuationis entgegen, in dem allein das ewig erreichte Ziel des Ur-Einen, seine
Erlosung <lurch den Schein, sich vollzieht . . . "
4oGT, l; III/l, p. 25 =BT, 1, p. 37;
BT, 2, p. 40.

GT, 2; III/l, p. 28 =
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one of appearances which he creates and, insofar as he creates this
world and thus stands outside of it as creator, another, darker world,
closer to the primordial pain of existence.

The Apollinian artist

alienated himself from this latter world through his creation of illusion. and it is this alienation which allows for the appearance of
the individual--indeed, necessitates it.

In order to complete ex-

istence. he must seperate himself from it.

The Dionysian seeks to

overcome such alienation, to become one with nature and other men,
but it is for precisely this reason that the Dionysian poses a threat
to culture;

such a reconc1liation would destroy its very foundation.

A completely unalienated individual becomes a contradiction in terms;
he would be so completely one with existence that he would cease to
be an individual.
A parallel tension arises between the respective media of expression for the Apollinian and the Dionysian artists.

The plastic

arts, the image, offer the possibility of clear definition, strong
lines, ba}ance, while music allows one to forget thP. self, to merge
with the flow of sensation.

So. too. the Apollinian play tends to

be more static than the Dionysian one:

a world in which each thing

has its place (indeed, one in which there are things) and remains
constant, whereas a world of music can never come to rest.

This ten-

sion between rest and motion is complemented by one between space and
time:

the Apollinian world expresses itself primarily in spatial

terms, while the Dionysian one is basically temporal in character.
Thus, through the mediation of the artist, existence plays
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two distinctly different types of games with itself.

The one is a

game of the individual, measure, the image, being as rest in space;
the other is a game of unity, the shattering of all divisions, musical, the flux of becoming in time.

In this sense, existence is at

its very heart contradictory, going in two mutually exclusive directions simultaneously, playing one direction off against the other,
incapable of achieving any final resolution, at least insofar as
such a resolution would imply a true transcending and unification of
these fundamentally contradictory powers of primordial existence.

The Tragic
If a final reconciliation of the Apollinian and the Dionysian
is impossible, if they are doomed to struggle against each other
endlessly, they remain, as shown above, in need of each other.

It

is here that the final meaning of play emerges in Nietzsche's analysis of the Greeks:

the tragic is the unending interplay of these

two different types of games which existence plays with itself.
Each of these worlds is justified on its own terms, but each is incompatible with the other.

Tragedy arises because they can never

truly exist only on their own terms, but are continually doomed to
transgress into each other's world because of their mutual interdependence.
When these two worldscome together in one individual, one
encounters one of the purest manifestations of the tragic.
The misfortune in the nature of things . . • the contradiction
at the heart of the world reveals itself to him [the Aryan] as
a clash of different worlds, e.g., of a divine and a human one,
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in which each, taken as an individual, has right on its side,
but nevertheless has to suffer for its individuation, being
merely a single one beside another. In the heroic effort of
the individual to attain universality, in the attempt to transcend the curse of individuation and to become the one worldbeing, he suffers in his own person the primordial contradiction that is concealed in things, which means that he connnits
sacrilege and suffers.40
The most basic form of this collision of two worlds is the coming
together of the Apollinian and the Dionysian.

The accompanying ugli-

ness and disharmony can only be justified as an aesthetic phenomenon,
as "part of an artistic game that the will in the eternal amplitude
of its pleasure plays with itself. 11 41
Insofar as the Dionysian and the Apollinian constitute the
two fundamental directions of existence, the two types of games
which the primordial one plays with itself, then the Apollinian and
the Dionysian are also the two basic aspects of human existence.42

40GT, 9; III/l, pp. 65-66 =BT, 9, p. 71. "Das Unheil im
Wesen der Dinge • • • der Widerspruch im Herzen der Welt offenbart
sich ihm als ein Durcheinander verschiedener Welten. z.B. einer
gottlichen und einer menschlichen, von denen jede als Individuum
im Recht ist, aber als einzelne neben einer andern flir ihre Individuation zu leiden hat. Bei dem heroischen Drange des Einzelnen ins
Allgemeine, bei dem Versuche liber den Bann der Individuation hinauszuschreiten und das eine Weltwesen selbst sein zu wollen, erleidet
er an sich den in den Dingen verborgenen Urwiderspruch d.h. er
frevelt und leidet."
41GT, 24; III/l, p. 148 = BT, 24, p. 141. "
ein klinstleriscbes Spiel . . . , welches der Wille, in der ewigen Flille seiner
Lust, mit sich selbst spielt."
42In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche's argument begins with
the Apollinian and Dionysian as human artistic drives, moves from
them to the dream and intoxication as fundamental powers of being,
and then interprets these original artistic drives in terms of these
metaphysical principles. Cf. Eugen Fink, Nietzsches PhiZosophie,
p. 25 on the structure of the argument here.
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The tragic individual is the place where they come together with full
force, where they attempt to become reconciled with each other rather
than simply try to conquer each other.

The relationship between the

two is one of struggle until it is transformed as an aesthetic phenomenon, at which point it becomes artistic play.

On the Adequacy of Play
Two main themes govern the line of investigation here.

The

first of these is primarily expository and interpretative, showing
the category of play is in fact fundamental to Nietzsche's thinking
during this period.

The second is critical and involves questioning

the adequacy of the category of play in this context.

In regard to

the first theme, it has been shown, not only that the category of
play occupies a central place in Nietzsche's thinking during this
period, but also that the category of play is corrnnon to the three
fundamental categorfes in terms of which Nietzsche analyzes existence:

the Apollinian, the Dionysian and the tragic.

As such, it

provides the unifying category in terms of which his overall view of
existence can be understood.
Some progress has already been made in regard to the second
line of investigation.

It has been shown that both Dionysian play

and Apollinian play have certain inadequacies, that they never stand
alone.

It was further shown that these inadequacies existed against

a background of a primordial contradiction in existence.

The nature

of this contradiction is such that no form of play can adequately
reconcile the contradictoriness of existence.

It can only suspend
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or conceal one side of the contradiction temporarily;
hidden side continues to exist.

but that

Tragedy does not achieve this re-

conciliation because it fails to eliminate the contradiction;

it

does, however, raise that contradiction to the level of an aesthetic
phenomenon, a game which the will plays with itself.
What would constitute an adequate category of play, given
the presence of this primordial contradiction.

If a criterion of

adequacy is the ability to overcome and eliminate this contradiction, then clearly the category of play remains inadequate.

In

fact, any category would be a priori inadequate, since it is impossible to change such a fundamental reality.
It is important to note, however, that this primordial contradiction is itself an assumption on Nietzsche's part, taken for
granted throughout his writings here but never justified.

Once

this assumption is made, life is condemned to futility, incapable
of finally eliminating the contradiction of existence.

It is ab-

surd to think of changing the world, of improving the human condition in any way, because in the end all such changes and improvements dwindle into insignificance when seen within the framework of
this primordial contradiction.

Some notion of play is practically

the only alternative available, given the framework Nietzsche has
assumed.
There is another aspect to this framework which is neglected
in The Birth of Tragedy.

In the forward to an unwritten book on

the Greek state. Nietzsche discusses the notions of dignity of man
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and the dignity of work.

These remarks offer a valuable insight into

the background of Nietzsche's idea of the Apollinian and the Dionysian and into the conditions under which the
forces is possible.

eme~gence

of the two

Nietzsche argues that in order for work to be

considered dignified, existence itself must have some claim to dignity.

The Greeks are clearly to be praised because they had no need

for such conceptual hallucinations such as the dignity of existence.
They recognized the true nature of things.
Work is a dishonor because existence has no value in itself;
but if even this existence sparkles in the seductive jewels of
artistic illusion and now really appears to have a value in
~t~e:£~ the proposition that work is a dishonor is still valid
Even artistic creation falls under the category of work for the Greeks,
and the presence of the artistic drive is but evidence that the artist
is subjected to the necessity of work.
In this situation man develops a feeling of shame when he
realizes that he is only the tool of forces much greater than himself, that he is the pawn of necessity.

These feelings of shame,

dishonor, and necessity belong to the experience of work and slavery,
and an examination of them reveals the truth of culture itself.
In order to provide a broad, deep and rich foundation for the
development of art, the overwhelming majority must be put

43"Filnf Vorreden. Der griechische Staat," III/2, p. 259.
"Die Arbeit ist eine Schmach, weil das Dasein keinen Werth an sich
hat: wenn aber eben dieses Dasein im verfilhrenden Schmuck kilnstlerischer Illusionen erglanzt und jetzt wirklich einen Werth an sich zu
haben scheint, so gilt auch dann noch jener Satz da8 die Arbeit eine
Schmach sei . . . "
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slavishly in the service of a minority, going above the measure
of their individual neediness. At their expense, through their
surplus work, that privileged class shall be removed from the
struggle for existence in order to create a new world of needs
and satisfy them.44
This makes it clear for Nietzsche that, "slavery belongs to the essence of culture: a truth which clearly leaves no doubt about the
absolute value of existence. 11 45

It is nature which is at work in

all this, "forging the monstrous tool of the state," seeking "through
society to come to its redemption in appearance, in the mirror of
genius. 114 6
In the passages in his notebooks which immediately precede
this preface, Nietzsche makes it clear that the purpose of culture
is to allow for the appearance of genius--Apollinian, Dionysian, and
tragic. 47 .This casts a different light on the previous analysis.

44Ibid., p. 261. "Damit es einen breiten tiefen und ergiebigen
Erdboden flir eine Kunstentwicklung gebe, muB die ungeheure Mehrzahl
im Dienste einer Minderzahl, Uber das MaaB ihrer individuellen Bedlirftigkeit hinaus, der Lebensnoth sklavisch unterworfen sein. Auf
ihre Unkosten, durch ihre Mehrarbeit soll jene bevorzugte Klasse dem
Existenzkampfe entrlickt werden, um nun eine neue Welt des Bedlirfnisses zu erzeugen und zu befriedigen."

45Ibid., p. 261. "DemgemaB mlissen wir uns dazu verstehen, als
grausam klingende Wahrheit hinzustellen, daB zwn Wesen einer Kultur
das Sklaventhwn gehore: eine Wahrheit freilich, die Uber den absoluten
Werth des Daseins keinen Zweifel Uhrig laBt."
46Ibid., pp. 264-65.

"Hier sehen wir wiederum, mit welcher
mitleidlosen Starrheit die Natur, um zur Gesellschaft zu kommen, sich
das grausame Werkzeug des Staates schmiedet . • . durch die Gesellschaft zu ihrer Erlosung im Scheine, im Spiegel des Genius, zu kommen!'
4 7Posthumously published notebooks in Die Geburt der Tragodie.
Der griechische Staat, p. 205.
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Whereas in The Birth of Tragedy the background of play was a metaphysical one, the primordial contradiction and pain of existence,
this is now made more concrete.

The societal correlate of this

original contradiction is revealed in the dichotomy between slavery
and the play of genius.

Play can take place only within the context

of slavery for Nietzsche.

Such slavery is, however, justified--or,

more precisely, not in need of justification--because existence in
itself has no value anyway.
It is here that I think one encounters one of the true dangers
of a philosophy of play.

As Nietzsche develops the problem in his

early writings, it is clear that there is an absolute division between work and play.

As a consequence of this, certain restrictions

are established on both work and play such that both are incapable
of providing true satisfaction for man.

It is clear from this descrip-

tion that work has no dignity for Nietzsche, that it is equivalent to
slavery, characterized by feelings of shame, dishonor and domination
by necessity.

True human creativity finds its expression in the

three forms of play developed here.

But this expression is fore-

ordained to an ultimate lack of meaning;

while it can cover up the

pain of primordial existence for a time, it cannot ultimately change
anything.

It can only create illusions which momentarily suspend

that pain and contradiction.

Any action in the world is denied to

it in advance because it involves the creation of an alternate
world.

There is no structure of mediation which can adequately

bring these two worlds together.

As a result of this, one realm of
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activity deals with the :veryday world and changes it, but it is unable to escape the burden· of need, the domination of necessity.

The

other realm of activity is indeed free from such need, although this
freedom is paid for by the slavery of the majority, but it cannot
really change anything with the freedom that it receives.
Nietzsche would, I think, argue at this point as follows.
First, my criticisms reflect the way I would like things to be, but
--Nietzsche would argue--he is showing us the way things are, the
horrible truth of existence, without making a value judgment about
it.

Second, no alternative is possible except the one present by

him, because the primordial pain and contradiction of existence cannot
be changed by human activity.

Third, such phrases as "cannot really

change anything" indicate a very specific notion of reality, one in
which "really" refers to the world of everyday activity.

Such a

narrow definition of reality would be unacceptable to Nietzsche.
The difficulties with these Nietzschean criticisms lead to the
most fundamental questions about the nature of reality itself.

Not

only is it impossible to settle such questions here in a definitive
manner, it is also unnecessary at this point if one considers the
problem only in relation to Nietzsche.

His position, as has been

pointed out above, is based on an assumption about the nature of
nrimordial existence as pain and contradiction.

Throughout his

writings during this period, this position is assumed, not proved.
He certainly never proves that things could not be otherwise, that
it is impossible to alter the basic character of existence, even
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presuming that his description of it is adequate.

The assumption of

an irreconciliable contradiction at the heart of existence, expressed
in the contradiction between the Apollinian and the Dionysian, is
the basis for denying any value to existence in itself and for <leveloping a notion of play as a temporary suspension of one side of that
contradiction.

It also provides the foundation for a devaluation of

work, a denial of the dignity of work, and a justification of the
slavery of the majority in the service of the play of genius.

This

seems to be rather a lot to base simply on an assumption.

Conclusion
This brief consideration of the role of the category of play in
Nietzsche's analysis of Greek tragedy and culture provides the
starting point for a systematic approach to the meaning of play in
Nietzsche's philosophy by delineating the various meanings of the
category itself.

Play can be considered either as a category des-

criptive of primordial existence itself or as referring to artistic
activity where the mediation of the human artist is a necessary component of the process.

Alternately, it can be considered as a way of

becoming one with the flux of existence in intoxication with an
accompanying shattering of the principle of individuation, or it can

'

refer to the creating of illusions in order to mask both the Dionysian
threat to the individual and theprimordial pain arising out of the
contradiction of existence.

In the latter case, it involves the

creation of a world of order and stability, in sharp contrast to
the Dionysian experience of flux and unity.

These divisions cut
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across one another, yielding the four-fold division of play which
Nietzsche outlined in "The Dionysian Worldview."

The interaction

of these two basic forces in existence, the Dionysian and the Apollinian, gives rise to the final meaning of play: the tragic play of
existence itself, an overarching category which includes the previous senses of play.

The category of play is the fundamental one

in terms of which both existence in general and the specific forms
of existence are understood in Nietzsche's writings during the
period of The Birth of Tragedy.
The category of play, however, proves itself to have certain
inadequacies, two of which have been discussed above.

First, the

category of play is predicated against a background of the primordial
pain and contradiction of existence, but this background proves itself to be only an assumption.

Thus the specific character of Nie-

tzsche's category of play is determined by a mere assumption.

Second,

when seen on the level of society, Nietzsche's category of play is
situated within the context of, and dependent upon, slavery.

The

result is that play is condemned to being ineffectual in the world,
while work is completely under the domination of necessity, shame
and dishonor.

The categories of work and play are unmediated and,

indeed, mediation is impossible at this stage.

CHAPTER III
PLAY AS THE HIGHEST FORM
OF HUMAN ACTIVITY

Introduction
The category of play, central to Nietzsche's early writings
about Greek tragedy and culture, reappears in his later writings in
the form of an ideal.

Although the status of ideals is itself a

problematic point in Nietzsche's philosophy which will have to be
discussed below, it remains true that play represents for Nietzsche
the highest form of human activity.

This is exceptionally clear in

the passage in Thus Spoke Za:r>athust:r>a on "The Three Metamorphoses,"
and it is also to be found in Nietzsche's treatment of the free
spirit and in his doctrine of the order of rank.

In each instance,

it is in play that human activity reaches its highest expression.
In this chapter I shall approach a demonstration of the
thesis that play is the highest form of human activity for Nietzsche
in two ways.

First, it will be shown to be true in a positive sense

by examining the three ideals for human existence mentioned above:
the image of the child in "The Three Metamorphoses," the free spirit,
and those who are highest in the order of rank.

It will be shown

in each case that the kind of activity proper to each is playing.
Second, it will also be shown in a negative sense that play must be
the highest form of human activity.
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This will be established by
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showing that play is the only form of human activity which allows for
the justification of existence in the face of the experience of
nihilism.

In the post-nihilistic world, play emerges as the form of

human activity which permits both a full recognition of the challenge of nihilism and at the same time a complete affirmation of
human existence in itself.
By considering only these specific concepts in this chapter,
I do not want to give the impression that I think these are the only
models of human existence which Nietzsche considers to be significant.
This is obviously not the case.
by their absence here:
to power.

Two central notions

are conspicuous

the doctrines of the overman and of the will

Each of these will be considered in the following chapters.

Chapter Four will extend the interpretation developed here to the
notion of the will to power and morality, while Chapter Five will
consider the doctrine of the overman in relation to Nietzsche's idea
of the self and the play of affects.
As in the previous chapter, there is a second major theme
which runs throughout this chapter.

In addition to establishing

the centrality of the category of play to Nietzsche's view of human
activity, I have endeavored to critically examine the adequacy of
this category both within Nietzsche's philosophy and, to a lesser
extent, in itself.

In this regard, I have pointed to certain ten-

sions which develop in a philosophy of human activity as play such
as

~ietzsche's

and have shown the degree to which these can be over-

come within a Nietzschean framework.
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A.

The Ideal of Creative Play

The Three Metamorphoses
In the first of Zarathustra's speeches in Part One of Thus

Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra presents a paradigm for the development and liberation of the spirit in three stages, symbolized by
the camel, the lion, and the child.I In this section dealing with
"The Three Metamorphoses," I shall show that in this model for understanding human existence play is clearly the highest form of human
activity.

In addition to this, it will be shown that this stage of

creative play cannot be achieved without prior preparation.

The

stages of development represented by the camel and the lion must be
lived through first in order that play in its fullest form can be
possible.

The experiences of the lion and the camel are prior con-

ditions of the possibility of the emergence of creative play on the
part of the child and give us important insights into the nature and
foundation of that play.

Finally, the adequacy of this category of

creative play will be discussed;

special attention will be paid to

the question of the relationship between the player and his fellow
players and those who stand outside of that play--in other words, to
the social dimension of the category of play as developed in "The
Three Metamorphoses."

1 11 von den drei Verwandlungen," AZ.so Sprach Zarathustra, in
Nietzsche Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Sechste Abteilung, Erster
Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), pp. 25-27 ="On the Three
Metamorphoses," Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1966), pp. 2S-27. Hereafter abbreviated as
"Z, 11 followed by chapter or speech title, volume and page numbers.
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Before turning to the text itself, two prefatory comments are
in order.

First, although the passage under consideration does not

present adequate evidence for concluding that ther can be only three
stages in this process of liberation, it is clear that these stages
represent a complete process, in particular in relation to its endpoint.

However, if the three metamorphoses culminate with the child

as the highest stage in the development of the spirit, there is still
room for other stages before this entire process begins, stages in
which the spirit has not yet developed the awareness found in the
stage of the camel.
Second, attention should be called to the subject of this
process of transformation: spirit.

Although Nietzsche does not define

precisely what he means by spirit, the speech in Book Two of Thus

Spoke Zarathustr>a

"On the Famous Wise Men". gives an indication of

the sense in which the term is employed.
itself cuts into life:

Spirit is, "the life that

with its agony it increases its own know-

ledge,112 and its happiness is, "to be anointed and through tears to
be consecrated as a sacrificial animal."3

Spirit is thus that form

of life which allows itself to be sacrificed in order to lead to
something beyond itself.

In this sense, spirit is a self-transcending

2z, II, "Von den beri.ihmten Weisen;" VI/l, p. 130 = Z, II, "On
the Famous Wise Men," p. 104. "Geist ist das Leben, das selber in's
Leben schneidet: an der eignen Qual mehrt es sich das eigne Wissen
II

3Ibid.

"Und des Geistes Gli.ick ist diess:
und durch Thranen geweiht zum Opferthier .
"

gesalbt zu sein
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form of life.

The three metamorphoses are distinct stages of life

cutting into life, in particular into the illusions which had previously been necessary if life was to continue.

The spirit's happi-

ness, however, can be something more than that of the sacrificial
animal, as well be shown below in the discussion of the child.
Suffice it to say here that spirit is that form of life which cuts
into itself, goes beyond itself in the ways which will be discussed
in "The Three Metamorphoses."

The Camel.

The starting point of this process of transforma-

tion is "the spirit who would bear much. 114

He asks for that which

is most difficult, for this is what his strength demands.

It is by

demanding the most difficult that life cuts into itself in this
first stage, goes beyond itself.

The most difficult is defined in

this passage through a series of questions, which are implicitly
given an affirmative answer.

It consists of:

humbling oneself to wound one's haughtiness • . • letting
one's folly shine to mock one's wisdom . • • parting from our
cause when it tri~mphs • . • climbing high mountains to tempt
the tempter •
What the spirit's strength demands would appear to be the negation of

4z, "Von den drei Verwandlungen;" VI/l, p. 25 = Z, "On the
Three Metamorphoses," p.· 25. "Vieles Schwere giebt es dem Geiste,
dem starken, tragsamen Geiste . • . "
5Ibid., p. 25 = Ibid., p. 26.

" . • sich erniedrigen, um
seinem Hochmuth wehe zu thun • • • Seine Thorheit leuchten lassen,
um seiner Weisheit zu spotten . . • von unserer Sache scheiden, wenn
sie ihren Sieg feiert . . . Auf hohe Berge steigen, um den Versucher
zu versuchen . • • " Four other examples are mentioned in the text.
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its strength, but it would be more precise to say that it demands the
full affirmation of the opposite of one's strength as well as of the
strength itself.

The point Nietzsche is making here is that a

strength which does not include the recognition and affirmation of
its own opposite weakness is itself only a limited strength precisely
because it does not recognize its own limits as strength.

Our wisdom,

for example, must recognize and affirm the presence of our folly in
order for us to fully know our limits, the true extent of its own
strength.

Not to do so is to fall prey to our own weakness.

In

order to overcome this weakness, to do what one's strength demands,
one must thus affirm one's weakness along with one's strength, transcending it as a weakness by knowing and willing it.
Implied in the description of the transformation of the
spirit from a camel to a lion is that the
l.S

"~ord

and god" of the camel

the "thou shalt," which represents "values, thousands of years

old • • . all created value."

The totality of these values has

already been created, leaving no room for the "I will."

Does this

mean that the "thou shalt" is the fundamental character of the
camel's existence?

It is fundamental only in a very specific sense.

The "thou shalt" is one of the strengths--perhaps the greatest one-of the spirit's existence at this stage.

The camel's task as spirit

is to assume not only this strength but also its opposite.

The

necessity of assuming the opposite of the strength as well as the
strength itself introduces the principle of transformation at the
heart of the camel's strength, presuming that the opposite of the
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"thou shalt" is the affirmation of the individual's will.

The as sump-

tion of the greatest strength and its negation leads the camel to the
negation of this whole mode of existence and pushes him toward the
second stage, that of the "I will."

Thus the principle of trans-

formation is to be found in the camel as spirit.
In a fragment from his notebooks entitled, "The Way to Wisdom:
Pointers on the Overcoming of Morality," Nietzsche develops a three
stage process that roughly parallels the three metamorphoses found
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

It sheds some light on the concrete

meaning of the camel.

The first path. Worshipping (and obeying and learning)
better than anyone else. Assimilating all things that are venerable and letting them struggle with one another. Bearing
every burden. Asceticism of spirit--bravery. A time of fellowship.
[The overcoming of evil, petty inclinations. The encompassing heart; one conquers only with iove. Fatherland, race,
everything belongs here. (Richard Wagner prostrated himself
before a deep, loving heart; Schopenhauer also. This belongs
to the first stage).]6
In this description of the first stage, there is a stronger emphasis
on the implied "thou shalt";

instead of assimilating all things

6Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Unschuld des Werdens. Der Nachlass,
selected and ordered by Alfred Baeumler (Stuttgart: Kroner Verlag,
1956), Volume I, p. 249, §662. "Der erste Gang. Besser verehren
(und gehorchen und lernen) als irgendeiner. Alles Verehrenswerte
in sich sammeln und miteinander kampfen lassen. Alles Schwere tragen.
Asketismus des Geistes--Tapferkeit. Zeit der Gemeinschaft.
"[Die iiberwindung der bosen, kleinlichen Neigungen. Das umfangliche Herz: man erobert nur mit Liebe. Vaterland, Rasse, alles
gehort hierher. (Richard Wagner warf sich vor einem tiefen, liebvollen Herzen nieder; ebenso Schopenhauer. Dies gehort zur ersten
Stufe.)]" (Brackets in original.)
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without qualification, one assimilates all things "that are venerable."
In a sense, one becomes transparent;

one mirrors the struggle of

those forces one assimilates, becomes their background.
The descriptions of the camel and this first path present a
basic way of being in the world which has the following characteristics:

extending one's world to encompass as much as possible,

especially the difficult, thereby extending one's self;

an affirma-

tion of one's existence by binding oneself not only to one's strengths
but also to one's weaknesses;

the discovery of the implicit act of

will which underlies this affirmation and leads finally to the negation of the most important part of that which was affirmed: the
"thou shalt."

This conflict with the "thou shalt" is implicit in

each of the other acts of reverence insofar as they demand the affirmation of opposites.

The "I will" is already hidden in the camel's

choice to test his own strength, and the more he affirms opposites,
the greater the tension between the "thou shalt" and the "I will."

The Lion.

One of the reasons for the emergence of the lion

has just been discussed:

the "I will" is implicit in the camel's

choice to take on the heaviest burdens.

Nietzsche puts the ques-

tion of the necessity of this transformation in Zarathustra's
words:
My brothers, why is there a need in the spirit for the
lion? Why is not the beast of burden, which renounces and is
reverent, enough?_
To create new values--that even the lion cannot do; but
the creation of freedom for oneself for new creation--that is
·within the power of the lion. The creation of freedom for
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oneself and a sacred "No" even to duty--for that, my brothers,
the lion is needed.7
The emergence of the lion from the camel is necessary as a condition
of the possibility of creating new values, of the creative play of
the child in the next stage.
necessary?

But why is the creation of new values

At this juncture two lines of argumentation are possible.

On the one hand, one can argue the necessity of this trans-

formation on the basis of the internal contradictions in the stage of
the camel.

In addition to the arguments presented above in this

connection, one could argue that one of the values which one affirms
at the stage of the camel would be that of freedom, which in the end
challenges the "thou shalt."

This line of argument parallels the

interpretation of European nihilism found at the beginning of The

WiZZ to P01.Uer: beginqing with an affirmation of Christian moral
values (which include truthfulness), one is led in this quest for
truth to the denial of those original values one affirmed as their
falsity is uncovered, destroying the entire worldview upon which
even one's concept of truthfulness (and its value) rested.

So too,

the camel's affirmation of traditional values (including freedom)

7z, I, "Von den drei Verwandlungen;" VI/l, p. 26 = Z, I, "On
the Three Metamorphoses," p. 27. "Meine Bruder, wozu bedarf es des
Lowen im Geiste? Was genilgt nicht das lastbare Thier, das entsagt
und ehrfilrchtig ist?
"Neue Werthe schaffen--das vermag auch der Lowe nicht: aber
Freiheit sich schaffen zu neuem Schaffen--das vermag die Macht des
Lowen.
"Freiheit sich schaffen und ein heiliges Nein auch vor der
Pflicht: dazu, meine Bruder, bedarf es des Lowen."
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would lead it to challenge that entire set of values and, in the end,
the very value of values--to question whether it is of value to life
to live under the domination of the "thou shalt."
A second possible line of argumentation would deny any real
necessity to the appearance of the lion except a conditional one:
if freedom is to appear, then the lion is necessary, but the appearance of freedom is not necessary in itself because it involves a

free act.

On the basis of the text of "The Three Metamorphoses,"

the second interpretation is to be preferred;

but the first, even

if it does go beyond the text, seems to be a valid interpretation if
one qualification is added.

This process is not necessary in itself;

that is, a given spirit may never be able to go beyond the first
stage.

If, however, he does, the first argument helps us to under-

stand some of the forces at work which made this possible.
The lion's being in the world is to be found in freedom, in
the negation of the "thou shalt," in a sacred "no" to everything one
had previously affirmed.

Truthfulness sets him off from other men.

8

The same phenomenon is described in "The Way to Wisdom" as follows.

The second path. To break the worshipping heart when one is
most strongly corronitted. The free spirit. Independence. Time
of the desert.

Critique of everything that has been venerated

8The element of truthfulness is emphasized in Z, II, "Von den
beri.ihmten Weisen;" VI/l, pp. 128 ff = Z, II, "On the Famous Wise Men,"
pp. 102 ff. If truthfulness is the principle governing the existence
of the lion, the lion stage may be considered as the logical consequence of the camel's affirmation of the value of truthfulness, which
leads eventually to his calling into question all other values.
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(idealization of all that is not venerated), attempt at reversing
evaluations.
[The overcoming also of good inclincations. (Unnoticed
such natures as Dilhring and Wagner and Schopenhauer have not
even once set foot on this level!)]9
The more deeply the spirit is committed in the first stage of the
camel, the more difficult is this breaking-away;
time, its significance also increases.

but at the same

One gains, in effect, the

right to reject all values only when one is first deeply committed
to them.

Nietzsche is not arguing for an unthinking rejection of the

past, for it is precisely that which would constitute a profane "no";
the sacred "no" takes reverence and commitment as its starting-point.

The Child.

The final stage of this transformation of the

spirit is the emergence of the child, the symbol of human activity
as creative play.

Asking why the lion must become a child, Zara-

thustra says:
The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game,
a self-propelling wheel, a first movement, a sacred "yes." For
the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred "yes" is needed:
the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to
the world now conquers his own world.lo

9uw, I, §662, p. 250. "Der> zweite Gang. Das verehrende Herz
zerbrechen, als man am festesten gebunden ist. Der freie Geist. Unabhangigkeit. Zeit der Wilste. Kritik alles Verehrten (Idealisierung
des Unverehrten), Versuch umgekehrter Schatzungen.
"[Die tiberwindung auch der guten Neigungen. (Unvermerkt
solche Naturen wie Diihring und Wagner und Schopenhauer als noah nicht
einmaZ auf dieser Stufe stehend!)]" Brackets in original.
10 z, I, "Von den drei Verwandlungen;" VI/l, p. 27 = Z, I,
"On the Three Metamorphoses," p. 27. "Unschuld ist das Kind und Vergessen, ein Neubeginn, ein Spiel, ein aus sich rollendes Rad, eine
erste Bewegung, ein heiliges Ja-sagen.
"Ja, zum Spiele des Schaffens, meine Bruder, bedarf es eines
heiligen Ja-sagens: seinen Willen will nun der Geist, seine Welt
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The innocence of the child arises out of the destruction of the "thou
shalt," an act which puts him beyond good and evil to such an extent
that the very distinction is forgotten;

in this sense, his appear-

ance marks a new beginning.
What does this child do?
he creates his own world freely;

He plays creatively.

In playing,

thus he is a first movement.

He

lives out, plays out, the game he has begun of his own initiative:
a self-pFopelled wheel, returning again and again to its startingpoint to begin another game.

The conditions of the possibility of

this creative play include not only the appropriation of the world
accomplished by the camel and the freedom won by the lion, but also
the sacred "yes" of the child.

The child wills his own will because

there is nothing else in itself to will;

everything else has become

the child's plaything, possessing no value or meaning in itself.
The sacred "yes" is then an affirmation, not of any thing in itself
in the world, but of the child's own will as the absolute source of
meaning and value in the world as his game or play.

In this sense,

the child not only conquers his own owrld, he creates that world
without being bound in any previous one.
The necessity of the transition from the stage of the lion
to that of the child appears to be completely conditional:
is to become creative. then one must go beyond the lion.

gewinnt sich der Weltverlorene."

if one
But, as is
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clear in the fragment on "The Way to Wisdom, 11 11 many are unable to
make this transition.

The creative play of the child is freely

undertaken, hence it is not necessary in itself.

Yet one can argue

that there is an implicit affirmation of creativity in the lion's
negativity which prepares the way for the child's play.

In the lion's

"no"-saying, he is already taking hold of existence, going beyond
it in affirming his right to deny it.

When he realizes that this

negation arises out of the strength of his own will, he lays the
foundation for the child's affirmation of his own will as measure
of the world.
While it can be said that playing involven the creation of
a world in most cases, the world that is usually created in ordinary
play is bounded.
a "real" world.

Its definition depends upon its juxtaposition to
Johan Huizinga, for example, has suggested that,

"play is not 'ordinary' or 'real' life.

It is rather a stepping out

of 'real' life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own. ul2

In this passage on the creative play of

the child, the play world becomes the world itself, absolved from
any dependence on an ordinary or real world through the liberating
transformation of the spirit from a camel through the stage of the
lion to that of the child.

Here Nietzsche's category of play differs

lluw, I, §662, p. 250.
12Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens.

in Culture, p. 8.

A Study of the Play Element
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from many other such theories by attributing to the world of play an
autonomy which it does not usually possess.

If the commitment of

the camel were to encompass all of existence, and if the lion were
able to overcome all that to which the camel was committed, then
there would be no limits at all to the creative play of the child.
It is questionable here whether the stage of the child as
described in "The Three Metamorphoses" is attainable and, if attained,
whether one can remain there for an extended period of time.

The

questions being raised here parallel those raised about the stability
arid adequacy of the Dionysian and Apollinian forms of play in the
previous chapter.

The issue is a crucial one in understanding Nie-

tzsche's category of play and in evaluating its adequacy.
tion may be posed this way:

The ques-

is it possible for the creative play of

the child to take upon itself an autonomous.existence which is independent of the two preceding stages of the camel and the lion?
possible interpretations present themselves.

Two

First, it is possible

in the creative play of the child to create a completelv autonomous,
self-sufficient world.

Second, the creative play of the child is

one moment in human activity which in itself comprises all three
moments of the camel, the lion and the child.
Nietzsche presents the three metamorphoses as three successive states which, having hapened once to a spirit, do not repeat
themselves again under ideal circumstances.

To interpret them chron-

ologically as successive stages which clearly be in accord with the
text, and such an interpretation would be consistent with Jaspers's
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interpretation of "The Way to Wisdom" as autobiographicai. 1 3
this interpretation raises certain problems.

Yet

Such autonomy is only

possible, as has been suggested above, under the conditions that the
camel has been able to encompass all of existence and that the lion
has been able to negate it and thus free the spirit for his creative
play.

It is possible to object to the feasibility of such a state

on the grounds that such a total encompassing and negating of existence would be practically impossible to achieve.

Such an objection

would constitute no real objection in Nietzsche's eyes, for he would
readily admit that only the very few attain such heights.
objection carries more weight.

A second

In order for such a complete encom-

passing of, and negating of existence to occur once and for all, it
is necessary to assume that existence is static, that the world
which it encompassed and then negated does not change.

If the world

were to change, if something new were to emerge, then that additional
"sometli.ing" would not have been appropriated and negated by the
spirit.

It would remain outside the spirit's world.

However, by

means of the camel and the lion, the world itself is transformed into
the child's world, from the world to his world.

If the play of the

child is to be complete, it is necessary either to assume that the
world possesses a static character which allows it to be completely

13For Jaspers's view on this, see Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche. An
Introduction to the Unde1?standing of His Philosophical Activity
(Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1965), pp. 44 ff.
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surpassed or else to view the three metamorphoses as three stages
which the spirit continually undergoes.

Since Nietzsche's world

clearly is not a static one, the latter alternative is more clearly
in accord with the general framework of Nietzsche's thought.
One can object to this interpretation by raising the following
question:

why should the creative play of the child not be possible

in itself as a continuous creation and destruction of stability, of
static worlds?

If the creative play of the child is interpreted in

this manner, then what I would consider one of the major strong
points of Nietzsche's category of play is negated: the connection
between the creative play of the child and the everyday world, a
connection which is based in the process of transformation which
the spirit undergoes in the stages of the camel and the lion, is
destroyed.

t~ansformation

Instead of being the creative

of the

world through play, the child's play becomes a creatio ex nihilo.
While such an interpretation is indeed possible, while it can account
for the static appearance of the world by treating it as an Apollinian illusion which itself could be the result of creative play,
it has two disadvantages in my opinion.

First, as already men-

tioned, it severs any mediating link between the creative play of
the child and the world.

Second, it appears to me to be an inad-

equate description of the actual relationship between play and the
world if one presumes that the world exists in some sense in itself outside of the child's creative play.

In this regard, it has

been argued that the three metamorphoses, rather than being stages
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which are temporally successive, are actually interpenetrating metamorphoses .14
To raise this second objection is to go beyond the questions
of what Nietzsche said and of the internal consistency of his statements.

It should be clearly indicated as such:

it is inquiring

into the adequacy of his category of play itself.

However, that in-

quiry reflects back upon the interpretation insofar as one, when confronted with two possible interpretations, tends to choose the one
which is more adequate on its own merits.

If the creative play of

the child is interpreted as a completely autonomous activity which
is no longer bound to the world from which it has sprung, then the
mediating link between creative play and the world is broken and
play loses its connection with the world--presuming the existence of
a world in need of mediation.

To view the three metamorphoses as

continually recurring transformations yields a model which more adequately reflects my own experience.

What is significant to me about

play is that it is a way of transforming the world;

if, on the

other hand, it leads merely to creating a private world, then play
becomes insignificant.

If it is not in some meaningful sense in

the world--and the camel and the lion symbolize the ways in which
it may be in the world--then it poses its transformative power.

It

14Ryogi Okochi, "Nietzsches Amor fati," Nietzsche-Studien,
edited by Mazzino Montinari, Wolfgang Muller-Lauter and Heinz Wenzel
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), Vol. I, p. 89 argues in favor of
this view as reflecting the nature of artistic activity in both East
and West.
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appears to be mere fooling around (SpieZerei), rather than true play

(SpieZ).

It is possible to develop and defend Nietzsche's position

without presuming the existence of a world outside of the world of
play; but my criticism here is not directed toward the internal
consistency of Nietzsche's position, but rather relates simply to a
different experience of the relationship of play to the everyday
world.
It is not insignificant in this regard that the child's
play, as presented in "The Three Metamorphoses," is solitary.
has no fellow players.

He

Whether he is alone at the seashore building

sand castles or alone ori the top of a mountain, he is nevertheless
always alone;
isolation.

his unlimited freedom is purchased at the price of

But isolation is almost too weak a word here:

he is

not only isolated from other men, he must deny their very existence
outside his world of play and the change they bring about in that
outside world.

One can object to this by ·asking:

can he not, like

Prometheus, in his creative play create fellow players, a whole world
of things, without having to accept anything given which did not
emerge from his creative play?

Without his creative play he would

be isolated, true, but why should he be isolated in his play from
which good neighbors, friends and enemies, etc., emerge?

However,

the question is, as I see it, how he can create these fellow players
if they are not at least present as potential players outside his
world of play and if he is not able to draw them into his world in
order to actually play together with them and thus constitute them
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as fellow players.

He cannot create such players out of nothing al-

though he may be able to radically transform the "something"--the
potential players--available to him.

The world of play must have a

point of insertion into the world out of which it springs, a continuing contact with that world.

The symbols of the camel and the

lion offer a conceptual framework in terms of which that continuing
contact with the world may be understood.
Interpreting the three metamorphoses as continually recurring
ways of existing is also consistent with the general structure of

Thus Spoke Zarathustra itself.

In Zarathustra's "Prologue," the

beginning of his descent is described as follows:
When Zarathustra was thirty years old he left his home and
the lake of his home and went into the mountains. Here he enjoyed his spirit and his solitude, and for ten years did not
tire of it. But -at last a change came over his heart • . • 5
At what stage was Zarathustra during his ten years in the mountains?
He says, "I am weary of my wisdom. •
receive it. 1116

I need hands outstretched to

The three-stage path considered in conjunction with

the three metamorphoses was called "The Way to Wisdom."
.thustra reach wisdom, this third stage?

Did Zara-

Did he reach the highest

15z, "Zarathustra's Vorrede;" VI/l, p. 5 = Z, "Prologue, p.
9. "Als Zarathustra dreissig Jahr alt war, verliess er seine Heimat
und den See seiner Heimat und gieng in das Gebirge. Hier genoss er
seines Geistes und seiner Einsamkeit und wurde dessen zehn Jahre
nicht mlide. Endlich aber verwandelte sich sein Herz,--"
l6Ibid., p. 5 =Ibid, p. 10. "Ich bin meiner Weisheit liberdrlissig • • • ich bedarf der Winde, die sich ausstrecken."
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point, the third metamorphosis, and then eventually have to "descend
to the depths • . • go under 11 ?17

If Zarathustra fits into the frame-

work of the three metamorphoses at all in this opening passage, it
is as the child who enjoys his spirit and solitude for years, but
eventually wearies of it, needing others to receive it.
But if Zarathustra is the child playing during his sojourn in
the mountains, what is he when he goes under?

He presents himself as

the teacher of the overman and the eternal recurrence, and he refers
to the desire to go to his work, his day. 18

Here it depends on

whether one interprets play as a completely autonomous activity
existing in its own world or as intimately bound up with the other
two stages of appropriation and negation which the camel and the
lion symbolize.

If one follows the second interpretation, then the

descent of Zarathustra into the depths is difficult to explain
without maintaining that he ceases to play.

If, however, one follows

the first line of interpretation, one may argue as follows.

Play,

in order to continue to be meaningful creative activity, must at
least periodically descend into the depths, into the world, in order
to gather into its own play world new material which it can transform, which it can play with.

17 Ibid., pp. 5-6
11
untergehen

Zarathustra's world is no longer

Ibid.'

p. 10.

II

in die Tiefe steigen

18 z, IV, "Das Zeichen;" VI/l, p. 401 = Z, IV, "The Sign,"
p. 325. "Zu meinem Werke will ich, zu meinent Tage . . • "

75
entirely self-sufficient;

he grows weary of it.

His activity differs

from the child's creative play in "The Three Metamorphoses" in this
respect:

it seeks others to receive it.

There is an implicit recog-

nition here of two shortcomings in the image of the child's play,
both of which relate to the social dimension of play.

In recog-

nizing that contact with the world must be periodically renewed, it
is implied that the world of play is not completely self-sufficient.
In searching for fellow players, it is recognized that this periodically renewed contact with the world involves some element of interpersonal relationships.

An adequate development of Nietzsche's

category of play must take these two problems into account, supplementing the category of the creative play of the child with a mediating structure by means of which it can remain in contact with the
non-play world if one assumes the existence of such a world.

The FT'ee SpiPit
The second major text to be considered here is the Preface
to Hwnan, AZZ-too-hwnan, which was written in the spring of 1886 for
a new edition of that work.

Thus it comes about three years after

the section on "The Three Metamorphoses" in Thus Spoke ZaT'athustT'a.
It is to be grouped together with several other new prefaces (for

The BiT'th of TT'agedy, Hwnan, AZZ-too-hwnan II, The Dawn, and The
Joyful Wisdom), Book Five of The Jou.fut Wisdom, Beuond Good and
Evil, and On the GeneaZogu of Morals. In these writings, the section
which adds the most to our understanding of the free spirit is
Section Two of

Be~ond

Good and Evil.

Although I am not taking this
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text as the explicit point of reference in this section, I shall
draw upon it freely to expand upon the idea of the development of
the free spirit found in the 1886 Preface to Human, AZZ-too-human,

I.

Taken together, these writings provide another model for under-

standing the development of the spirit, "in which the type 'free
spirit' will sometime become ripe and sweet to perfection. 1119
In this section, I shall first show that there are six separable moments in the development of the free spirit: (1) the fettered
spirit, which forms the starting-point; (2) the great breakingloose; (3) the bird's £reedom; (4) the great health; (5) the emergence of self-awareness; and (6) the generalization of the free
spirit's self-awareness into the problem of the order of rank.

It

will be shown that the highest form of activity in this process of
development is an activity which corresponds to the category of
play developed in the preceding analysis of "The Three Metamorphoses."

Finally, it will be shown that this type of playing involves

the doctrine of the order of rank, suggesting that the creative play
which is Nietzsche's highest activity is not a completely arbitrary
play, that rules of this play may be understood in relation to the
order of rank--a hypothesis whose validity will be tested in the
section which follows.

19Menschliches, AZZzwnenschZiches, I, "Vorrede," 3, in Nietzsche Werke, Vierte Abteilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1967), p. 9. "
. in dem der Typus 'freier Geist' einmal
bis zur Vollkornrnenheit reif und siiss werden soll • • . " Hereafter
abbreviated as MA, I.
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The fettered spirit is the starting-point: a man of a high
and select type, but who is chained down by duties, a spirit whose
"highest moments themselves will bind them the most strongly, obligate them the longest. 1120

The element of duty calls attention to

the similarities between the fettered spirit and the camex:both are
out of the ordinary (spirits, not mere members of the herd), both
are still under the influence of the "thou shalt," both contain
within themselves the possibility of self-overcoming.

This is the

attitude of youth, with its wrathful and reverent attitudes that
themselves contain an element of forgery and deception.21

The

~reat breakin~-Zoose

is the decisive event which marks

the start of the spirit's journey toward liberation.

It "comes • . •

suddenly, like an earthquake, 11 22 and the person "doesn't understand
what is happening. 11 23

Here the spirit has much less control over

the situation than the lion does in Zarathustra.

This reflects a

shift of emphasis in the description from an ideal viewpoint in the

20MA, I, "Vorrede, 11 3; IV/2, p. 10. " . . • ihre hochsten
Augenblicke selbst werden sie am festesten binden, am dauerndsten
verphlichten. 11
21 cf.

Jenseits von Gut und B8se, II, in Nietzsche Werke,

Sechste Abteilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968),
p. 45 = Beyond Good and Evil, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New
York: Random House, 1966), p. 43. Hereafter abbreviated as JGB and
BGE respectively.
22MA, I, "Vorrede, 11 3; IV/2, p. 10.
komrnt • • • plotzlich, wie ein Erdstoss •

23Ibid.
was sich begiebt.

11
11

•

•

•

die junge Seele

"Die grosse Loslosung
II

• selbst versteht nicht,
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three metamorphoses to a more concrete standpoint here.

The great

breaking-loose is characterized by a desire to go away, anywhere, a
contempt for what has been called duty, accompanied by "a turbulent,
willful, erupting longing for wandering, strangeness, alienation,
cold, disenchantment, congelation . • • 11 24

What unites these char-

acteristics is that they all represent a great

breakin~-loose

from

all previous bonds and a willful going beyond oneself to what had
previously been forbidden or revolting.
This second stage is both a victorv and a sickness from which
the soirit will eventuallv recover.
makes its first appearance here:

It is a victorv because of what

"this first outbreak of force and

the will to self-determination. setting one's own values. this will
to the free will. 1125

This freedom and breaking-loose closely parallel

the stage of the lion in "The Three Metamorphoses," the free spirit
being seduced further and further away from the familiar and toward
the great loneliness. A fragment from Nietzsche's notebooks indicates
that he considered himself to be passing through this stage while
he was writing Human, AU-too-human--"a strange and evil game. 112 6

24Ibid. "
ein aufri.ihrerisches, willki.irliches, vulkanisch
stossendes Verlangen nach Wanderschaft, Fremde, Entfremdung, Erkaltung,
Erniichterung, Vereisung • . . "
25 Ibid., pp. 10-ll.

" . • • dieser erste Ausbruch von Kraft
und Willen zur Selbstbestimmung, Selbst-Werthsetzung, dieser Wille
zum freien Willen."
26uw,

Spiel •

II

r,

§1298, P· 405.

"

ein unheimliches und hoses
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The bird's freedom is a middle state between the great breaking-loose and the great health, a long period of convalescence characterized by a tough Will to Health, which disguises itself at times
as health itself.

It is in this period of convalescence that the

bird's freedom appears:

"a feeling of the freedom of the bird, its

vision, its high spirits, a third something in which curiosity and
tender contempt are bound together. 112 7

The free spirit emerges,

and his existence is characterized by a peculiar detachment, living
without "yes," without "no."

This state is one step closer to the

child, to the great health, but still lacking the creative affirmation of the child's play.

Irideed, it is clear that the highest form

of human activity for Nietzsche is not an arbitrary, capricious play
--it might be possible to interpret the bird's freedom in this manner
--but something more, since the development.of the spirit does not
end with this stage.

The great health comes only gradually, in small doses, and
allows the free spirit to draw nearer to life.

The very image of the

flying bird suggests the instability of the previous state:
eventually descend and land.
time what is near;
the first time.

it must

In so doing, he discovers for the first

at the same time he is able to see himself for

Seeing himself became possible only after he had

27MA, I, "Vorrede," 4; IV/2, p. 12. "
ein Gefiihl von
Vogel-Freiheit, Vogel-Umblick, Vogel-Uebermuth, etwas Drittes, in dem
sich Neugierde und zarte Verachtung gebunden haben."
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gone beyond himself, had literally been outside of himself.

He must

become alienated from himself in order to come to know himself, and
it is sickness which brings about this alienation.

The sickness that

the free spirit undergoes is then the door through which it must pass
in order to reach health, "that monstrous, overflowing safety and
health, which itself cannot dispense with sickness as a means and a
fishhook. 1128
This great health is characterized by overflowing, superabundance, various and opposite ways of thinking, and "the right to
live experimentally. 1129

It is in living experimentally that one

reaches the state comparable to that of the child in Thus Spoke

Zarathustra.

In Beyond Good and Evil those who reach this state

are called "Versuaher," which could be translated variously as
"attempters," "tempters·," or "experimenters. 1130

It is important to

note that living experimentally comes after the spirit has come back
down to earth, drawn nearer to life.

The activity of the free spirit

who has achieved the great health is one which takes place in the
world.

28

Ibid., p. 11. "
jener ungeheuren ilberstromenden
Sicherheit und Gesundheit, welche der Krankheit selbst nicht entrathen mag, als eines Mittels und Angelhakens der Erkenntniss
29
30

Ibid.' p. 12.

II

II

• auf den Versuah hin leben."

JGB, II, §42; VI/2, p. 55 = BGE, II, §42, p. 52. As Nietzsche sees it, "mochten diese Philosophen der Zukunft ein Recht,
vielleicht auch ein Unrecht darauf haben, als Versuaher bezeichnet zu
werden. Dieser Name selbst ist zuletzt nur ein Versuch, und, wenn
man will, eine Versuchung."
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The play character of the great health is emphasized in Book
Five of The Joyful Wisdom, written at about the same time as the Preface to Human, All-too-human.

In a section entitled "The Great

Health," Nietzsche describes the ideal of human activity as play.
Another ideal runs on before us, a strange, tempting ideal, full
of danger, to which we should not like to persuade any one, because we do not so readily acknowledge any one's right thereto:
the ideal of a spirit who plays naively (that is to say involuntarily and from overflowing abundance and power) with everything that has hitherto been called holy, good, inviolable,
divine • • • 31
Play is the proper activity of the free spirit when he has achieved
the great health, and this play takes place after the descent of the

free spirit from the heights of the bird's freedom.

Self-ai.Jareness develops as the free spirit begins to realize
what has happened to him;

this is when "the puzzle of that great

breaking-loose • • • may begin to unveil itself. 11 3 2

Here his con-

sciousness of himself as a master develops: a master for whom all of
existence--not only things, but also values and reasons--become tools
at his service, toys that he can play with.

True perspectivism, not

31Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fr8hliche Wissenschaft, mit einem
Nachwort von Alfred Baeumler (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner, 1965), Fifth
Book, §382, p. 302 = TheTJoyful Wisdom, translated by Thomas Common
(New York: Frederick Ungar, 1960), p. 352. "Ein anderes Ideal lauft
vor uns her, ein wunderliches, versucherisches, gefahrenreiches Ideal,
zu dem wir niemanden ilberreden mochten, weil wir niemandem so leicht
das Recht darauf zugestehen: das Ideal eines Geistes, der naiv, das
heiBt ungewollt und aus ilberstromender Fillle und Machtigkeit mit allem
spielt, was bisher heilig, gut, unberilhrbar, gottlich hies- • . . "
Hereafter these works are abbreviated as FW and JW respectively.
32MA, I, "Vorrede," 6: IV/2, p. 14. "
jener grossen Loslosung zu entschleiern beginnt."

• sich das Ratsel
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only in thought but also in action (for this involves living experimentally, not just thinking freely33) comes to fruition here.

The

free spirit gains power over all his "for's" and "against's," learns
to play with them and use them to his own higher purposes.

He sees

the necessary injustice in every "for" and "against," sees "injustice
as inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned through the perspectival and its injustice. 11 34

Injustice is to be found in partic-

ular there where life is least developed, most narrow, where it nonetheless cannot refrain from tak1ng itself as the purpose and measure
of things.35

Although the free spirit also lives perspectivally, his

perspectivism differs from that which is normally encountered, for he
realizes that it is a perspective, assumed for the sake of the experiment of life, nothing more.
The category of play lies at the heart of this notion of perspectivism and this idea of life as an experiment.

In gaining power

over one's "for's" and "against's," one realizes that there is no
essential opposition between "true" and "false," that it is rather a
question of degrees of appearance, that it is a moral prejudice to

33The emphasis on action is suggested in Nietzsche's distinction between the "free thinkers" and the "free spirits;" see JGB, II,
§44; VI/2, p. 58 = BGE, II, §44. p. 55. It is made explicit in FW, V,
§372, p. 288 = JW, V, §372, p. 336.
34MA, I, "Vorrede," 6; IV/2, p. 14. " • • . die Ungerechtigkeit als unablosbar vom Leben, das Leben selbst als bedingt <lurch das
Perspektivische und seine Ungerechtigkeit."

35Ibid.
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assume that truth is worth more than mere appearance.36

When this

line of thinking is carried to its final conclusion, one realizes
that there are only interpretations.37

The doctrine of perspectivism

implies that everything is really nothing more than a plaything,
lacking any nature in itself which would give it a "true" meaning.
To live experimentally is, then, "to dance even on the verge of the
abysses, 1138 to play creatively when one is on the verge of realizing
that there is only play.

This is the activity of the free spirit

par exce Uence.

The doctPine of the oPdeP of Pank is the highest expression
of .the growing self-awareness of the free spirit;

it grows out of

the insight that "power and right and the scope of perspective grow
higher with one another. 11 39
case.

In this final step he g€]nePaZizes his

"'The way it works out for me,' he tells himself, 'is the

way it must work out for everyone in whom a task becomes incarnate
and will "come into the world".' 11 40

36JGB, II, §34;
37JGB, I, §22;

The ·problem of the order of

VI/2, p. 49 = BGE, II, §34, p. 46.
VI/2, p. 31

= BGE,

I, §22, p. 30

38 Fw, v, §347, p. 245 = JW, V, §347, p. 287. " •• selbst
an Abgriinden noch zu tanzen. Ein solcher Geist ware der fr>eie Ge1>st
par excellence."
39MA, I, "Vorrede," 6; IV/2, pp. 14-15. "
Macht und
Recht und Umfiinglichkeit der Perspektive mit einander in die Hohe
wachsen."
40MA, I, "Vorrede," 7; IV /2, p. 15. "Wie es mir ergieng,
sagt er sich, muss es Jedem ergehn, in dem eine Aufgabe leibhaft
werden und 'zur Welt korrnnen' will."
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rank defines the free spirits and their task, and it is this problem
which has guided their development, even when they did not know it.41
Although a detailed discussion of the doctrine of the order of rank
is given- in the next section of this chapter, a preliminary interpretation can be set forth here in regard to this question:
the order of rank a task for the free spirit?

how is

Insofar as the free

spirit realizes that all of existence is perspectival, insofar as he
realizes that it is the result of creative activity which is fundamentally play. he sees the order of rank as a task in this sense: he
must gain power over his "for's" and "against's," over his purposes,
over his perspectives.

In other words, he must create the order of

rank--that is the task of the free spirit.

Realizing that this is

his task, he knows that the meaning and order of his world are the
result of his creative play.

That there must be some order of rank

is a recognition of the necessity of rules and structure in play.

The

free spirit's realization that the creation of the order of rank is
his task implies his awareness of himself as a creative player whose
activity results in the appearance of new worlds.
This preliminary interpretation of the doctrine of the order
of rank in relation to the creative play of the free spirit provides
the foundation for a refinement of the distinction between the play
world and the non-play worlds.

The realization that everything is

interpretation and the awareness of the order of rank as his task

41 Ibid.
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gives the free spirit the basis for concluding that his play world
is but one such world among many--that there are only play worlds,
no "real world."

They define themselves in relation to each other,

and there is no need to assume the opposite of a play world.

Rather

than saying that the child's play must return to the world, it would
be more precise to say that this creative play must continually seek
to enlarge its boundaries, to extend its influence.

The need for

creative play to extend its influence is equivalent to the free
spirit's realization that the order of rank is its proper task and
is consistent, as will be shown later, with the general tendency of
the will to power to extend its boundaries, maximize its effects.
This investigation of the category of play in relation to
the free spirit and his development again underscores the fact that
this kind of creative play is possible only for the few.

Only a

high and select type enter upon the process of the liberation of
the spirit, and even these few have no guarantee of final success.
Moreover, the free spirit himself is not consciously directing this
process.

Reaching the stage where one can play creatively is itself

an achievement.

It has also been shown that the proper task of the

free spirit is playing, creating the order of rank and thereby_ impressing on the other play worlds the character of the free spirit's
play.

This play is not an arbitrary activity.

it is related to a very specific task:
of rank.

For the free spirit,

the creation of a new order

This is the creative play of the Versucher, who realize

that the world itself is but a multiplicity of play worlds, none of
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which have any claim to being absolutely true.
Given this preliminary analysis, we now have to turn to a
more detailed consideration of the order of rank, seeking to discover
what specific bounds it imposes upon the creative play of the free
spirits.

The Order of Rank
It is the order of rank which gives content to Nietzsche's
idea of the free spirit, and its importance for an understanding of
his notion of human activity as play is clear.

Nietzsche identifies

his own philosophy with teaching the order of rank, 42 arguing that
this must be re-established to counteract the growing emphasis on
equality43 and to prevent the extension of the values of the herd to
those who are outside the herd.44
In this section dealing with the doctrine of the order of
rank, it will be shown that previous explanations of the orderliness
and purposefulness of human existence can be understood as examples
of the order of rank.

In the past these have often been taken to be

something more than, or other than the order of rank.

They have, for

example, been taken to be expressions of an absolute order and purpose

42uw, II, §1411, p. 508.
43Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht (Stuttgart: Alfred
Kroner Verlag, 1964), §854, p. 581 =The Will to Power, translated by
Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967),
p. 457.
Hereafter abbreviated as WM and WP respectively.
44WM, §287, p. 203

= WP,

§287, p. 162.
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in nature itself, rather than being seen as an expression of man's
creative play.

The various orders of rank are not, however, absolute,

but rather on-going, developing, as indeed existence itself is.

They

are, like all games, finite expressions of man's creativity, limited
and changing.
It will be shown, furthermore, that the doctrine of the order
of rank has a two-fold meaning.

It is both an analytical tool in

terms of which past orders of rank may be analyzed and also, as has
already been seen, a task for the free spirits.

These two notions

come together in the idea of interpretation as creative play, the
first being play with the past, the second being play with the future.
Finally, an analysis of the criteria for determining the
order of rank will be shown to give an insight into the specific
character of play, the way in which play is power, the will to power
created by the overman.

This gives us an insight into the essential

unity of Nietzsche's thought and suggests a possible way of overcoming the traditional opposition between freedom and necessity in
the category of creative play.

Thus it will be shown that the doctrine

od the order of rank is an expression of the orderliness proper to
the creative play of the free spirits.
The primary function of the doctrine of the order of rank as
an analytical tool is that it allows one to confront and deal with
traditional moral problems and divisions on a non-moral basis.

The

conflict between the "true world" uncovered by pessimism and "a world
possible for life" must be seen as a struggle of one kind of life
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("sickly, despairing life that cleaves to a beyond") with another
kind ("healthier, more stupid and mendacious, richer, less degenerate
life"), not as a struggle between "truth" and life.
can only be resolved in terms of an order of rank:

This problem
"Here one must

demonstrate the need for an order of rank--that the first problem 1s
the order of rank of different kinds of life. 11 45

By rejecting an

interpretation of this conflict as one between "truth" and life,
Nietzsche is following his own suggestion in Beyond Good and Evil to
forgo interpretati,ons in terms of "true" and "false" and to deal
instead with "degrees of apparentness. 1146

One of the essential

characteristics of the order of rank is that it overcomes one of the
traditional prejudices of philosophers, the faith in opposite values.
It does this by realizing that there are many created worlds, play
worlds, some of which are more powerful than others, but all of
which still remain as created worlds.
This demonstration of the necessity of an order of rank is
possible if one can show (1) the insufficiency of all previous divisions, especially the moral one, and (2) the way in which the order
of rank is grounded in life itself.

The first part of this task

45WM, §592, p. 411 = WP, §592, p. 324. "Hier muB die Beweisfilhrung einsetzen, daB eine Rangordnung not tut,--daB das erste
Problem das der Rangordnung der Arten Leben ist."
46JGB, II, §34; VI/2, p. 49 = BGE, II, §34, p. 46. "Ja,
was zwingt uns ilberhaupt zur Annahme, dass es einen wesenhaften
Gegensatz von 'wahr' und 'falsch' giebt? Genilgt es nicht, Stufen
der Scheinbarkeit anzunehmen . • • ?"
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is accomplished primarily by means of a reduction of previous divisions of the order of rank.

First, and most important, morality must

be shown to be only another version of the order of rank in disguise.
Morality is the doctrine of the order of rank of men, and consequently also of the meaningfulness of their actions and works
for this order of rank: thus the doctrine of human value judgments in relation to everything human. Most moral philosophers
present only the contemporary ruling order of rank; on the one
hand, a lack of historical sense,--on the other, they themselves
are ruled by the morality, which the present teaches as eternallyvalid.47
Thus the order of rank has an historical dimension not usually found
in morality, and one can infer from the description above that the
one who holds the order of rank would be able to go beyond the distortions of morality which mistakes the present for the eternallyvalid.

Thus moralities are reducible to "the expression of locally

limited orders of rank. 11 48
Insofar as one is concerned with morality instead of the
order of rank, one would be--in Nietzsche's order of rank--in a rank
below that of the free spirit.

One's perspectives would be narrowed,

confined by the limits of a particular morality.

One would not have

47uw, II, §675, p. 213. "Moral ist die Lehre von der Rangordnung der Menschen, und folglich auch von der Bedeutsamkeit ihrer
Handlungen und Werke flir diese Rangordnung: also die Lehre von den
menschlichen Wertschatzungen in betref f alles Menschlichen. Die
meisten Moralphilosophen stellen nur die gegenwartige herrschende
Rangordnung dar; Mangel an historischem Sinn einerseits,--anderseits
sie werden selber von der Moral beherrscht, welche das Gegenwartige
als das Ewig-Gill tige lehrt."
48WM, §966, p. 644 = WP, §966, p. 507. "Moralen sind der
Ausdruck lokal beschrankter Rangordnungen in dieser vielfachen Welt
der Triebe."
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realized that morality is also a human creation.

One would be lacking

in the instinct for privilege, distance, the feeling of creative natures which characterize the higher reaches of the order of rank.49
The superiority of the doctrine of the order of rank as a source of
meaning and order in the world in contrast to morality consists in
the fact that it allows all this:

the widening of perspectives, the

realization of the role of human creativity in the development of
this meaning and order, the instinct for privilege, distance, and
the other qualities of the free spirit.
Other phenomena can also be understood more adequately in
terms of the order of rank.
just one here:

religion.

It will suffice to call attention to
It is "essentially a doctrine of the order

of rank, even an attempt at a cosmic order of rank and of power. 11 50
Approaching religion as a manifestation of the order of rank allows
Nietzsche to make sense of its appearance without giving to it the
validity it would claim for itself.

The existence of religion is

not denied, but its own interpretation of its significance is questioned.

49WM, §879, p. 598 = WP, §879, p. 470 = Nachgelassene Fragin Nietzsche Werke, Achte Abteilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), 9(152), p.
88. Hereafter the Nachgelassene Fragmente will be abbreviated as
NF, followed by the part and volume numbers, then the notebook number,
and finally the page number. Thus: NF, VIII/2, 9(152), p. 88.

mente.

Herbst 1887 bis Marz 1888

50UW, II, §846, p. 291. "Religion--wesentlich Lehre der
Rangordnung, sogar Versuch einer kosmischen Rang- und Machtordnung."
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The task of creating one's own order of rank, the principle
which dominates the creative play of the free spirit, is clearly
not to be understood as a moral imperative, as a fragment from Nietzsche's notebooks shows.
An imperative, "conduct yourself in accord with the order of
rank that you belong to," is senseless: because we would have
to know (1) ourselves and (2) that order, neither of which is
the case,--and (3) because it is superfluous to order something
which would occur anyway.51
It is questionable how much weight should be put on this fragment,
since Nietzsche did not include it in any of the works he published.
While it would be possible to interpret it in such a way as to suggest
that ·the order of rank is something beyond our control, a necessity
imposed upon us, it is more in line with Nietzsche's thinking to
read this fragment in conjunction with his three-stage history of
morals in Beyond Good

Oftd Evil.

In pre-historical times the value of

an action was judged on the basis of its consequences.

In the last

ten thousand years, the origin of the action became the decisive
factor.

In the third stage, represented by the innnoralists,
• the decisive value of an action lies precisely in what is

unintentional in it, while everything about it that is ·intentional, everything about it that can be seen known, "conscious,"
still belongs to its surface and skin . • • 5 2

51

uw, II, §757, p. 246. "Ein Imperativ, 'beninnn dich der
Rangordnung gemaB, zu der du gehorst, ist unsinnig, weil wir 1. uns,
2. jene Ordnung kennen mi.i.ssten, was beides nicht der Fall ist,--und
3. weil es liberfllissig ist, etwas zu befehlen, das ohnedies geschieht."
52

JGB, II, §32; VI/2, p. 47 = BGE, II, §32, p. 44. II
gerade in dem, was nicht-absichtlich an einer Handlung ist, ihr entscheidener Werth belegen sei, und dass alle ihre Absichtlichkeit,
was von ihr gesehn, gewusst, 'bewusst' werden kann, noch zu ihrer
Oberflache und Haut gehore . • • "
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While a thorough treatment of this theme must await the material presented in the next two chapters, it can be indicated in a preliminary
way that the order of rank is not an imperative, nor is it an abstract idea, but rather an expression of the totality of one's being.
One cannot be corrnnanded to act according to it, for no other alternative is possible.

It is what we make it to be.

reason that we cannot know the order of rank:

It is for this

as our creation, much

of it is intentional, but perhaps the most significant part of it
remains unintentional.

There is implied in this position a notion

of human action as stemming from the entire self, not just thought,
which will be considered in detail in Chapter Five.
There are numerous other formulations of the order of rank,
a number of which are to be found in Nietzsche's notebooks.

It is

possible here to call attention to only a few of these, but they
will serve to point out the two-fold sense in which the idea of the
order of rank is used.

In the face of skepticism growing out of the

nineteenth-century historical sense, Nietzsche asserts the existence
of an order of rank of both men and problems. 53

Elsewhere he writes

of posing the question of the order of rank of artists in a new way,
distinguishing between artists who are dominated by major intellectual
movements and those where the artist is only a part of the man, as in
the case of Plato, Goethe, and Giordano Bruno. 54

5 3uw, I, §563, p. 214.
54uw, I, §538, p. 202.

A short fragment
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refers to a new order of rank for spirits in which the tragic natures
are no longer dominant.55

The crisis precipitated by nihilism re-

sults in a process of purification, promoting "an order of rank of
strengths [forces] from the viewpoint of health. 11 56

An order of rank

of goods according to the degree of egoism is presented in Human,

All-too-human, and Nietzsche acknowledges that this order of rank can
change. 57

Although after each such change specific actions become

designated as moral or immoral, the principle of change is not morality itself. 58

The order of rank is prior to, and more fundamental

than morality.
Two different usages of the notion of the order of rank can
be distinguished in these and other passages.

First, it is used as

a descriptive term in relation to past and present phenomena which
lays bare their true structure.

Thus morality, religion and art are

to be understood first and foremost in terms of the way in which they
express the dominant order of rank.

Second, the idea is used to

point the way toward the creation of a new order of rank.

In addi-

tion to the passages cited above, one can call attention to a fragment in the notebooks where Nietzsche asserts that, with the transvaluation of all values, the principle of the order of rank of all

55WM, §992, p. 655 =WP, §992, p. 517.
56WM, §55, p. 48

= WP,

§55, p. 38.

"

der Krafte, vom Gesichtspunkt der Gesundheit • . . "
57MA, I, 2, §42; IV/2, p. 63.

58Ibid.

einer Rangordnung
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values is inverted.59

So, too, the innnoralists are engaged in the

task of creating a new order of rank insofar as they are reversing
the traditional relation between, on the one hand, priests and other
teachers of a beyond and, on the other hand, the blasphemers and
other innnoralists.60

These two diverging notions of the order of

rank begin to merge when Nietzsche takes this second usage and
applies it to historical instances, creating a new order of rank
in the past.
rank.

By interpreting history, one creates new orders of

Thus what might have appeared at first to have been a fixed

order of rank in the past is changing in two senses.

First, the

order of rank itself changes in the course of history through the
creative actions of men, especially of the powerful ones.

Second,

in interpreting this past development, new orders of rank are created
through the power of the interpretation as an exercise of the will
to power.

Both of these are play activity.

In the past, the ere-

ative play of the powerful creates orders of rank, transforms old
ones.

In the present, one plays with the past, creating out of the

manifold possibilities it offers new orders of rank, which in turn
creates an openness for the future.
The principle governing the order of rank is clearly power:
II

what detennines rank, sets off rank, is only quanta of power;

59WM, §1006, p. 661

WP, §1006, p. 521

NF, VIII/2, 9(66),

p. 173.
60WM, § 116, p. 84 = WP, §116, p. 71 =NF, VIII/2, 15(44),
p. 232.
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and nothing else. 11 61

It is on this basis that the two fundamental

types of life can be distinguished:
I distinguish between a type of ascending life and another
type of decay, disintegration, weakness.
Is it credible that the question of the relative rank of
these two types still needs to be posed.62
Clearly there is no question in Nietzsche's mind:
superior to decaying, disintegrating life.

ascending life is

Since ascending life is

basically life that is increasingits own power and extending its
boundaries, it is also clear that this ascending life is fundamentally
the will to power which is increasing.

It is not ascending toward

some goal which exists outside of itself, but rather ascending toward
more and more power, greater and greater dominance.

As it reaches

its highest point, we encounter "here and there, a completely Epicurean god, the overman, the redeemer of existence."63

The order of

rank is the highest expression of the creative play of man, the most
powerful expression of created order and purpose.

The notion of

ascending life indicates that this creative play is seeking continually to extend the boundaries of its play world.

61WM, §854, p. 581 = WP, §854, p. 482. "Rangbestimmend, Rang
abhebend sind allein Macht-Quantitaten: und sonst nichts."
6 2WM, §857, p. 581 =WP, §857, p. 457 =NF, VIII/3, 15(120),
p. 275. "Ich unterscheide einen Typus des aufsteigenden Lebens und
einen anderen des Verfalls, der Zersetzung, der Schwache.
"Sollte man glauben, daB die Rangfrage zwischen beiden Typen
iiberhaupt noch zu stellen ist? •
"
63uw, II, §1408, p. 507. "
• hier und da • . . ganz
epikurischer Gott, der Ubermensch, der Verklarer des Daseins."
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Thus the order of rank is the result of the creative play of
the powerful who, in the fullness of their power, give a new order to
the world--indeed, create a new world in both thought and action.
They reinterpret the past, creating new orders of rank through their
playful thinking, through the power of their thinking.

They create

a new order of rank in the present by means of all their actions,
preparing the way for a future in which the overman can emerge.
Their play is founded in their will to power and, at the same time,
gives full expression to that will to power by establishing the
order of rank--which is based in power--as the order of the world.
They do this by extending the boundaries of their own play world,
by taking over and transforming other worlds which themselves were
the result of previous instances of such creative play.
There remains one final qualification which should be noted
in this description.

Throughout this analysis, the free spirit and

the overman have been referred to in such a way as to suggest that
they are isolated individuals.

In a fragment in his notebooks, Nie-

tasche seeks to refine this view by extending his notion of the
multiplicity of forces in such a way as to call into question the
concept of an "i ndi vi dua 1."
That man is a multiplicity of forces, which stand in an
order of rank: so that there are those who give the orders, but
they must also create everything that is necessary for the survival of those who obey; thus they are conditioned through the
existence of those who obey. All these living beings must be of
a related type, otherwise they could not serve and obey each
other so: the servants must, in some sense, be those who obey
also, and in finer cases the role must change between them; the
one who otherwise orders must obey. The concept "individual"
is wrong. These beings are not present in an isolated manner;
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the main point of importance is something changeable; the
continual creation of cells, etc. yields a continual change
in the number of these beings.64
Although this is a problem which will be discussed in depth in Chapter
Five, it is important to point out here that this creative play that
brings about a new order of rank is itself founded in a more fundamental type of play:

the interplay of this multiplicity of forces

which is constitutive of the will to power.

Concluding Remarks on the Ideal of Creative Play
In the three preceding sections of this chapter the foundation for a Nietzschean philosophy of play has been laid.

It has been

established, first of all, that the category of play is one in terms
of which the creative activity of the child in "The Three Metamorphases" and that of the free spirit is to be understood.

It has

been further established that the doctrine of the order of rank is
the expression of the order which such play creates:

riot an ab-

solute, unchanging order, but rather an order of becoming.

Sugges-

tions were made that the will to power is itself this creative play

64uw, II, §734, p. 237. "DaB der Mensch eine Vielheit von
Kraften ist, welche in einer Rangordnung stehen: so, daB es Befehlende
gibt, aber daB auch der Befehlende den Gehorchenden alles schaffen
muB, was zu ihrer Erhaltung dient, somit selber <lurch deren Existenz
bedingt ist. Alle diese lebendigen Wesen milssen verwandter Art sein,
sonst konnten sie nicht so einander dienen und gehorchen: die Dienenden rnilssen, in irgend einern Sinne, auch Gehorchende sein, und in
feineren Fallen muB die Rolle zwischen ihnen vorilbergehend wechseln,
und der, welcher sonst befiehlt, einmal gehorchen. Der Begriff 'individuum' ist falsch. Diese Wesen sind isoliert gar nicht vorhanden:
das zentrale Schwergewicht is t etwas Wandel bares·; das fortwahrende
Erzeugen von Zellen usw. gibt einen fortwahrenden Wandel der Zahl
dieser Wesen. 11

98
and these will be developed in Chapter Four.

It has at least been

established that the foundation of this creative play is power, and
that the extension of this power--the attempt to maximize it--involves the expansion of the play world of the free spirit.
By thinking through the problem of the order of rank in
tenns of creative play, it is possible to follow Nietzsche's suggestion that we think in tenns of degrees of appearance rather than
in opposites.

Reality becomes a multiplicity of play worlds, the

more powerful ones dominating the less powerful.

The creation of

an order of rank by the free spirit imprints the play character of
existence on the world in both a specific and a general sense.

In

the specific sense, the free spirit makes his particular play real
through his creative activity.

In the general sense, all creations

of orders of rank reaffirm the basic quality of human activity as
play and of existence as the plaything of the powerful.
To what extent is this creative play arbitrary?
arbitrary in two senses.

It is not

First, its appearance is not something

that just happens, but rather the culmination of a long process of
development of the person's entire being.

In this sense, to begin

to play creatively is not an arbitrary occurrence.

Second, play is

not mere capricious activity--it necessarily involves the creation of
order.

The question is whether there is a third sense in which the

specific order that one creates is something other than arbitrarv.
In other words. granting that play must create order, is it completely free to create any order?
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I would maintain that Nietzsche thought that there were
limits, that creative play did know some boundaries.

Perhaps the

best example of what those limits would be is the series of "thou
shalt's" which Nietzsche addresses to the free spirit in the 1886
Preface to Hwnan, AZZ-too-hwnan.
Thou shalt become master over thyself, master also over your
own virtues . • • Thou shalt gain control over your "for" and
"against" . • • Thou shalt learn to comprehend the perspectival
in every evaluation . • • Thou shalt learn to comprehend the
necessary injustice in every "for" and "against," injustice inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned through the perspectival and its injustice. Thou shalt above all clearly see
where the injustice is always greatest: namely there, where life
is smallest, narrowest, neediest, most recently developed and
yet cannot refrain from taking itself as the purpose and measure
of things • • • Thou shalt see the problem of the order of rank
clearly and see how power and right and scope of perspective
grow higher with one another.65
It 1s clear from this passage, which could be supplemented by numerous other exhortatory passages throughout. Nietzsche's writings,
that this creative play is not completely arbitrary, but rather
stands under very definite rules.

However, these rules spring, not

6 5MA, I, "Vorrede," 6; IV/2, pp. 14-15. "Du solltest Herr ilber
dich werden, Herr auch ilber die eigenen Tugenden • • . • Du solltest
Gewalt iiber dein Fiir und Wider bekornmen . . • Du solltest die nothwendige Ungerechtigkeit in jedem Filr und Wider begreifen lernen, die
Ungerechtigkeit als unablosbar vom Leben, das Leben selbst als bedingt durch das Perspektivische und seine Ungerechtigkeit. Du
solltest vor Allem mit Augen sehn, wo die Ungerechtigkeit irnmer am
grossten ist: dart namlich, WO das Leben am kleinsten, engsten,
dilrftigsten, anfanglichsten entwickelt ist und dennoch nicht umhin
kann, sich als Zweck und Maass der Dinge zu nehmen . . • du solltest
das Problem der Rangordnung mit Augen sehn und wie Macht und Recht
und Umfanglichkeit der Perspektive mit einander in die Rohe wachsen."
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from any external source, but from the free spirit himself.
. Thou shalt"--enough, the free spirit knows by this time
which "thou shalt's" he has obeyed, and also what he now can do,
what he for the first time--may do . • . 66
II

The foundation of these "thou shalt's" is in the activity of the free
spirit.

In order to play freely and creatively, one must have con-

trol over the game, over the "for's" and "against's."

One must realize

the self-delusion on the part of those who mistake their own narrow
perspectives for the purpose and measure of things, as if their play
were equival'ent to reality its elf.

Finally, one must realize that

one's own creative play brings about an order of rank which seeks
continually to extend its power and scope to more and more of existence.

The consummation of this creative play is to be found in

making all the other play worlds into your play world.
B.

Nihilism and the Necessity of Play

Introduction
The first part of this chapter has been concerned with showing
that the highest form of human activity for Nietzsche was play.

That

part of the analysis was concerned with Nietzsche's ideas about the
creative play of the child, the free spirit, and the order of rank.
These may all be classed as positive descriptions of ideal forms of
human activity.

66Ibid., p. 15. '" • . Du solltest'--genug, der freie Geist
Weiss nunmehr, welchem 'du sollst' er gehorcht hat, und auch, was er
jetzt kann, was er jetzt erst--darf • . . "
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There remains a second way in which play emerges as the highest
form of human activity, and this can be termed a negative one.
rooted in Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism.

It is

In this chapter I shall

conclude the analysis of play as a form of human activity by showing
that the only type of meaningful human activity possible after the
experience of nihilism is play.
to overcome nihilism.

It is in play that man becomes able

Insofar as nihilism is the necessary starting-

point of contemporary man, play becomes the only way in which man can
achieve self-overcoming.

The Necessity of Nihilism
The experience of nihilism functions as a gateway into the
contemporary world for Nietzsche--indeed, more than a gateway: a corridor two centuries long through which mankind must pass, 67 one which
we still find ourselves in today.68

Histori~ally considered, nihilism

is the culminating moment of the breakdown of the Christian moral
interpretation of the world which characterized the nineteenth century. 69

It is a necessary experience for contemporary man precisely

67WM, "Vorrede, 11 2, p. 3

= WP, Preface, 2, p. 3

NF,

VIII/2,

11 (411), p. 431.

6 8on the contemporary dimensions of the problem of nihilism,
see Helmuth Thielicke, Nihilism, with an Introduction by Michael Novak
(New York: Schocken Books, 1969); Stanley Rosen, Nihilism. A Philosophical Essay (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Michael
Novak, The Experience of Nothingness (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
6 9cf. Karl Lowith, "The Historical Background of European
Nihilism," in Nature, History and Existentialism, edited with a Critical
Introduction by Arnold Levison (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1966), pp. 3-16.
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because he is contemporary man, because he belongs to an era characterized by nihilism.
Beginning one's philosophical reflection with a confrontation
with nihilism holds a promise similar to that offered by Descartes's
methodological doubt:

it purifies the starting-point by calling every-

thing possible into question.

It differs, however, from Cartesian

doubt in this essential aspect:
a methodological postulate.

it is a Zived experience, not simply

The description of this experience given

by Michael Novak is worth quoting at this point.

I know of none

better, and it will serve well as an introduction to the reflections
which follow.
The experience of nothingness defined: that experience in
which a man perceives that his former perceptions were structured
in a way they did not have to be, in an arbitrary and unnecessary
way. There is no obligatory way to perceive things. A kind of
giddiness and dizziness arise. One's former goals, aims, purposes
now seem suspended in air. The unity of· one's life slips from
one's grasp, dissolves. Raw, tumultuous experience is overwhelming: how can one shape it, manage it, reduce it to form?
Action is problematical because no goal at all seems more valuable, more useful, or more attractive than any other. It is as
though at the heart of the human animal there were a love of dissolution, a longing to split into a million measureless particles
and fly apart in scattered mist. The experience of nothingness
is an experience of the formlessness at the heart of human consciousness. We exist only through form; the experience of our
formlessness is terrifying. We know our kinship to nothingness.
We dread being reminded of it.70
To anticipate what will follow, we can say here that this experience of
nothingness, of formlessness, of the arbitrary and unnecessary character of our perceptions, is the experience of the play character of

7~ichael Novak, "Introduction," in Helmuth Thielicke, Nihilism,
p. 3.
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the world--the realization that we have created this world, given form
and meaning to it, and that this is all that the world is.

Insofar as

we have been led to expect it to be something more, this experience is
a threat to our existence, calling into question that which had previously been unquestionable.

As such, play initially stands as a

threat to man because of his long-held belief that there is something
more to existence.

The Meaning of Nihilism
The most important fragments on nihilism, most of which are to
be found at the beginning of The Will to Power, were written in the
autumn of 1887.

In Nietzsche's notebooks they begin with the following

description.

1. Nihilism [as] a normal condition.
Nihilism: the goal is lacking: the answer to the question of "why?"
is lacking. What does nihilism mean?--that the highest values devaluate themselves. 71
Nietzsche then goes on to distinguish between active nihilism as a
sign of increased strength and passive nihilism as a sign of the decline and regression of the spirit's power--a distinction that reminds
one of the difference between ascending and decaying types of life
discussed above.

Active nihilism can arise when the spirit outgrows

its old beliefs, frees itself from their authority, and consequently

71 NF, VIII/2, 9(35), p. 14. "Der Nihilism ein normaler Zustand.
Nihilism: es fehlt das Ziel; es fehlt die Antwort auf das 'Warum?'
was bedeutet Nihilism?--dass die obersten Werthe sich entwerthen." All
but the first line of this passage is to be found in WM, §2, p. 10 =
WP, §2, p. 9.
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turns destructive.

As such, it has fundamental similarities to the

image of the lion in "The Three Metamorphoses" and to the great breaking-loose discussed above in the section on the free spirit.
there are limits on this process.
result is pure destruction.

Again,

If the spirit stops here, the

However, for Nietzsche this is not a

final state, but rather a pathological, transitional state in which
sufficient strength is still lacking "in order to posit for oneself
once again a goal, a 'why?', a belief."

72

If the spirit is to in-

crease its strength, it must go beyond this state of destructive
nihilism.
The question of the presuppositions of nihilism is then raised
in this fragment, and Nietzsche lists them as these:
no truth;

"that there is

that there is no absolute character to things, no 'thing

1n itself' . 1173

Commenting on these presuppositions, he states:

--this is itself nihilism of the most extreme kind. It places
the value of things precisely in the lack of any reality corresponding to these values and in their being merely a symptom of
strength on the part of the value-positers, a simplification for
the sake of life. 74

72NF, VIII/2, 9(35), p. 14. " . • • urn produktiv sich nun auch
wieder ein Ziel, ein Warum? einen Glauben zu setzen."

73 Ibid, p. 15.

"DaB es keine Wahrheit giebt; daB es keine absolute Beschaffenheit der Dinge, kein 'Ding an sich' giebt."

74Ibid., pp. 15-16. "--dies ist selbst ein Nihilism, und zwar der
extremste. Er legt den Werth der Dinge gerade dahinein. daB diesern
Werthe keine Realitat entsoricht und entsorach. sondern nur ein Symptom
von Kraft auf Seiten der Werth-Ansetzer, eine Simplification zum Zweck
des Lebens."
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There is a dispute over the question of whether Nietzsche's philosophy
is a form of nihilism, and passages such as this one would seem to
suggest that his philosophy is nihilistic.

Arthur Danto has argued

that, "Nietzsche's is a philosophy of Nihilism, insisting that there
is no order and a fortiori no moral order in the world. 1175

Arguing

against Danto and others, Richard Schacht has maintained that, "careful analysis of his [Nietzsche's] writings shows that he neither considered himself to be a nihilist, nor deserves to be considered one,
either metaphysically or axiologically. 1176

The question is partially

one of definition--in regard to the meaning of the term "nihilism"-but goes well beyond that to the more fundamental question of whether
Nietzsche's philosophy goes beyond nihilism or not.

Schacht maintains

that he indeed does go beyond nihilism, quite far beyond it:
~ar

from holding that there are no truths about reality which may
be discovered and stated, because there is no actual nature of
things to discover and describe, he [Nietzsche] in fact holds the
contrary, and has a good deal to say of a substantive nature in
this connection. And far from denying objective validity to all
value-judgments as such, he in fact maintains that a certain
standard of value has an objective basis in the very nature of
things.77
Danto, on the other hand, sees Nietzsche's claims for going beyond
nihilism to be far more modest:

"There is a crucial tension throughout

75Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 80; cf. pp. 19-35.

The

76Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche and Nihilism," in Nietzsche. A
Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Robert C. Solomon (New York:
Doubleday, 1973), pp. 81-82.
77 Ibid, p. 82.
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Nietzsche, between a free-wheeling critic, always prepared to shift
ground in attacking metaphysics, and a metaphysical philosopher seeking
to provide a basis for his repudiation of any such enterprise as he is
practicing. 1178

This would suggest that Nietzsche is not actually

going beyond nihilism;

rather, he is simultaneously going in another

direction in addition to his nihilistic one.
Although I would not agree with either of them completely,
Danto is far closer to being right in this controversy:
crucial tension in Nietzsche's thought.

there is a

This tension, however, can be

resolved in terms of an elaboration of the Nietzschean category of
play.

The claims that Schacht makes about Nietzsche's adherence to

notions of objective truth and value simply ignore too much of what
Nietzsche has said in his critique of values and the notion of truth.
Since I have treated these matters at other places in the dissertation, it is not necessary to go into these issues in depth here;
brief indication of the argument will suffice.
two possibilities here;

a

There are more than

it is not an either/or choice between nihilism,

on the one hand, and objective values and truth on the other.

It is

precisely this middle ground which the category of play is able to
express.

The creative play of the free spirit goes beyond the exper-

ience of nihilism while recognizing the validity of its insights.

The

world is a human creation, but that does not make it meaningless.

In

creative play one affirms the created character of existence--thus its

78nanto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 80.
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hwnan character--and adds to it by creating new meaning and order.
reaching this stage, nihilism has a liberating effect.

In

It is a "path-

ological transitional stage, 11 19 but it is very definitely a stage that
most contemporary men must go through.
that Schacht's analysis leaves out:

This is one of the factors

the necessity of nihilism.

In

order to become free enough to play creatively, contemporary man-insofar as he holds to any absolute interpretation of the world--needs
to undergo the experience of nihilism.

It is comparable to that of

the lion or the great breaking-loose discussed above.
man to play;

Nihilism frees

and as long as man remains unfree, nihilism remains the

pathway to creative play.

In this sense, Nietzsche's philosophy is

not a nihilistic one, but rather a philosophy of the overcoming of
nihilism through creative play.
Nihilism accomplishes this task of liberating man by showing
that the world is nothing in itself, but only what man has made of it.
Passive nihilism becomes resigned in the face of this realization,
while active nihilism becomes destructive.

In the destructiveness of

the active nihilism is hidden the possibility of overcoming nihilism;
this possibility emerges into the light when the nihilist realizes
that, even in his destruction, he has control over that reality.
is then coupled with a second insight:

This

the nihilist realizes that he

79WM, §13, p. 16 =WP, §13, p. 14 =NF, VIII/2, 9(35), p. 15.
"Der Nihilismus stellt einen pathologischen Zwischenzustand dar (-pathologisch ist die ungeheure Verallgemeinerung, der SchluB auf gar
s·~nn-- ) . . . "
.
k e~nen
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is really existing in two worlds simultaneously.

His expectations are

still rooted in a previous world, a world characterized by faith in
the categories of reason. 80

His experience, on the other hand, is of

a world in which there is no necessary order or form, no meaning to
things in themselves, in which the categories of reason have no validity.

The nihilist's problem is this:

to be governed by absolute categories.
expectation that his nihilism arises;

he still expects the world
It is from this unjustified

and when this expectation is

overcome, then he can affirm existence through creative play.

Play and the Overcoming of Nihilism
Although Nietzsche riever worked out the relationship between
play and nihilism in explicit terms, the basic outline of a philosophy
of play as the overcoming of nihilism is to be found in his writings.
The outline is like a sketch. some lines of which are auite boldly
drawn. others only faintly suggested.

The preceding remarks have

elaborated some aspects of this picture;

it now remains to be seen

if the picture can be completed.
Play meets the nihilist's experience of meaninglessness and
purposelessness on its own terms and yet is able to go beyond those

80cf. WM, §12, p. 13 = WP, §12, p. 13 = NF, VIII/2, 11(99),
p. 291: "Resultat: der GZaube an die Vernunft-Kategorien ist die Ursache des Nihilismus,--wir haben den Werth der Welt an Kategorien
gemessen, we Zehe sich auf eine rein fingirte Welt beziehen." Schacht
("Nietzsche and Nihilism," p. 62) implies that it is only the falsity
of the Christian moral interpretation of the world that is at stake
here, but Nietzsche presents nihilism "als die nothwendige Folge von
Christenthum, Moral und Wahrheitsbegriff der Philosophie." NF, VIII/3,
22(24), p. 402.
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tenns.

It grants that nothing in the world has meaning or purpose--

but it affirms the world as a created world, as man's creative play.
This the nihilist does not do because he still tries to measure the
world in terms of the categories of his previous, absolutist worldview.

The absence of an absolute order and value in things does not

imply the impossibility of crny order or value.

What is possible is

the order and value which emerges from man's creative play.
There is a tendency to suggest that this kind of order, that
which arises out of creative play, is no order at all.

Stanley Rosen's

criticisms of Nietzsche exemplify this position.
Traditionally, as for example in Plato and Aristotle, power is
defined in terms of an actuality--an activity, goal, or end.
According to Nietzsche, these are values, or themselves manifestations of the will to power. The world (represented by the earth
or body) is altogether the will to power; as a consequence, power
cannot be said to manifest itself for an end outside of itself.
The temporary and perspectival nature of values reduces them to
the status of facts, with respect to the world-process as a whole.
The values are devalued; the world is what it is--purposeless
play.81
The first obvious problem with this criticism centers around Rosen's
idea of play.

Play is not purposeless, but rather characterized by

created purposefulness.

So, too, the "temporary and perspectival nature

of values" does not reduce them to the status of facts.

It makes them

temporary and perspectival values--nothing more, nothing less.
they are created values;

Again,

to say that these are consequently only

facts is to maintain the absolutist position which is the cause of
nihilism:

either there are absolute values or none at all.

81 Rosen, Nihilism, p. 97.
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For the nihilist, the categories of "aim," "unity," and "being,"
in terms of which value had previously been projected into the world,
are pulled out of the world, with the result that the world looks
valueless.

82

Play reintroduces these categories into existence, but

in a finite sense.

As already mentioned, there is a purposefulness

in play, an aim, but this is a posited aim or purpose--a human creation.

Play creates a unified world, and the unity of the world is

expressed in its presuppositions and rules;
limited unity.

but again, this is a

There are a multiplicity of such unities, and the

creation of the order of rank is concerned with bringing these into
relation with each other.

So, too, play creates "being," but this

"being" is not absolute.

It is the degree of apparentness which a

given play world can create and express.

This involves a creative

positing of images, of ·order, which is the essence of philosophy;
again, it does not presuppose any absolute truth.

83

To consider existence as a game would open up a number of possibilities that the individual might otherwise, after the experience
of nihilism, reject.

In his notebooks from 1878, Nietzsche had already

posed the questions:

"Why not consider metaphysics and religion as

adults' play?"

82
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"Why shouldn't one be allowed to play metaphysicaUy?

WM, §12, p. 15 =WP, §15, p. 13 =NF, VIII/2, 11(99), p. 290.
WM, §605, pp. 414-15 =WP, §605, p. 327 =NF, VIII/2, 9(48),

P• 23.

84

NF in Menschliches, Allzwnenschliches II. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1878-18?9, in Nietzsche Werke, Vierte Abteilung, Dritter Band
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 29(49), p. 378. "Warum !asst man
Metaphysik und Religion nicht als Spiel der Erwachsenen gelten?"
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and apply the enormous force of creating to this? 11 8 5

Two years later

he would write of himself as, "playing a game with the belief of the
whole world. 1186

A year after that, one of his outlines contained a

chapter on "The Game of Life. 1187

In the notebooks from the time of

The Joyful Wisdom, Nietzsche refers to Zarathustra's new form of
superiority:

"playing with the holy. 1188

This appears to open up the

possibility of thinking, in its widest sense, as a type of playing.
Metaphysics, rejected insofar as it claims to make statements about
the real, is transformed into playful thinking which creates its own
world and recognizes it to be such.
possibl~

As will be shown later, it is

to understand some of Nietzsche's central ideas, especially

that of the eternal recurrence of the same, as this kind of activity:
playful thinking.

So, too, the very idea of a "gay science" allows

85NF, IV/3, 29(45), p. 377. "Warum sollte man nicht metaund ganz enorme Kraft des Schaffens darauf

physisch spielen dilrfen?
ve~enden?'!

86 NF in MorgenrBthe. Nachgelassene Fragmente. Anfang 1880
bis FrWijahr 1881, in Nietzsche Werke, Filnfte Abteilung, Erster Band
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), 8(109), p. 735. "Meine geheirnen
Neigungen, apres tout die der Natur, gewisser Affektation von GroBe
entgegengesetzt, rnit der ich mich dekoriren muB, geben mir unendliche
Hlilfsquellen, um mi t dem Glauben aller Welt ein Spiel zu treiben."
87Quoted by Alfred Baeumler in the "Vorwort"to UW, I, p. xvi.
"Das Spiel des Lebens."
88uw, r, §1311, p. 418. "Allgemeiner Spott ilber alles Moral1s1eren von heute. Vorbereitung zu Zarathustras naiv-ironischer
Stellung zu allen heiligen Dinge (neue Form der Uberlegenheit: das
Spiel mit dem Heiligen)."
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itself to be understood as play.89
That such playing is not limited to trivial matters is already
clear from some of the preceding statements, and other texts from Nietzsche confirm this, showing not only that play is serious,"but that
it can even be a matter of life and death.

In Beyond Good and Evil it

is maintained that a man's maturity, "consists in having found again
the seriousness one had as a child, at play. 1190

Ten years earlier

Nietzsche had considered this same theme in his notebooks when commenting on Eugen Dlihring's Der Werth des Lebens. 91

Noting that Dlihring

considered the idea of life as play to be insipid, Nietzsche points
out that this idea goes back to Plato and argues against Dlihring's
contention that true pain cannot be contained in play.

92

Although

Nietzsche's own position on the nature of play is not clear from this
passage, he does not appear to agree with Dlihring that the idea is
"insipid. 1193

In a later entry in the same notebook, however, Nie-

tzsche discusses chance in relation to death, arguing that the greatest
attraction is to be found in testing out the element of change in
existence, even to the point of playing for life and death.

In saying

89 UW, II, §659, p. 211.
90JGB, IV, §94; VI/2, p. 90 = BGE, IV, §94, p. 83. "Reife
eines Mannes: das heisst den Ernst wiedergefunden haben, den man als
Kind hatte, beim Spiel."
9 1Published' in Breslau, 1865.
92NF, IV/l, 9(1), pp. 224-5.

93Ibid. , p. 230.
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that "existence is not the playing out of a game where we only have to
look on, 11 94 Nietzsche suggests that it is a game--or play--in which we
participate to the fullest, even at the risk of death.

This is where

the highest energy of life unfolds itself, "where the play of succeeding and failing transforms itself into a test of life and death."95
In this sense, life itself can be considered a game--quite
serious, even a matter of life and death, but still fundamentally a
game.

By so doing, even death is made an act of living, for the in-

dividual creates the conditions under which he wills his test with
death.

This is, in part, a battle with time, for it is the untime-

liness of death which gives it such a bitter flavor, and this untimeliness results from chance.

By playing for life and death, one is

able to set the terms for chance, thereby escaping the plight of being
merely the passive victim of chance.
By considering life as a game, by equating living with playing,
the nihilist is thus able to go beyond his nihilism, both on the level
of thinking (playing metaphysically) and on the level of acting (by
playing for life and death).
fully overcome:
or death.

It is in this insight that nihilism is

we are playing, even when it is a question of life

By viewing life in terms of play, the nihilist is able to

give full meaning to the experience of nihilism, but nonetheless able

94Ibid, pp. 239-40. "Der Mensch liebt es unter gewissen Umstanden geradezu um Leben und Tod zu spielen.
. Das Dasein ist nicht
die Abspielung eines Schauspiels, bei dem wir nur das Zusehn batten."
95Ibid., p. 242. " . . • wo das Spiel van Gelingen und MiBlingen sich in eine Erporbung vom Leben und Tod wandelt."
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to recognize that there is more to existence:
play.

it can be affirmed as

Indeed, he first devalues existence because he expects it to

be something more than this.

Nihilism is the expression of man's un-

willingness to recognize that existence is play and only play;

but

as the nihilist discovers that his expectations that existencelbe
something other than play are unjustified, he moves toward affirming
what the experience of nihilism uncovers and from which he draws back:
existence is play, life a game, nothing more.

Conclusion
Play has been shown to be the highest form of human activity
for Nietzsche in two ways.

First, it has been shown that play is the

proper activity of the child in "The Three Metamorphoses" and of the
free spirit.

The doctrine of the order of rank emerged as the ex-

pression of the order that such creative play imposes on the world,
an order whose foundation is power.

This leaves the way open for a

consideration of the will to power as play, a topic to be considered
in the next chapter.

Second, it was shown in a negative sense that

play must be the highest form of human activity, since play is the
only type of activity which is possible in a meaningful sense after
the experience of nihilism--an experience which Nietzsche designated
as the characteristic one of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The relationship between the play world and the everyday world
has been clarified.

There are a multiplicity of worlds, none of which

has any claim to absolute being.

The task of creative play is to

extend one's play world to its farthest limits, and this task is that
of the creation of a new order of rank.

Such creative play serves
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to reintroduce purposefulness, unity and being back into the particular
world under consideration--the play world of the individual player-but these qualities are now seen to be finite and created, not absolute.

The world--more precisely, the multiplicity of worlds--is no

longer to be understood in terms of opposites (purpose versus purposelessness, unity versus chaos, etc.), but rather in terms of the degree
of purposefulness, unity, and being which it possesses as a result of
creative human play.

Finally, it becomes clear that there is no ques-

tion of play being outside "the world."

It creates its own world.

When we say that a given play is outside the world, it is clear that
for Nietzsche this would mean that someone else's play world has not
been able to extend its boundaries to include our play world.
Certain problems still remain.

If play is the highest form

of human activity, what categories are we to use to understand what,
for the moment, can be called "lower" forms of activity?
activity play?
of his play?

Is not all

Moreover, to what degree is the individual in control
It has been suggested that the individual is a multi-

plicity of forces, an interplay of forces.
play in this regard?

What role does the will

Is man really a player or a plaything?

Does

thinking direct our playing, or is it also the result of an interplay
of forces?
These and other related problems lead us into the subject
matter of the next two chapters, in which the relationship between
morality, the will to power and the category of play will be considered and in which Nietzsche's idea of the self in relation to the
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interplay of forces as affects will be considered in an attempt to
clarify and complete this consideration of play as human activity.

CHAPTER IV
MORALITY AND THE WILL TO POWER

Introduction
Morality, like everything else in existence, is a game for
Nietzsche, but it is distinguished from the creative play of the free
spirits in several ways.
tence:

First, it is not open to newness in exis-

it must judge everything in terms of moral values.

necessarily to a narrowing of perspectives.
tive.

This leads

Second, it is not crea-

Morality is given to us to be followed, rather than created

by us.

Third, morality represents the values of the herd--the medi-

ocre--and for this reason is in fundamental opposition to the creativity of the free spirits.

Fourth, it does not realize that it is

an illusion, but rather thinks that it is founded in some ultimate
reality.

Fifth, morality condemns existence--or at least the greatest

part of it--while the free spirits affirm it.

Finally, morality is

a sign of weakness, while the creative play of the free spirits is
characterized by strength.
In this chapter, the critique of morality just outlined in
the preceding paragraph will be developed.

After this, it will be

shown that Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power represents the
overcoming of morality through creative play.

On the basis of this

analysis, two fundamentally different types of play can then be
117
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distinguished:

creative play organized and controlled by the powerful

expressing their will to power, and the play of the weak in which they
are dominated by their own game.

Morality then emerges as a game of

self-delusion that is played by the powerless and which dominates
them, and the will to power is to be understood as the creative play
of the powerful.
A.

Morality as a Game of Self-Deception

Morality as Interpretation
Morality is, first of all, an interpretation.

There are, Nie-

tzsche argues in Beyond Good and Evil, "no moral phenomena at all,
but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. 111

While the moral char-

acter of phenomena stems, not from the phenomena themselves, but
rather from our interpretation of them, we must realize that this is
not an arbitrary interpretation, but rather one which possesses an
inner logic.

Nietzsche understands morality as, "a system of evalua-

tions which is connected with the conditions of life of a being. 112
How is it connected with them?

In his notebooks from 1887, Nietzsche

argues that morality may be the only schema of interpretation by means
of which man is able to endure himself.3

Morality is in this sense

lJGB, IV, §108; VI/2, p. 92 = BGE, IV, §108, p. 85. "Es giebt
gar keine moralischen Phanomene, sondern nur eine moralische Ausdeutung
von Phanomenen . . . . "
2WM, §256, p. 185 = WP, §256, p. 148. "
ein System von
Wertschatzungen, welches mit den Lebensbedingungen eines Wesens sich
beriihrt."
3WM, §270, p. 192 =WP, §270, p. 154 =NF, VIII/2, 10(121),
p. 154.
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is always an interpretation, the purpose of which may be to make life
endurable--especially for the weak.

The Instinctual Foundations of Morality
Morality does not, hpwever, always achieve this goal--and when
it does, it does so only at a price to the believer in morality.
price is the denial of

This

life, especially the higher forms of life.

This is evident in those cases where morality is considered as the
will to power of the herd.

This particular will to power, according

to a fragment written in 1887, has three "powers" behind it:
1.

2.
3.

the instinct of the herd against the strong and independent;
the instinct of the suffering and unfortunate against the
happy ones;
the instinct of the mediocre against the exceptions. 4

Morality as the will to power of the herd is reducible to particular
instincts, which themselves bring about a restriction of power--exemplified in the herd, the suffering and the mediocre--rather than an
extension of that feeling--which the strong and independent, the happy
ones, and the exceptions represent.

Thus Nietzsche criticizes morality

because, as a manifestation of the herd instinct, it allows the individual to have value only as a function of the herd. 5

If "the

highest

power and splendor actu~lly possible to the type man 116 were not

4WM, §274, p. 195 =WP, §274, p. 156 =NF, VIII/2, p. 93. "l)
der Instinkt der Heerde gegen die Starken Unabhangigen 2) der Instinkt
der Leidenden und Schlechtweggekommenen gegen die Glilcklichen 3) der
Instinkt der MitteZmassigen gegen die Ausnahmen."
5 FW, III, §116, p. 134

= JW,

III, §116, p. 161.

6zur GeneaZogie der Moral, "Vorrede," 6 in Nietzsche Werke,
Sechste Abteilung, Zweiter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), p.
265 = On the Genealogy of Morals. Ecce Homo, edited by Walter Kaufmann
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achieved, morality would probably be responsible for this.
are directed against the individual.7

Moral norms

Morality has become a sign of

weakness,8 of decadence, 9 of complete psychological corruption.lo
Morality, in short, is the game of the weak--a dangerous one because
it threatens the powerful.
Morality is also a "sign language" of our affects, a symptom
of physiological occurrences.

Moral evaluations are in the end depen-

dent upon our affects.
Moral evaluation is an interpretation, a way of interpreting. The
interpretation itself is a symptom of certain physiological conditions, likewise of a particular spiritual level of prevalent judgments: Who interprets?--Our affects.11
This is the basis of an extra-moral interpretation of morality:

(New York: Random House, 1967)' p. 20.

it

eine an sich mogliche
" Hereafter
abbreviated as GM and GM, referring to the German and English editions respectively.
II

h8chste Machtigkeit und Pracht des Typus Mensch .

7M, II, §108, p. 93.

8 UW, II, §1289, p. 459.

9Ecce Homo, in Nietzsche Werke, Sechste Abteilung, Dritter Band
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), p. 309 = Ecce Homo, in The Portable
Nietzsche, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press,
1968), p. 272. Hereafter abbreviated as EH and EH, referring to the
German and English editions respectively.
l0 11 Disposition und Entwlirfe zum Dritten Buch der Umwertung
aller Werthe, 11 in Gotzendammerung, Der Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Gedichte,
edited by Alfred Baeumler (Stuttgart: Kroner Verlag, 1964), p. 290.
11 WM, §254, p. 184 = WP, §284, p. 148. 11
•
das moralische
Wertschatzen ist eine Auslegung, eine Art zu interpretieren. Die Auslegung selbst ist ein Symptom bestimmter physiologischer Zustande,
ebenso eines bestinnnten geistigen Niveaus von herrschenden Urteilen:
Wer legt aus?--Unsre Affekte."
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is the manifestation of certain instincts or affects which in themselves are neither moral nor immoral.

While these at one time were

in the service of self-preservation, they gradually became ingrained
and remained even after they had lost their survival value.

Or, Nie-

tzsche also suggests, they arose among the slaves in order to gain
control over existence through its partial negation;
moment when ressentiment became creative.12

this was the

As long as it is the

affects which do the interpreting, the moral man is their plaything
or tool--morality is not his game, but under the control of the affects.

If the moral man were, however, to recognize the role that

the affects play in the formation of his moral judgments--and this
includes the role which the herd plays--, he would cease to be moral
man, for he would have recognized the extra-moral foundation of his
morality.

Morality as Negation
A common characteristic of moral interpretations of the world
is the negation of some or all of existence.
ment on existence:
over existence.

Morality passes judg-

doing this allows it then to assert its control

A basic means employed here in the service of morality

is the theory of cause and effect.

Interpretation of existence in

terms of cause and effect provides man with a way of grasping existence (if only an imaginary, created one), allowing

him at least to

think that he is controlling the flux bf existence.

What distinguishes

12GM, I, §10; VI/2, pp. 284-88

= GM,

I, §10, pp. 36-39.
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the moral from the extra-moral period in the history of man is the rejection of the traditional framework of causality, and thus a rejection of intentionality. 1 3

What is important in a given action for

those who have gone beyond the moral framework is precisely that which
is not intentional.

By going beyond the framework of causality and

intentionality, the imm.oralist can discover the fullness of human
activity, the perception of which is denied the moralist when he sees
human actions within the narrow framework of causality.

Morality is

necessarily an interpretation of the world which denies much of existence because it is bound to an understanding of the world and human
action in terms of cause and effect--a mode of understanding which
only touches on the surface, concealing more than it reveals.
The point of contrast to the moral interpretation of the world
is that offered by the imm.oralists.
aspects, rather than deny it. 14

They affirm existence in all its

They are the antithesis of those who

believe in the Christian or decadence morality. 15

They are the

strongest power--they constitute the world in their own image, 16

13JGB, II, §32; VI/2, pp. 46-47 = BGE, II, §32, pp. 43-45.

14c8tzendllmmerung, in Nietzsche Werke, Sechste Abteilungt
Dritter Band (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), p. 81 =Twilight of
the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 491-92. Hereafter abbreviated as GD and TW respectively.
15 EH, "Warurn ich ein Schicksal bin," 4; VI/3, pp. 365-67
EH, "Why I am a Destiny," 4, pp. 328-30.
16WM, §116, p. 84 =WP, §116, p. 71 =
p. 232.

=

NF, VIII/3, 15(44),
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whereas the moralists accept the givenness of morality.
The contrast here is between the moralists and the immoralists, the weak and the powerful, the negators of life and its affirmers.
For the moralists the game of existence is something which dominates
them.

For the immoralists, their power allows them to affirm and

creatively transform this game through their creative play--the will
to power.

Morality, Free WiZZ and Purpose
The conceptual difficulties surrounding the moral interpretation have their foundation in this:
mistaken for reality itself.
example of this.

schemas of interpretation are

The doctrine of free will provides an

Nietzsche speculates that this probably arose out

of the feeling of freedom of the ruling caste.

However, it was even-

tually falsely transferred from the socio-political realm into the
metaphysical sphere. 17

The end result of this process was the postu-

lation of something called a "free will" which was presumed to have
a distinct existence.

Such a free will, according to Nietzsche, simply

does not exist--it is an invention which does not correspond to anything "in itself," a fiction.

Nietzsche's arguments in this regard

are not directed primarily against the possibility of becoming free,
but rather against the notion of a "free will" which would serve as
the foundation of such freedom.

Freedom does not come from a faculty,

but is created by the will to power in its creative play.

17MA II, II, §9;

IV/3, p. 183.
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Not only does such a thing as the "free will" not exist, but
to assume its existence results in a distorted view of human activity.
Instead of seeing an action as the expression of the entire person-including what we call affects, sensation, evaluations, thoughts and
the will--we see the action as the result of the person's will.

This

is a distortion which results in a man composed of parts--the will,
cognitive faculty, sensory apparatus--rather than a totality-in-becoming.
A similar distortion takes place when we interpret actions in
terms of purposes.

If I consider the significance of an action only

in terms of that which it was intended to accomplish, I see only a
small part of the fullness of that act. 18
distortion in another sense:

The notion of purpose is a

I often form a clear notion of my pur-

poses only after I act--or at least when I have a reasonably good idea
of how successful my action will be. 19

Finally, it is often impos-

sible to foresee the consequences of an act.

To understand them fully,

or as fully as possible, it is necessary to view them as experiments,
the results of which can be only dimly anticipated.
The point of the arguments which Nietzsche advances is this: the
moral interpretation of the world (1) is a fiction, (2) is a narrow

18UW, II, §37, p. 17.
l9Arthur Danto has described well the psychological process involved when we deceive ourselves into thinking that we have such knowledge of our actions; see Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, pp. 113-14.
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fiction which prevents us from understanding the complexity and the
full possibilities of our actions, and (3) is a narrow fiction which

mistakes itself to be a statement about reality.
As a narrow and mistaken fictional interpretation of existence, morality judges existence in terms of two categories:
evil.

good and

Not only is there no foundation for these categories in them-

selves, there is al.so no basis for saying that existence is to be understood only--or even prirnarily--in terms of them.

The distinction

between good and evil creates a univocal world--all things have their
value determined in relation to this pair of opposites.

But while

these categories do not refer to the world itself, they do have a
foundation:

in the instincts, especially the herd instinct.

The

foundation in the herd instinct means not only that morality is a
game of self-deception, but also that in this game the moralists are
really the pawns or playthings of forces beyond their control.

More-

over, they cannot recognize this fact and cannot admit that their
respective moral systems are only interpretations founded in their
respective herd instincts, for that would be tantamount to admitting
that the foundation of their morality was an extra-moral one.

Morality

is the game of the herd and, as such, dominates the members of the
herd, making them the playthings in the game rather than allowing them
to be true, creative players.

Conclusion
Morality, then, is a game of interprP-tation with certain rules
which have their foundation, not in things themselves or a higher moral
law, but in our affects and instincts, especially the herd instinct.
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Belief in causality, intentionality and a free will are among the rules
of the game.

Nietzsche says that the world can be interpreted in

this way (since it obviously has been), but it is a mistaken interpretation insofar as it takes itself to be something more than an interpretation, insofar as its narrowness prevents the appearance of
the exceptional ones (the creative ones, the innnoralists, the free
spirits and the overman), and insofar as it is a negation of existence
rather than its affirmation.

For morality to recognize that it is

only an interpretation founded in the instincts of the herd is impossible--unless morality is to become innnorality, the moralist the
innnoralis t.
B.

The Will to Power

Willing and Creating
Nietzsche's critique of morality must be juxtaposed to his
positive notion of willing and creating which is found in Thus Spoke

Zarathustra and his notebooks.

In Zarathustra there is clearly no

denial of the will or its importance.

For Zarathustra himself, it is

the will which frees him, 20 which is his destiny, to which he sings
.
21
h ymns o f praise.

To will is to create;

the will is a creator. 22

20z, II, "Auf den Glliclseligen Inseln;"VI/l, pp. 105-08 = Z, II,
"On the Blessed Isles," pp. 85-88; Z, II, "Von der Erlosung," VI/l,
PP· 173-78 = Z, II, "On Redemption," pp. 137-42.
21 z, III, "Von alten und neuen Tafeln;" VI/l, pp. 264-65 = Z,
III, "On the Old and New Tablets," pp. 214-15.
22z, II, "Von der ErlOsung;" VI/l, pp. 173-78 = Z, II, "On
Redemption," pp. 137-42; Z, IV, "AuBer Dienst;" VI/l, pp. 317-42 =
Z, IV, "Retired," pp. 258-63.

127
The purest will is to be found in the one who wills beyond himself.

23

Zarathustra incarnates this image of the creator, the one who dares
to will.
The notion of willing that Zarathustra presents here is not to
be equated with the concept of a free will which Nietzsche criticizes.
Willing for Zarathustra is, first and foremost, a creative activity.
As such, it is not the confirmation of a given order of things or the
following of a moral law, but a creation--not only of order, but of
things themselves, and even of one's self.
one's entire being.

Second, it is an act of

Zarathustra's "will" is not in any way an entity

separate from him, although his poetic language can be misleading on
this point.

Third, his will seeks to affirm all of existence--but

this is not an indiscriminate affirmation of existence as given, but
a creative affirmation·in sharp contrast to the destructive negation
characteristic of morality.
Arthur Danto remarked that it seemed to be one of Nietzsche's
methodological directives "to abolish distinctions wherever found.

1124

This remark gives us some insight into the basic character of Nietzsche's critique of the will.

Traditionally, the will has functioned

as a bridge between the mind and the physical world, between thought
and action.

Nietzsche does not destroy this bridge through a critique

23

z, II, "Von der unbefleckten Erkenntnis;" VI/l, pp. 152-56
Z, II, "On Immaculate Perception," pp. 121-24.
24

Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 105.

=
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of the notion of free will in order to sever the two realms, but rather
to bring about the collapse of the two into each other.
is to destroy the need for a bridge.

His purpose

The notion of the creative will

in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a formulation of the will to power--a
notion which is meant to express the coming together of thought and
action in one world as the result of creative play.

The WiU to Power
The broad outlines of the doctrine of the will to power as
creative play have already been presented in a preliminary fashion.
Now they must be synthesized into a unified category.
In his notebooks, Nietzsche poses the question:

"Is the 'will

to power' a kind of 'will' or identical with the concept of 'will'? 1125
After asking whether the will to power is the same as desiring, as
commanding, as Schopenhauer's will as the "in itself of things," Nietzsche puts forth his position.
My proposition is: that the will of previous psychology is an
unjustified generalization, that this will does not exist at
all, that instead of grasping the idea of the development of one
definite will into many forms, one has eliminated the character
of the will by subtracting from its content, its 'whither 1 ?26

25

WM, §692, p. 468 =WP, §692, p. 369 =NF, VIII/3, 14(21), p.
93. "
ist 'Wille zur Macht' eine Art 'Wille' oder identisch mit
dem Begriff 'Wille'?"

26

Ibid. ": mein Satz ist: daf3 WiUe der bisherigen Psychologie,
eine ungerechtfertigte Verallgemeinerung ist, daf3 es diesen Willen gar
nicht giebt, daf3 statt die Ausgestaltung Eines bestimmten Willens in
viele Formen zu £assen, man den Charakter des Willens weggestrichen
hat, indem man den Inhalt, das Wohin? heraus subtrahirt hat." (The
italics are given in the Colli and Montinati edition and followed in
the translation above, which differs in regard to the italics from
Kaufmann's translation.)
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Criticizing Schopenhauer's notion of will as being "a mere empty
word," Nietzsche continues by arguing that even the "will to live" is
but a special case of the will to power.

From this one may conclude

that the "whither?" which must be included in the notion of a definite
will is "power. 1127

The will to power is then one definite will, de-

finable in terms of the "whither" of power, which develops into many
forms.

In the same passage, Nietzsche argues further that this will

to power is the primitive affect form, 28 and that all other affects
are only developments of it, giving some idea of some of the "forms"
this might take.
The "whither" of the will to power is power itself:

especially

the increase of power:
. • . not merely conservation of energy, but maximal economy of
use, so the only reality is the will to grow stronger of every
center of force--not self-preservation, but the will to appropriate, dominate, increase, grow stronger.29
The will to power then divides itself into many specific centers of

27 This formulation should not be taken to imply the existence
of power outside of the will. Heidegger's formulation of the relationship between will and power_ is quite accurate: "Das Wesen der
Macht ist Wille zur Macht, und das Wesen des Willens ist Wille zur
Macht." Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), Vol.
II, p. 265.
28WM, §688, p. 465 =WP, §688, p. 366 =NF, VIII/3, 14(121), p.
92. "DaB der Wille zur Macht die primitive Affekt-Form ist, daB alle
anderen Affekte nur eine Ausgestaltungen sind .
"
29wM, §689, p. 466 =WP, §689, p. 367
NF, VIII/3, 14(81), p.
53. ". · . . nicht bloB Contanz der Energie: sondern Maximal-Okonomie
des Verbrauchs: so daB das Starker-werden-woZZen von jedem Kraftcentrum
aus die einzige Realitat ist,--nicht Selbstbewahrung, sondern Aneignung,
Herr-werden-, Mehr-werden-, Starker-werden-wollen."
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force, and on this basis plurality is introduced into a world which is
"the will to power and nothing more. 1130

The interaction of these

specific centers of force, each of which seeks to expand and increase
its power, is the basic interplay of the universe.

This process takes

place on every level from the cosmic to the human.

Here we are con-

cerned with the specifically human instances of this will to power,
for it is here that it finds its most complex and most powerful manifestation.

Here the play of forces in the universe is transformed

into the creative play of the will to power reaching its highest express ion.

The Opposite of the Will to POlJer
How is difference introduced into the Nietzschean universe?
Is there another operative principle, in addition to--or within--the
will to power, a counter principle, to account for the possibility of
opposition?
Four possibilities present themselves.

First, Nietzsche him-

self writes of the principle of laisser-aller as a counter principle
to the will to power, 31 and he implies a connection between that and
the instincts of decadence.

Yet is it not possible to see these very

instincts as a weaker manifestation of the will to power itself?

The

The instinct of decadence is indeed referred to as an instance of the

30wM, §1067, p. 697 =WP, §1067, p. 550.
zur Macht--und nichts auBerdem!"
31 WM, §122, p. 89

= WP,

§122, p. 75.

" • • • dieser Wille
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w1·11 to power. 32
power. 33

Our drives themselves are reducible to the will to

If so, then all conflicts appear to be cases of a conflict

of the will to power with itself.

But what separates it into these

various centers of force which conflict with each other?

The prin-

ciple of Zaisser aZZer is in the end reducible to the will to power,
but it can function as a counter-principle in this way:
of weakness, "letting go," the decline of power.

Zaisser aZZer
will to power.

it consists

Morality, decadence,

as signs of weakness are counter-instances of a strong
They are still the will to power, but a declining one.

They provide an opposition to the increasing will to power:
versus weakness, increase in power versus decrease in it.

strength
This cor-

responds to Heidegger's position that, since the essence of power is
to increase itself, to over-power itself, the opposite of the will to
. t h e power 1 essness to power. 34
power is

A second possibility is that the will to power provides its
own internal opposition by splitting into various parts.

Where the

attempt at appropriation and assimilation fails and a unity is not
achieved, a duality arises as the result of the will to power, with
the consequence that,

11

in order not to let go what has been conquered,

the will to power divides itself into two wills (in some cases without

32 WM, §461, p. 323 =WP, §461, p. 254 =NF, VIII/3, 14(135),
p. 112.

33uw, II, §838, p. 287.
34cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, p. 266.
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completely surrendering the connection between its two parts)."
I think Nietzsche means here is this:

35

What

one instance of the will to

power, when threatened with the possibility of disintegrating completely because it is trying to control too much, makes a strategic
retreat and splits into two instances.

If we look at this in terms

of the idea of creative play, it would mean that when the tension of
keeping one play world together becomes so great as to threaten the
destruction of that entire world, two smaller, more manageable worlds
are created.

But this explanation does not account for the original

opposition which gives rise to the tension.
A third way of approaching the problem would be to argue that
the principle of opposition is nothingness.

The close relation between

the will to power and nihilism suggests this avenue of approach as
consonant with Nietzsche's thinking.

The will to power and the trans-

valuation of all values represent a movement that, "in some future will
take the place of this perfect nihilism--but presupposes it, logically
and psychologically, and certainly can come only after and out of it.

1136

Furthermore, if nihilism is taken as formlessness, then the will to

35WM, §656, p. 438 =WP, §656, p. 346 =NF, VIII/2, 9(151), p.
88. " •• um nicht fahren zu lassen, was erobert ist, tritt der Wille
zur Macht in zwei Willen auseinander (unter Umstanden ohne seine Verbindung unter einander vi::illig aufzugeben) • • • "
36 WM, "Vorrede," 4, p. 4 = WP, "Preface," 4, pp. 3-4. "
eine Bewegung, welche in irgend einer Zukunft jenen vollkommenen Nihilismus abli::isen wird; welche ihn aber voraussetzt, logisch und psychologisch, welche schlechterdings nur auf ihn und aus ihn kommen kann."
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power as f arming,
s h aping,
an d res h aping
counter-princip
0

in formlessness.

This interpretation allows room for the first alter-

native considered above, for the instincts of decadence
inverse relationship to the will to power:

stand in an

"wherever the will to

power declines in any form, there in invariably also a physiological
decline, decadence. 11 38

Nothingness, formlessness, decadence, Zaisser

aZZer all indicate a decreasing power.

Nothingness as formlessness

presents the best formulation of such a principle.

Insofar as Nie-

tzsche considers nihilism as a historical movement rather than as an
ever-present nossibilitv. nihilism must be taken as a particular instance of a decrease in vower.

This interpretation does no injustice

to the nihilist's experience, for it is characterized precisely by
the lack of power to hold his world together.
There is a fourth way of approaching this problem, again
beginning with the idea that the will to power can only express itself
in opposition.

The highest will to power, Nietzsche argues in a frag-

ment from 1883-85, is "to impose upon becoming the character of being. 11 39
It is in the notion of the eternal recurrence, the idea that "everything recurs," that one encounters "the closest annroximation of a

37WM, §656, p. 438 =WP. §656. o. 346 =NF. VIII/2. 9(151).
p.

88.
38

A. 17: VI/3. n. 181 =A. 17. n. 583. "Wo in irgend welcher
Form der Wille zur Macht niedergeht. giebt es jedes Mal auch einen
phvsiologischen Ri.ickgang. eine decadence."
39 WM, §617, p. 418 = WP, §617, p. 330. "Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzupragen--das ist der hochste Wille zur Macht."
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world of becoming to the world of being.

1140

Here, in the imposition

of the character of being upon becoming, the greatest opposition is
encountered.

But is this not the same dichotomy as that between form

and formlessness, the will to power and nothingness?

The highest form

of the will to power is the willing of the eternal recurrence, the
imposition of the character of being upon becoming, for it is here
that one encounters the highest degree of resistance, the greatest
opposition.
The above remarks provide us with the foundation for the
formulation of a counter-principle for the will to power, a principle
which manifests itself in powerlessness, becoming, formlessness,
nothingness and nihilism.

Moreover, it reveals the fundamental meaning

of the will to power as the imposition of order and form on chaos
and formlessness, and

~t

is here that the meaning of the will to power

as creative play becomes apparent.

Moreover, it allows us to under-

stand the apparently pointless repetition in the end of the last
fragment of The WiZZ to Power, where Nietzsche describes his vision
of the universe as a monstrous play of forces.

This world is the wiZZ to power--and nothing besides!

And you
yourselves are also this will to power--and nothing besides!41

40Ibid. "DaB aUes wiederkehrt, ist die extremste Annaheru.ng
einer Weit des Werdens an die des Seins:--GipfeZ der Betrachtung."
41

WM, §1067, p. 697 =WP, §1067, p. 550. "Diese Weit ist
Und auch ihr selber seid
dieser Wille zur Macht--und nichts auBerdem!"

der WiZZe zur Macht--und nichts auf3erdem!
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Everything is the will to power, but on its lowest levels it is least
organized--formless, chaotic, dispersed.

On its highest levels it is

most ordered, giving form, imposing the character of being on becoming.
In both senses, the will to power is play.

On its lowest levels, it

is the chaotic play of forces; on its highest levels, the creative
play of the powerful.
will to power;

The world is the will to power, and we are the

but insofar as our will to power does not give order

and meaning to the world, it remains a random play of forces.

As

one moves up the order of rank of power, one sees the way in which
play transforms itself:
chaotic activity;

at its lowest reaches, it is a random,

at its highest points, a creative activity which

builds entire worlds.

The Nietzschean category which holds this view

of play together throughout its many forms is the will to power.
Thus the decline or absence of power represents the counterprinciple against which all creative play struggles.

In order to

create order, form, meaning and beauty in the world, the specific
wills to power must continually seek to extend the boundaries of
their created worlds.

The specific ways in which this is done will
I

be considered in the next chapter, where Nietzsche's notions of the
overman and self-overcoming are considered.

Conclusion
It is now possible to distinguish between two fundamentally
different types of play in Nietzsche's philosophy:

the creative play

of the will to power in its higher manifestations and the declining
play of morality and other forms of existence which are characterized
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by the decrease in power.

Whereas the play of the creative will to

power affirms existence in its creative activity, the moralist's
game denies it by judging it only in terms of moral value.

Whereas

the creative play of the will to power affirms the totality of man's
existence, the game that the moralists play divides man into parts-will, cognition, sensation--and affirms one or two of these at the
expense of the remainder.

The creative play of the will to power

seeks to expand itself, moral games seek to fortify themselves against
intrusion.

Whereas the person who is his will to power most fully

is most in control of his play, the moralists--because of their powerlessness, because of their herd instinct, and because they do not
recognize the forces at work on them--are but pawns in a game outside
of their control.

CHAPTER V
ON THE SELF, SELF-OVERCOMING AND THE OVERMAN

IntPoduction
The self is not a static entity for Nietzsche, but rather an
interplay of affects.

This interplay can be such that thinking and

willing are dominated by the play of affects, in which case willing
and thinking are made into the playthings of the affects.

There is,

however, a second sense in which the self is play--the self as the
will to power whose creative play organizes and directs the forces
under its connnand.

The self as play in this sense is the overcoming

of the traditional concept of the self.

The symbol of the highest

degree of such self-overcoming for Nietzsche is the overman.
In this chapter this two-fold notion of the self as play will
be developed in relation to the ego, willing, thinking, evaluations,
sensations and the affects in order to show that the fundamental
meaning of self-overcoming on each of these levels resides in creative
play.

This category of creative play is the key to Nietzsche's doc-

trine of the overman.
In dealing with the problem of the "ego," Nietzsche directs
his remarks toward three main themes:

(1) the way in which the ego

brings about an overcoming of the herd instinct, (2) the linguistic
basis of the concept of the ego, and (3) the relationship between
137
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the concept of the ego and the belief in causality, being, and things.
He also discusses the possibility of overcoming the "ego-feeling,"
and this notion of overcoming is directly related to the will to power
as creative play.

It will be shown here that his criticisms are

directed against those conceptions of the ego which would reduce the
ego to an independent entity, and that he argues in favor of a notion
of the ego as will to power.

The concept of the ego as an independent

entity results in its becoming a plaything of the affects, while the
ego as the will to power emerges as the creative player in existence.

The Ego as the OVeraoming of the Herd
Zarathustra's argument in favor of the ego is based in part
on his conception of the ego as the negation of the herd instinct.
The clever and self-seeking ego marks the decline of the herd. 1

Thus

Zarathustra exhorts us to pronounce the ego wholesome and whole, 2 a
position which would seem to entail the rehabilitation of man's
drives.3

In his speech, "On the Afterworldly," Zarathustra puts the

matter even more forcefully.
Indeed, this ego and the ego's contradiction and confusion still
speak most honestly of its being--this creating, willing, valuing
ego, which is the measure and value of all things. And this most
honest being, the ego, speaks of the body and still wants the
body, even when it poetizes and raves and flutters with broken

lz, I, "Von rausend und Einem Ziele;" VI/l, p. 72
Thousand and One Goals," p. 60.

2z, III, "Von den drei Bosen;" VI/l, p. 236
Three Evils," p. 191.
3uw, II, §§376-77, PP· 495-97.

= Z,

= Z,

I, "On the

III, "On the
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wings. It learns to speak ever more honestly, this ego: and the
more it learns, the more words and honors it finds for body and
earth.4
It is the ego which creates, wills and values, which is the measure and
value of things.

Clearly, this is not an ego which exists only on

the conceptual level, but rather one that wants to make itself incarnate in the world through the body.

It is this experience of the

ego which leads to a new sense of pride, the will to create "a meaning
for the earth • • • to will this way which man has walked blindly,
and to affirm it and no longer to sneak away from it like the sick
and decaying. 115

The appearance of the ego--as presented in this

passage--indicates that man is beginning to take hold of his existence.

Instead of walking blindly, he wills and thereby affirms his

path.

The appearance of the ego indicates the first stirrings of the

wi 11 to power.

The Linguistic Basis of the Concept of the Ego
Nietzsche's arguments against the concept of the ego begin

4z, I, "Von den Hinterweltern;" VI/l, p. 32 = Z, I, "On the
Afterworldly," p. 32. "Ja, diess Ich und des Ich's Widerspruch und
Wirrsal redet noch am redlichsten von seinem Sein, dieses schaffende,
wollende, werthende !ch, welches das Maass und der Werth der Dinge
ist.
"Und diess redlichste Sein, das Ich--das redet vom Leibe, und
es will noch den Leib, selbst wenn es dichtet und schwarmt und mit
zerbrochnen Flilgeln flattert.
"Innner redlicher lernt es reden, das Ich: und je mehr es
lernt, um so mehr findet es Worte und Ehren filr Leib und Erde."

5Ibid., p. 33 =ibid., p. 32.

"
• der Erde Sinn . • •
diesen Weg wollen, den blindlings der Mensch gegangen, und gut ihn
heissen und nicht mehr von ihm bei Seite schleichen, gleich den Kranken
und Absterbenden!"
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with his critique in The Daum, although there is clearly an implied
critique of the self already to be found in his notion of the Dionysian overcoming of the self.

In the section on, "The So-Called

'Ego'," Nietzsche argues that our concept of the ego is limited by
our language and misshapen through its prejudices. 6

To presume that

we are limited in our being to that of which we are conscious and
that for which we have words is to open the door to misunderstanding
ourselves.

In a similar way, the reflexive pronoun represents a self

quite different from the subject. 7

The false opinion which arises

out of this linguistic confusion is, however, significant in that it
shapes our character and destiny.

In the Preface to Beyond Good and

Evil, Nietzsche points out the way in which the ego superstition is
but an up-dated version of the "soul superstition. 118
The belief in the ego is, then, an unjustified generalization
insofar as the content of that belief is not coextensive with the
ego itself.

This unjustified generalization is perhaps inescapable,

given the nature of language. 9

The ego is a complex reality, not a

a thing--but language destroys this complexity, substituting a single
word for it.

Nietzsche's arguments here are not directed against that

complex reality to which the concept of the ego refers, but against

6M, II, §115; V/l, p. 105.
7uw, II, §§163-64, p. 62.
8 JGB, "Vorrede;" VI/2, p. 3 = BGE, "Preface," p. 2.

9WM, §552, p. 358

= WP,

§522, p. 283;

UW, II, §33, p. 16.
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the over-simplification involved in our concept of the ego.

The Concept of the Ego and the Belief in Causality, Being and Things
Nietzsche adds to these criticisms in his discussion of "The
Four Great Errors," and in his notebooks.

In The Twilight of the

Idols the belief in the ego is seen as a consequence of the belief in
the will as a cause (the ego as "subject," the cause of thoughts).
Arguing against mental causes, for which the will is the paradigm,
Nietzsche maintains that the ego has become, "a fable, a fiction, a
play on words:

it has altogether ceased to think, feel, or will!"lO

It is only a piece in a conceptual game philosophers play--a fiction
which they mistake for a reality.

As such, it is incapable of being

the cause of anything.
In addition to this, the belief in the ego is the foundation
of our belief in the concepts of "being" and "thing."
took the concept of being from the concept of the ego;

Man" • • • even
he posited

'things' as 'being' in his image, in accordance with his concept of
the ego as a cause. 1111

Thus it comes as no surprise when man finds

being and thingness in the world, for he himself put them there.

Nie-

tzsche implies that practicallv the entire framework of Western thought
has developed out of the belief in the ego.

lOGD, "Die vier groBen Irrtiimer," 3; VI/3, p. 85 =TI, "The
Four Great Errors," 3, p. 495. "Das ist zur Fabel geworden, zur Fiktion, zum Wortspiel: das hat ganz und gar aufgehort, zu denken, zu
fiihlen und zu wollen!"

11 Ibid.

"
er nahm erst den Begriff Sein aus dem Begriff
Ich heraus, er hat die 'Dinge' als seiend gesetzt nach seinem Bilde,
nach seinem Begriff des Ichs als Ursache."
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The origins of this belief are two-fold.

First, as already

mentioned, the concept of the ego can be traced back to the superstition of the soul;

A second source of this belief is the necessity

of dealing with the world, although out very survival is not contingent on this necessity. 12

We need unities in order to be able to

reckon, and the concept of the ego is the paradigm for the concept of
unity. 13

Insofar as the concept of the ego is the foundation of

"being," and insofar as knowledge is only possible on the basis of a
belief in being, then the concept of the ego is the condition of the
possibility of knowledge.

14

But within this context, being is some-

thing which is imposed upon the world of becoming, a falsification,
"a perspective illusion--an apparent unity that encloses everything
like a horizon.
ways.

1115

This statement can be developed in two different

If the ego is the paradigm of all being, and if the ego is in

fact not being but becoming.16 then the world of being is an illusion.
The task for the future would then be a rethinking of the nature of
existence in such a way that the traditional categories of reason,
grounded in a concept of being, are replaced by categories of becoming.

12 uw, II, §115, P· 53.
13WM, §635, p. 428 =WP, §635, p. 338 =NF, VIII/3, 14(79),
p. 50.

14 WM, §518, p. 355 = WP, §518, p. 281.

15 Ibid.

" . . . eine perspektivische Illusion . • . die scheinbare Einheit, in der wie in einer Horizontlinie alles sich zusammenschlieBt."
16 WM, §519, p. 355

WP, §519, p. 281.
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But there is another way of developing the implications of this statement.

If the highest form of the will to power is the imposition of

the characteristics of being on the world of becoming, 17 then the
concept of the ego would appear as the highest expression of the will
to power.

In one sense this does not appear to be the direction that

Nietzsche wants to go in at all, since it would appear to give a justification for the metaphysical concept of the self which he wants to
reject.

However, this line of thinking is in harmony with his own

concept of the self as presented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: a created
self which gives stability, order, and being to the world of becoming.
However, this apparent contradiction can be resolved.

The creation

of the self through the will to power does not involve a metaphysical
notion of a self existing "in itself."
that is at issue here.

It is clearly a

created self

The fullest expression of the will to power

involves the creation of the most powerful self;

it does not imply

that that self has any independent existence as a metaphysical· entity
apart from the will to power.

This self, as created by the will to

power, is not a thing but an on-going process.

It gives--creates--

order, stability, and being to the world of becoming through its
creative play and thereby creates itself.
'The main thrust of Nietzsche's criticisms of the ego directs
itself against the concept of the ego as an independent entity existing in the world of things, of being.

17WM, §617, p. 418

The ego is a simplification

WP, §617, p. 330.
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necessarily- leading to

a division

of the self.

It can never encompass

or be identical with "the central government of our nature" because
it is only a conceptual synthesis, 18 nor can it be one with the totality
19
.
b ecause it
. intro
·
d uces an ego I non-ego d istinction.
·
·
·
o f b eing

Thus

the concept of an independent ego leaves us with a bifurcated world.
Furthermore, once this dichotomy between ego and non-ego is established, there is a tendency on the part of the ego to feel overpowered
by the immensity of the non-ego. 20

This results in the denial of the

ego, the triumph of the herd instinct, and the prohibition of the
strongest, most natural and only real drives.

Finally, perceiving

things within the ego/non-ego framework clouds our vision of the
world by forcing our perception into one particular framework, reifying
what would otherwise b~ a multiplicity of processes and relationships
into a limited set of "things. 1121

Overcoming the "Ego-Feeling"
Thus the possible benefits connected with overcoming the "egofeeling" (das IchgefUhl) would include an expanded perception of the
world.

18WM, §371, p. 251 =WP, §371, p. 200. "Das 'Ich'--welches
mit der einheitlichen Verwaltung unsres Wesens nicht eins ist!--ist ja
nur eine begriffliche Synthesis."
19WM, §786, p. 525

= WP, §786, pp. 413-14

p. 152.
20Ibid.

2luw, II, §447 ' p. 180 .

NF, VIII/2, 10(57),
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If we eliminate these additions, no things remain but only dynamic
quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta:
their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their
"effect" upon the same. The will to power is not a being, but a
pathos--the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting
first emerge. 22
The world for Nietzsche then becomes a collection of dynamic quanta of
the will to power, each one of which is related to all others, but
which are not to be understood under the category of causality.
Yet one would want to ask at this point:
self?

what is left of the

Have we in the process of achieving liberation simultaneously

destroyed that which was to be liberated? Here I think that Nietzsche
would argue that the self has not been destroyed, but rather our
traditional interpretation of the self has been shown to be a falsification.

The self is no longer an isolated entity, but rather is

the creative play of the will to power.

The degree to which it is

will to power determines its strength, determines the degree to which
it can create itself through its creative play.
The framework for the following interpretation is to be found
in a fragment in Nietzsche's notebooks in which he sketches the relationship among a number of his key categories.
Our intellect, our will, even our sensations are dependent upon
our value judgments: these correspond to our drives and the

22 w11, §635, p. 429 =WP, §635, p. 339 =NF, VIII/3, 14(79), p.
51. "Eliminiren wir diese Zuthaten: so bleiben keine Dinge i.ibrig,
sondern dynamische Quanta, in einem SpannungsverhaltniB zu allen anderen
dynamischen Quanten: deren Wesen in ihrem VerhaltniB zu allen anderen
Quanten besteht, in ihrem 'Wirken' auf dieselben--der Wille zur Macht
nicht ein Sein, nicht ein Werden, sondern ein Pathos ist die elementars te Thatsache, aus der sich erst ein Werden, ein Wirken ergiebt
II
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conditions of their existence.
will to power. 23

Our drives are reducible to the

I shall attempt to show the ways in which

our intellect, will and

sensations are dependent upon our evaluations, and why these must
correspond to our drives.

Finally, the relationship among the various

drives will be shown to be that of either a free play of forces, in
which case the self becomes the plaything of those forces, or a creative play organized by the individual's will to power, in which case
the self becomes the player.
There are two senses in which thinking is play for Nietzsche.
First, it rltilts from the interplay of affect.
really the plaything of the affects.

As such, thinking is

Second, when the person realizes

the true nature of thinking and its relation to the affects, it becomes possible for him to affirm this relationship and to organize
it.

This is the second way in which thinking can be play;

thinking

as the will to power organizes the play of affects into a creative
play.

In this case, thinking is an expression of the creative will

to power of the thinker.

The Dependence of Intellect, Will and Sensation on Evaluations 24

23uw, II, §838, p. 287. "Unser Intellekt, unser Wille, ebenso
andere Empfindungen sind abhangig von unseren Wertschatzungen: diese
entsprechen unseren Trieben und deren Existenzbedingungen. Unsre
Trieben sind reduzierbar auf den Willen zur Macht."
24 Throughout this section there are references to thinking,
willing, sensation, etc. which give the impression that these exist
in themselves apart from each other and the multiplicity of forces
whose activity constitutes the self. This misleading impression is
unavoidable, given the misleading character of language.
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The InteZZect and Ihinking.

The intellect appears as the place

where the various affects compete with one another for dominance.

There

is no drive for knowledge, rather the intellect is "in the service of
various drives. 1125

In the notebooks from the period of The Dawn,

Nietzsche pictures the intellect in the following terms.
The intellect is the tool of our drives and nothing more; it will
It sharpens itself in the struggle of the various
drives, and refines the activity of each individual drive thereby.
The will to power, to the infallibility of our person is in our
greatest justice and honesty: skepticism arises only in relation
to all authority. We do not want to be duped, not even by our
drives! But then what does not want that? Certainly a drive! 26

never be free.

Nietzsche attempts to substantiate the thesis that the intellect is
the 'tool of our drives through consideration of specific ideals and
moral judgments, in each case reducing the ideal to the emotions that
gave rise to it and arguing that its expression in language is but

. which
.
another way in

~he

drive
.
.
27
seeks dominance.

Thinking is then a sign language, pointing to the competing
drives, each of which seeks to gain dominance over the others. 28

In

25uw, I, §639, p. 243. "Kein 'Erkenntnistrieb': der Intellekt
im Dienst der verschiedenen Triebe."
26 UW, II, §348, p. 132. "Der Intellekt ist das Werkzeug unserer Triebe und nichts mehr, er wird nie frei. Er scharft sich im
Kampf der verschiedenen Triebe, und verfeinert die Tatigkeit jedes
einzelnen Triebes dadurch. In unserer groBten Gerechtigkeit und Redlichkeit ist der Wille nach Macht, nach Unfehlbarkeit unserer Person:
Skepsis ist nur in Hinsicht auf alle Autoritat, wir wollen nicht
dilpiert sein, auch nicht von unseren Trieben! Aber was eigentlich
will denn da nich t? Ein Trieb gewiB ! "
27

uw, II, §352, p. 134.

28 UW, II, §253, p. 97. "Das Denken ist • . . nur eine Zeichensprache filr den Machtausgleich van Affekten."
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his explanations, Nietzsche uses several images.

When speaking of the

intellect as a "tool" of drives or affects,29 he implies a purposeful
activity on the part of the affects since the notion of a tool implies
a purpose.

The intellect is a tool insofar as the various drives and

affects seek to gain more power by means of it.
plies purpose only in this sense.

The term "tool" im-

Insofar as these affects are related

to each other in an interplay of affects, thinking could also be called
their "plaything."

Insofar as Nietzsche employs the image of a strug-

gle among the affects, the term "tool" is more appropiate.

The notion

of a struggle is often the dominant one, and in this image it is the
struggle itself which seeks to maintain itself, 30 not the being in
which the struggle takes place.

An alternate view is the suggestion

that it is the affects which bring about the struggle.

In either view

it is the activity, the interaction among the various affects, which
constitutes the primary reality.

The intellect and thinking are, in

this view, simply the by-products of this process;

they in no way

cause it.
Nietzsche does not seem to differentiate clearly between play
and struggle.

He suggests that thoughts are, "signs of a play and

struggle of the affects:
roots."

31

they always hang together with their hidden

This leads to the rejection of a unified subject and the

29uw, II, §§340, 874, PP· 124, 301.
31

30Ibid., §255, p. 97.

UW, II, §248, p. 95. "Die Gedanken sind Zeichen von einem
Spiel und Kampf der Affekte: sie hangen immer mit ihren verborgenen
Wurzeln zusammen."
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substitution of Nietzsche's hypothesis about the subject as a multiplicity of forces, "whose interplay and struggle constitutes the
foundation of our thinking and even our consciousness. 11 3 2

Thinking

then appears as something which happens in the subject, an interplay
of sensations.
Our thinking is really nothing but a very refined interwoven play
of seeing, hearing, feeling, the logical forms are physiological
laws of sensory perception. Our senses are developed centers of
sensation with strong resonances and mirrors.33
Viewed in this manner, thinking appears to be equivalent to ,fantasy,
as is suggested in a fragment from this same period.

Thinking, our

fundamental intellectual life, is the "playful pondering of material
• • • This spontaneous play of fantasizing force is our fundamental
intellectual life. 1134

We seldom become conscious of this process,

but rather engage in the grossest of oversimplifications.

Although

Nietzsche suggests in this fragment that precise hearing and seeing,
in contrast to the fantasy which we mistake for true perception, is
possible, it is seldom achieved.

32 WM, §490, p. 341 =WP, §490, p. 270. " • . . deren Zusarrnnenspiel und Kampf unserem Denken und ilberhaupt unserem BewuBtsein zugrunde liegt . • • "
33NF, V/l, 6(433), p. 639. "Unser Denken ist wirklich nichts
als ein sehr verfeinertes zusarmnengeflochtenes Spiel des Behen H8rens
F'Uhlens, die logischen Formen sind physiologische Gesetze der Sinneswahrnehmungen. Unsere Sinne sind entwickelte Empfindungscentra mit
starken Resonanzen und Spiegeln."

34Ibid., 10(D79), p. 760. "
. spielende Verarbeiten des
Materials . . . . Dieses spontane Spiel von phantasirender Kraft ist
unser geistiges Grundleben."

150

The necessity for the oversimplification characteristic of
most thinking is to be found in our need to perceive things as wholes.
For example, we think we see the movement of a bird as movement, when
we actually interpret the data of our perception and infer the movement from that. 35

We put in more than is there at times.

In another

fragment Nietzsche uses the same premise, that perception imposes a
unity not otherwise present, but this time argues that this imposition of unity involves a leaving out of a multiplicity of factors.

"Between two thoughts aU possible affects play their game:

but the

movements are too quick, then we misunderstand them, we conceal them
The need to understand things in terms of causality (and
thus to understand them as things, not as processes) is in part the
source of this deception, and causality itself could presumably be
traced back to the dominance of a particular drive.
Thinking, then, is basically play in two senses:
affects and the playing together with affects.

the play of

First, in a descriptive

sense, Nietzsche argues that thinking, which had mistakenly been mistakenly understood as something dealing with a real world, is reducible
to the interplay of our affects;
fantasy.
favor:

it is hardly distinguishable from

This fantasy which we call thinking has ,one thing in its
it works.

By reducing processes and events to conceptual

35Ibid.
3 6WM, §477, p. 332 =WP, §477, p. 264 =NF, VIII/2, pp. 295-96.
"Zwischen zwei Gedanken spielen noch aUe moglichen Affekte ihr Spiel:
aber die Bewegungen sind zu rasch, deshalb verkennen wir sie, leugnen
•
•
wir
sie
. • . II
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unities--"things," "causes," "effects," etc.--it can create a world
that it can r:ianage.

However, in doing so it denies its own nature

by thinking of itself as independent of emotion, affects, etc.

This

denial of its own nature may well serve the needs of life up to a
point, but it also contains a weakenss.

The thinking subject, by re-

fusing to acknowledge the way in which it is related to the affects,
becomes their "tool."

Insofar as the person identifies himself with

his thinking self, he becomes only the tool of his affects.
brings us to the second notion of play here.

This

By recognizing that

thinking is the result of the interplay and struggle of affects, the
person is able to see that he is this play.

Insofar as this happens,

the person is then in a better position to creatively organize this
interplay of forces, to engage himself activtty in this creative play
which is fundamentally the will to power.

The way in which this is

so will now be discussed in relation to Nietzsche's notion of willing.

Willing

The Critique of the Will.

The analysis of the self in terms

of play can now be extended to the notion of the will.

The Nietzschean

critique of the will reveals it also to be the plaything of the affects.

His affirmation of willing, on the other hand, is of willing

as playing together with--and creatively organizing--the play of affects.
The main lines of Nietzsche's critique of willing have already
been presented in the previous chapter.

Insofar as willing is depen-

dent upon thinking, it is already clear that willing, even if it does
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take place, lacks the foundation in thinking that the will presumes it
has.

It is only a by-product, the "accompanying appearance of all

outpourings of force."37

The belief in willing, a belief in miracles, 38

is founded on the belief 1n causality, a false extension of the scientific view of the world. 39

The AffiT'lTlation of the WiZZ.

Willing does, however, retain

meaning for Nietzsche, a meaning which is similar to his notion of
thinking as play.

In a fragment from 1880, he relates the feeling of

freedom to an excess of strength, which leads one to act for a purpose, "but the purpose does not completely rule us; it only gives an
opportunity for our strength to play with itself ."40

Knowing that

there will be many other such opportunities, we do not feel ourselves
to be enslaved to that particular purpose.

What one might call authen-

tic willing, then, lies 1n giving free play to the forces within one,
in which case a purpose is but the occasion for the playing out of
these events.

It is not the subject as a unity which wills, but

rather the plurality of forces doing the "willing."

This is in harmony

with the idea that the will to power is in general willing to become

37 UW, II, §720, p. 231.

". . • Beglei terscheinung all es Aus-

stromens von Kraft."
38WM, §670, p. 449

= WP, §670, p. 354.

39Ibid.

40NF, V/1, 3 (48), p. 390. ". . . aber der Zweck beherrsch t
uns nicht ganz, er giebt nur eine Gelegenheit, damit unsere Kraft
mit sich spiele, wir wissen, es giebt noch viele andere Gelegenheiten
dazu . . . "
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stronger, 41 but it is not the subject as such which does the willing,
but rather the forces which converge in that space and time which we
identify in everyday language as the subject.
periment.

Such willing is an ex-

In a fragment from the time of The DOhJn, Nietzsche argues

that actually willing something is "to make an experiment in order to
experience what we can do;
this. 1142

success or failure alone will teach us about

This involves a feeling of connnanding or ordering:

"A man

who wiUs connnands something within himself that renders obedience. 1143
This is a complex relationship in which the one who connnands is also
the one who obeys in certain circumstances. 44
In evaluating Nietzsche's position on the will, Arthur Danto
has argued that, "There is, I think, very little of the sort of thing
Nietzsche here identifies as feelings of connnanding and obeying, not
at least in connection with voluntary actions, so called. 1145

On one

level Danto is correct--on the surface of things, this element of
connnanding does not seem to be a prominent characteristic of voluntary
acts.

But if the will is viewed in relation to the play of affects, as

another way of ordering this play creatively, then the elements of

41WM, §675, p. 451 =WP, §675, p. 356 =NF, VIII/2, 11(96),
p. 286.
42 WM, II, §36, p. 16. "
ein Experiment machen, urn zu erfahren, was wir konnen; daruber kann uns allein der Erfolg oder MiBerfolg belehren."
43 JGB, I, §19; VI/2, p. 26 = BGE, I, §19, p. 26.
der will--, befiehlt einem Etwas in sich, das gehorcht .

4 5nanto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 113.

"Ein Mensch,
II
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connnanding and obeying become more meaningful.

Willing and thinking

both represent ways in which the play of affects may be organized.
Again, there are two distinguishable categories of play involved
here.

Nietzsche's critique of the will is directed against those who,

denying the relationship between the will and the affects, prevent the
will from becoming free.

By affirming the relationship between the will

and the affects, one again opens the way for the will to become the
creative force organizing these affects in its creative play.

The

ambiguity of the commanding-obeying relationship reflects the more
fundamental ambiguity inherent in the role of the player, who is both
player and plaything.46

Evaluations
A middle term binds thinking and willing to sensation and the
affects:

evaluations.

The argument relating willing to evaluations

centers around the notion of purpose.

To will involves willing some-

thing, a purpose, and this purpose contains an evaluation;47
willing is always dependent upon evaluations.

48

thus

Thinking, insofar as

it is necessarily a process of selection and interpretation, exhibits

46see above, Chapter Two, pp. 24-25.
47WM, §260, p. 186 =WP, §260, p. 150.
48These purposes may be fully constituted by the affects with
minimal participation on the part of thinking or willing. In this case,
the purpose is created by the affects--as the result of their interplay. For the free spirits, their will to power creatively transforms
these in play and thus brings them under their control.
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a parallel structure:
. 1 . 49
perspectiva

both thinking and evaluating are necessarily

What today is regarded as knowledge can presumably be

traced back to older evaluations. 50

So, too, even our sense impres-

sions are shaped by our evaluations.5 1
These evaluations are themselves interpretations, "a symptoip
of particular physiological conditions. 1152
pretations which we make;
terpreting.53
the body.

But they are not inter-

rather, it is the affects which do the in-

This is a process which takes place in, and changes,

It is an experiment;

valuations and consciousness, pleasure

and displeasure are but signs of it.

The person in which this process

happens is of significance insofar as he is able to control this process.
The degree to which he can do that is the degree to which he is the
will to power.
These valuations themselves have their foundation in the conditions of existence of particular beings, but they do not always remain perfectly in accord with them, as the case of morality shows.54

49WM, §259, p. 186 = WP, §259' p. 149.
50WM, §678, p. 456 = WP, §678, p. 359.
51WM, §260, p. 187 = WP, §260, p. 150.
52WM, §254, p. 184 = WP, §254, p. 148. "Die Auslegung ist
ein Symptom bestimmter physiologischer Zustande."

53 Ibid.
54WM, §256, p. 185 = WP, §256, pp. 148-49.
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Thus we retain evaluations which are no longer precise or true, 55 which
have outlived their function, and these can eventually cause man's downfan.56

Nietzsche criticizes contemporary morality precisely on this

basis, because creative force and the conditions of existence are
missing in it.5 7
a game.

Now it has become fixed, static, and has lost its creative

character.
rules.

In such moralities one encounters what was originally

The game now dominates the players, imprisons them in its

The alternative to a regression to some previous morality,

which in any case would appear impossible, is the development of a new
kind of morality, one in which man gives himself his own goal:
perimental morality.SB

an ex-

But this kind of morality is only possible if

the notion of goal is defined in terms of the interplay of affects as
an organic multiplicity, an interplay of forces, seeking to increase
its power.

In this sense, purposes arise when one lets the forces in

oneself have a free play, and through the creative play of the will
to power purposes are created.

In this case, our evaluations are to

be understood as the creative coming-to-expression of the will to
power which is operative in us.

55 uw, II, §266, p. 101.
56uw, I, §650, p. 246.
57WM, §260, p. 187

= WP, §260, p. 150.

58cf. Ingeborg Heidemann, "Nietzsches Kritik der Moral," Niezsche Studien, I, pp. 135 f. for a discussion of some of the problems
in the idea of an experimental morality.
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On the Affects and the Will to Power

This analysis of Nietzsche's idea of the self has led us from
the phenomena of thinking and willing through the intermediate stage of
evaluations down to the fundamental level of life activity:

the af-

fects or passions.
It has been shown that the relationship among these different
activities may be understood as play in either of two senses.

It may

be play in which the affects dominate thinking and willing, making them
into their playthings or it may be a creative play in which thinking
and willing play together with its affects, organizing them and maximizing their power.

In the latter case, the full person emerges as a

player, ,while in the former case the person is dominated by a play
which he cannot control.
In this section it will be shown that the play of affects is a
structured interplay founded in an order of rank.

This order of rank

is a created one, the result of the creative play of the will to power.
Insofar as the person is powerful, insofar as he is the will to power,
he becomes the creative player who shapes his own world in his play and
seeks to extend the
as possible.

boun~aries

of that play world to encompass as much

The highest manifestation of this tendency, as will be

shown in the following section, is the overman.
Nietzsche's analysis of the self is rooted in the body as an
organic process, a multiplicity of forces which struggle with one
another and generally exist in some sort of relation of dominancesubjection, and which in the affirmation of their individual existence
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also affirm the whole.

59

In rooting the self in the body in this

manner, Nietzsche avoids reducing the self to a thing, for the body
itself is for him not a thing but a process--and Nietzsche's name for
this process is the will to power.60
But what is the nature of the relationship among the affects?
There is an order of rank among them, a hierarchy.

In his notebooks,

Nietzsche calls for substituting a perspectival doctrine of affects
to replace epistemology, adding that "a hierarchy of affects" belongs
to this view:

"the affects transfigured; their superior order, their

'spirituality' • 1161

During this same period he describes man as a

plurality of forces which stand in an order of rank, some commanding
and others obeying. 62

So, too, there is a division of labor of the

affects or passions within society itself which breeds a more useful
type of sou1.

63

Elsewhere the affects are treated as a regency rather

than as a necessary unity. 64

59uw, II, §733, p. 236.
60rhis notion of even the organic as the will to power is developed as a hypothesis in JGB, II, §36; VI/2, p. 48 = BGE, §36, p. 48.
61

WM, §462, p. 323 =WP, §462, p. 255 =NF, VIII/2, 9(8), p. 6.
"An Stelle der 'ErkenntniBtheorie' eine Perspektiven-Lehre der Affekte
(wozu eine Hierarchie der Affekte gehort).
" • . . die transfigurirten Affekte; deren hohere Ordnung, deren

'Geistigkeit'."
6 2uw, II, §734, p. 237.
63WM, §719, p. 486

= WP,

124.
64 UW, II, §340, p. 124.

§719, p. 383

NF, VIII/2, 10(8), p.

159
There is a unity or order among the affects and, insofar as
Nietzsche prestnnes to speak of this order, it would appear to be knowable to some extent.

But even this must be qualified.

Affects are not

to be considered as causes, for in this case they are but a construction
of the intellect, 65 as indeed are all causes for Nietzsche.
for example, the occasion of affects for their causes. 6 6

We mistake,

The only type

of order which would seem admissible for Nietzsche is one according to
the degree of power each affect manifests.
affects is a construct.

A causal ordering of the

If they are taken to be anything more than

this, affects become errors of the intellect.
In seeming contradiction to this view of the affects, Nietzsche
urges us at times to control our affects.

Greatness of character con-

sists 1n having powerful affects, but keeping them in line. 67

The

affects are not to be overcome, but rather made to serve us.

Overcoming of the affects? No, if what is implied is their weakening and extirpation. But putting them in service: which may
mean subjecting them to a protracted tyranny . . . • At last they
are confidently granted freedom again: they love us as good servants and go voluntarily wherever our best interests lie. 68

65WM, §670, p. 448

= WP, §670, p. 354.

66uw, I, §733, p. 270.
67WM, §928, p. 624
PP· 395-96.

= WP, §928, p. 490

NF, VIII/2, 11(353),

68 WM, §384, p. 261 =WP, §384, p. 207. "Uberwindung der Affekte? Nein, wenn es Schwache und Vernichtung derselben bedeuten soll.
Sondern in Dienst nehmen: wozu gehoren mag, sie lange zu tyrannisieren
• • • Endlich gibt man ihnen eine vertrauensvolle Freiheit wieder: sie
lieben uns wie gute Diener und gehen freiwillig dorthin, wo unser Bestes
hin will."
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In passages like this one, one encounters an affirmation of the individual as master of his own drives which, presumably, arises out of
Nietzsche's rejection of those positions which advocate a negation of
the affects. 69

It seems that Nietzsche here goes beyond the limits he

has established for himself.

He argues in Beyond Good and Evil against

the possibility of overcoming an affect insofar as this so-called over.
. .
d ominance.
.
70
coming
is actua 11 y re duci bl e to anot h er a ff ect gaining

It

0

would seem, however, that a similar argument is in order against his
idea of taking the affects into one's service.
into service but another affect?

Who or what takes them

Although the passage quoted above

does not answer this question, there is a clear implication that the
person, the individual, is in some way in control of this process;

but

it is precisely this which Nietzsche seems to have established as impossible within his framework.

It could only be another affect which

fulfills this function.
It is true that one could identify the self with a particular
affect, in which case such a position would make sense from a particular
standpoint, but Nietzsche would have to acknowledge that the standpoint is a falsification, for the self is a multiplicity of such affects,
not simply the one which has gained ascendency.

Thus, for example, he

appears to distinguish between the self and its affects by saying that

69see Nietzsche's comments on the false order of rank among the
affects created by Schopenhauer and others in WM, §612, p. 417 = WP,
§612, p. 329 =NF, VIII/2, 9(119), p. 68.
7oJGB, IV, §117; VI/2, p. 93 = BGE, IV, §117, p. 86.
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the damage is less when the affects are let loose on others than on
the self. 71

Such an assertion seems to posit a self which is unten-

able according to Nietzsche's own criteria.
Thus the self, including its thinking and willing, is reducible
to evaluations, which in turn are themselves reducible to the interplay
of affects.

Attempts to identify a self standing over and against this

multiplicity of affects fail to overcome Nietzsche's objection that
even here it is but another affect which is at work.

The affects in-

terpret, put other affects into their service--the self or the individual does not do so.
The apparent contradiction here can be resolved in terms of the
category of play and the doctrine of the will to power.
power is the organizing principle of our affects.

The will to

In a passage from

one of his later notebooks, Nietzsche discusses the way in which willing
in general is a willing to be stronger, adding:
• • • that the most universal and basic instinct in all doing and
willing has for precisely this reason remained the least known and
most hidden, because in praxi we always follow its commandments,
because we are this commandment • . • • All valuations are only consequences and narrower perspectives in the service of this one will:
valuation. itself is only this will to power.72

71 uw, I, §857, p. 285.
72WM, §675, p. 452 =WP, §675, p. 356 =NF, VIII/2, 11(96), p.
287. " • • • daa der allgemeinste und unterste Instinkt in allem Thun
und Wollen eben deshalb der unerkannteste und verborgenste geblieben
ist, weil in praxi wir imrner seinem Gebote folgen, weil wir dies Gebot
sind. . . . Alle Werthschatzungen sind nur Folgen und engere Perspektiven im Dienste dieses Einen Willens: das Werthschatzen selbst ist
nur dieser Wille zur Macht."
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Once again, this calls for a distinction.
but this can be taken in two senses.

We are the will to power,

First, we can be the will to

power in such a way that it dominates our willing and thinking--even if
we do not recognize it.

Second, we can be the will to power in such a

way that our thinking and willing is the highest expression of that will
to power--the dominant aspect.

This introduces a new self--a multi-

plicity of forces organized by this creative play of the will to power.
The fragment quoted above begins with a passage which describes
the process we have been examining:

the destruction of the traditional

concept of the self and its replacement by the notion of the creative
player who orders the play of affects through his will to power.
That one should take the doer back into the deed after having conceptually removed the doer and thus emptied the deed; that one
should take doing something, the "aim," "intention," "purpose,"
back into the deed after having artificially removed all this and
thus emptied the deed.73
Through his analysis of willing and thinking as being dependent upon
evaluations, which in turn are reducible to affects, Nietzsche takes
the doer out of the deed, reduces it to the interplay of affects;

then

brings the doer back in through the notions of the free spirit, the
child, the highest in the order of rank, and the overman--all of which
can be subsumed under the category of the creative player.

So, too,

73WM, §675, p. 451 =WP, §675, p. 356 =NF, VIII/2, 11(96), p.
286. " • • . daB man den Thater wieder in das Thun hineinnimmt, nachdem
man ihn begrifflich aus ihm herausgezogen und damit das Thun entleert
hat;
" • • • daB man das Etwas-thun, 'das Ziel,' die 'Absicht,' den
1
Zweck' wieder in das Thun zurlicknimmt, nachdem man ihn klinstlich aus
ihm herausgezogen und dami t das Thun entleert hat. 11
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aim, intention, and purpose have been removed from the deed by means of
the same reduction;

they have been shown to be illusions, after-the-

fact rationalizations, massive self-deceptions.
duced, all contained in one category:
order to increase power;

power.

Now they are re-introAll deeds are done in

they are instances of the will to power.

Particular goals are set through creative play to increase that power.
There is no meta-game in terms of which these individual games
are to be judged.

Another section of the fragment quoted above gives

evidence of this.

Following his statement that all valuations are only

consequences and narrower perspectives of the will to power, Nietzsche
. says:
A critique of being from the point of view of any one of these
values is something absurd and erroneous. Even supposing that a
process of decline begins in this way, this process still stands

in the service of this will . •.
To appraise being itself:

but this appraisal itself is
still this being--: if we say no, we still do what we are . . .
One must comprehend the absurdity of this posture of judging existence, and then try to understand what is really involved in it.
It is symptomatic.74

The absurdity of trying to appraise being from any one point of view
lies in this:

these points of view are all in the service of one will.

74 WM, §675, p. 451 =WP, §675, pp. 356-57 =NF, VIII/2, 11(96),
p. 287. " . • . eine Kritik des Seins aus irgend einem dieser Werthe
heraus ist etwas Widersinniges und MiBverstandliches; gesetzt selbst,
daB sich darin ein UntergangsprozeB einleitet, so steht dieser ProzeB
noch im Dienste dieses Willens . . .
"Das Sein selbst abschCitzen: aber Abschatzen selbst ist dieses
Sein noch--; Man muB die AbsurditCit dieser daseinsrichtenden Gebarde
einsehen; und sodann noch zu errathen suchen, was sich eigentlich
damit begiebt. Es ist symptomatisch."
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None of them offer a privileged position from which appraisal of the
whole is possible.

An order of rank can, however, be established ac-

cording to the degree of power.
develops into many forms. 75
their degree of power.

While there is one will to power, it

These forms can be ranked according to

Such a ranking is, as was shown in Chapter

Three, a creative act of the powerful.

This creative ranking extends

the boundaries of one will to power to encompass other, weaker instances
of the will to power.

This is the creative play of the powerful ex-

tending the boundaries of its created world to encompass more and more
of existence.

A decline may stand 1n the service of a more powerful

instance of the will to power, but this does not overshadow the fact
that it is a decline.

The creative play of the powerful expands to

include and dominate the play of the weak.
These powerful ones are the overmen.
On

the OVerman
The significance of the doctrine of the overman in Nietzsche's

philosophy is an open question.

Most of the references to the overman

in the writings Nietzsche himself published are confined to Thus Spoke

Zarathustra.

There are hardly more than six or seven references to the

overman after Zarathustra. 76
of the concept.

Connnentators disagree on the importance

Jaspers devotes only a few pages to it, admitting

75 WM, §692, p. 468 =WP, §692, p. 369.
76cf. Richard Oehler, Nietzsche Register (Stuttgart: Alfred
Kroner Verlag, 1965), p. 461.
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that "the image of the superman, as Nietzsche sees it, remains indeterminate.1177

Danto, discussing Zarathustra's description of the over-

man, maintains that it is, "divorced from the extravagant language and
rushing cadences of Zarathustra's singing • . • a bland and all-toofamiliar reconnnendation, rather squarely in the moralistic tradition
. • • to keep our passionate as well as our intellectual life in our
connnand, not to deny one at the price of the other, and not .
petty and 'merely' human. 1178

be

Both Kaufmann 79 and Morgan 80 equate the

overman and the notion of Dionysus which develops in Nietzsche's later
writings.

Heidegger accords more importance to the overman, making it

one of the five fundamental words in Nietzsche's metaphysics. 81

He

criticizes the overman because he negates the previous essence of man
as reason in a nihilistic way. 82

Fink also admits that the image of

the overman is at first "rather indeterminate, 1183 but he argues that
the predecessors of the overman, which form the bridge between man and
the overman, give content to this image--and the idea of the overman
gives a unified form to that content. 84

77Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 166.

78Danto, Nietzsche, p. 199.

79 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 316.
80George A. Morgan, What Nietzsche Means (New York: Harper and
Row, 1965), pp. 301-03.
81Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, pp. 259-60.

82 Ibid.' p. 293.
83Fink, Nietzsches Philosophie, p. 69.

84Ibid., pp. 69-70.

166
There is clearly room here for interpretation in regard to the
importance of the concept of the overman.

Other concepts, such as that

of the free spirit or Dionysus, could also be used in developing an
integrating image for Nietzsche's ideal.
used in Chapter Three:

Three such images have been

the child, the free spirit, and the creators

of the order of rank.

Nietzsche presents in fact a multiplicity of

images to describe his ideal.

Among these, the overman is the most

poetical and, for this reason, the one most easily subject to misinterpretation.
In this section, I shall show that the notion of the overman
functions as the unifying image in terms of which both the previous
images of creative play and the notion of self-overcoming can be understood.

The overman is the player par excellence in existence.

The

overman is not a goal outside of existence, but the culmination of
the creative play of the free spirit.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche first presents the idea of
Zarathustra is the teacher of the overman, 85

the overman in detail.

who is "the meaning of the earth. 1186
meaning of their being'."

For man, the overman is "'the

In his notebooks, Nietzsche says that, "Not

humanity, but oveY'l71an is the goal1 1187

85z, "Vorrede," 3; VI/l, p. 8 = Z, "Preface," 3, p. 12.

B6Ib·a
'[, • ' p. 8

=

Ibid.' p. 13.

"Der Ubermensch ist der Sinn der

Erde."
87WM, §1001, p. 658 =WP, §1001, p. 519.
sondern Vbermensch ist das Ziel."

"Nicht 'Menschheit,'

r
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The descriptions of the overman have a religious dimension that
seems quite intentional.

The very name of Zarathustra evokes the image

of Zoroaster and his religion.

The tone of Zarathustr>a hints at shades

of John the Baptist preparing the way for the savior.
indicate that the overman is to take God's "place."
tion implied by the quotation marks here is this:

Other passages
(The qualifica-

God's place may

simply be eliminated and the overman may take up a different place,
one which is not outside of human history.)

Thus we are told, now that

all the gods are dead, long live the overman. 88

When one used to say

"God" when looking out over distant seas, now he is to say the name of
the overman.89
might live.90

With God dead, the higher men wish that the overman
In his notebooks, Nietzsche refers to the overman as

"a completely epicurean God . • • the one who transfigures existence." 91
It is difficult not to be mistrustful of such statements, especially in the light of Nietzsche's own critique of Christianity and
religion in general.

Certainly he is not trying to start another

88z, I, "Von der Schenkenden Tugend," 3; VI/l, p. 98
"On the Gift-giving Virtue," 3, p. 79.

= Z,

89z, II, "Auf den gliickseligen Inseln;" VI/1, p. 105
"Upon the Blessed Isles," p. 85.

= Z, II,

I,

90z, IV, "Vorn hoheren Menschen," 2; VI/l, p. 353 = Z, IV, "On
the Higher Man," 2, p. 287.
9 1uw, II, §1409, p. 507. "Die Rangordnung, durchgefiihrt in
einern System der Erdregierung; die Herren der Erde zuletzt, eine neue
herrschende Kaste. Aus ihnen hier und da entspringend, ganz epikurischer Gott, der Uberrnensch, der Verklarer des Daseins."

r
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religion;

he is not looking for disciples, but rather for equals.

Nonetheless, the overman is somewhat problematic.

Nietzsche would

make great sacrifices for him; he would suffer anything to reach the
overman for only a moment.9 2

To bring about the emergence of the

overman, he would offer up himself and others.93

These and similar

remarks suggest a denial of one's existence in the moment, a sacrificing of the moment to bring about a future redemption, which is characteristic of the religious consciousness.
counter argument:

Indeed, one could offer a

this sacrificing is really only being what one is,

being one who prepares the way for the overman by participating in
the self-overcoming of man. 94

Consequently it is not a denial of ex-

istence, but rather its affirmation.
Additional problems arise from Zarathustra's contention that,
"Never yet has there been an overman. 11 95

Nietzsche's own argument

against a final goal of becoming--if the world had a goal, it would
have been reached by now96 __ seems equally valid in relation to the

92uw, II, §1260, p. 453.
93uw, II, §1211, p. 445.
94cf. Eugen Fink, Nietzsches PhiZosophie, p. 69. "Der Mensch
ist ein sich selbst ilberwindendes Wesen, weil in ihm das allgemeine
Wesen des Lebens ilberhaupt, der Wille zur Macht, sich selbst erkennt,
bzw. erkennen kann."
p. 93.

95 z, II, "Von den Priestern;" VI/l, p. 115
"Niemals noch gab es einen Ubermenschen. 11

= Z, II, "On Priests,"

96WM, §55, p. 44 =WP, §55, p. 36. "Wir leugnen
hatte das Dasein eins, so milBte es erreicht sein." Here
Ivan Soll's interpretation of this fragment: "According
ment, given an infinite amount of time in the past and a

Schluf3-Ziele:
I am following
to the argufinite number
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overman:
by now.

if the overman were going to appear, he would have appeared
But nowhere does Nietzsche maintain that the overman has

already appeared, except perhaps in that passage from Ecce Homo on

ZaPathustPa, where it is implied that in Zarathustra's interactions
with men man is overcome at every moment, that "the concept of the
'overman' has here become the greatest reality."97

But Zarathustra

can be said to exist only in a very qualified sense, as a poetic creation.

The overman's coming seems in general to be an event which Nie-

tzsche seeks as happening in the future.

It 1s precisely the futurity

of the overman which allows it to be a unifying concept.

It pulls

together the many different images considered so far--the child, the
free spirit, the creators of the order of rank--and focuses them in
one image:

the overman.

The overman is the symbol which represents

the culmination of these developments.

This is not a goal outside of

the course of history, a final goal of the world, but rather the symbol
of the highest reaches of man's process of self-transcendence, the goal
which man sets for himself.
The last man is characterized by his desire to avoid all deviation from the norm, all exertion.

Zarathustra describes him in the

of possible states of the universe, every state, that will occur in the
future has already recurrent in the past." "Reflections on Recurrence:
A Re-examination of Nietzsche's Doctrine, DeP Ewige WiedePkehP des
G7,,eichen," in Nietzsche. CPiticai Essays, p. 330.
97EH, "Also sprach Zarathustra," 6; VI/3, p. 342 = EH, "Thus
Spoke Zarathustra," 6, p. 305. "Hier ist in jedem Augenblick der
Mensch liberwunden, der Begriff 't.ibermensch' ward hier hochste Realitat."
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following terms.

"No shepherd and one herd!

Everybody wants the same,

everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a
madhouse. 1198

While they can be said to be playing, it is clear that

they are not doing so consciously or creatively.
to dominate them.

Their game has come

They shrivel up and wait for it to end.

The meaning of the overman can be seen more clearly by concentrating on the tendencies in existence to which it calls attention.
The overman represents a sharpening of contradictions and tensions in
existence, which results in the opposite of the overmen: the "last
men 11 • 99
overman.

Two other characteristics belong to the emergence of the
His coming brings about the greatest

sciousness of strength.loo

increase in his con-

Indeed, insofar as an increase in power is

associated with a greater struggle, the highest instance of power--the
overman--necessitates the greatest tension--that between the overman
and the last men.

Finally, the entire process under discussion here

involves the overcoming of man. 101
But just what is meant by "man" here?

One fragment suggests

that it is the species man which is to be overcome, 1 02 but the entire

98z, "Vorrede," 5; VI/l, p. 14 = Z, "Prologue," 5, p. 18. "Kein
Hirt und Eine Heerde! Jeder will das Gleiche, Jeder ist gleich: wer
anders ftihlt, geht freiwillig in's Irrenhaus."
99uw, II, §§1211, 1212, p. 445.
lOOwM, §1060, p. 691 = WP, §1060, p. 546.
lOlz, IV, "Vom hoheren Menschen," 3; VI/l, p. 353
the Higher Man," 3, p. 287.
102UW, II, §1211, p. 445.

= Z,

IV, "On
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thrust of Nietzsche's writings suggests a more adequate formulation:
the "man" that is to be overcome is everything in man which Nietzsche
has criticized.

The preceding sections of this chapter have shown the

specific ways in which this overcoming is brought about in relation to
willing, thinking, evaluating, sensing, and the play of affects.

This

is the fullness of Nietzsche's notion of self overcoming: the affects,
sensations, evaluations, thinking and willing are brought together in
the creative play of the will to power.
culmination of this process.

The overman symbolizes the

It is not, as Heidegger maintains, a

nihilistic overcoming only of thought. 103

Nor need it remain vague.

The notion of overcoming in and through creative play, as presented
in the preceding sections of this chapter, gives this overcoming specific content.
There is one final aspect of the notion of the overman: his
realization that everything recurs, 10 4 the eternal recurrence of the
same.

The way in which the eternal recurrence of the same completes

Nietzsche's philosophy of creative play is the final problem to be
considered in this work, the topic of the final chapter.

Conalusion
The result of Nietzsche's critique of thinking, willing, evaluating and sensations was to reduce the self to the interplay of the
affects, which effectively removed the doer from the deed.

103Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, p. 293.
104 UW, II, §§1384, 1385, 1387, p. 500.

This left
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the way open to a reinterpretation of the deed as a particular instance
of the one will to power and a reconstitution of the self as the overman.

The idea of the overman restores a unity to the self which had

been destroyed in Nietzsche's critique, but this unity is of a very
qualified type.

play. "l05

"All unity is unity only as organization and inter-

The overman possesses unity only in the sense that he or-

ganizes the interplay of forces which are his affects through the
will to power.
Nietzsche.

Thus there are two ways in which the self is play in

The self may be the plaything of the affects, in which

case they control him.
the will to power.

This is the mark of weakness,. the absence of

Alternately, the self may creatively organize and

control this interplay through the will to power, in which case the
entire self--including the affects,

eYaluations, thinking and willing

--is a creative playins which seeks to extend itself.

This two-fold

meaning of play has been analyzed on several levels--on the level of
willing, thinking, evaluating, sensing and the affective level.

This

lays the foundation for a unified self where the overcoming of the
self on all levels is accomplished through creative play.

The overman

is the highest symbol of this process.
It now remains to extend this interpretation to the doctrine
of the eternal recurrence of the same.

105WM, §561, p. 383 = WP, §561, p. 303.
als Organisation und Zusammenspiel Einhei t."

"Alle Einheit ist nur

CHAPTER SIX
THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE AND THE PLAY OF FORCES:
TEMPORALITY AND PLAY

Introduction
In the last three chapters, the category of play in Nietzsche's
philosophy has been developed on three levels: as the highest form of
human activity, the creative play of the free spirits (Chapter Three);
as the hidden meaning of morality, the game of self-deception (Chapter
Four); and as constitutive of the self in the interplay of affects as
shaped through the will to power.

It now remains to consider the

most fundamental level on which play is encountered in Nietzsche's
philosophy:

the eternal recurrence of the same.

The following analysis

of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same will show that
this doctrine yields a picture of the cosmos as fundamentally an inter-

play of forces, eternally creating and destroying, without end in
either of two senses--without a final goal or purpose, and unending
in time.
By showing that the eternal recurrence of the same is essentially a picture of the universe as an interplay of forces, this analysis
will have been completed.

It will have been shown that the category of

play is the fundamental one in terms of which all of existence is to
be understood for Nietzsche.

At the same time, it will be shown that
173
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this category shifts in meaning.

In relation to the free spirits, play

was considered as a free creative activity through which and in which
the free spirit makes his own world, continually seeking to enlarge
its boundaries to encompass other play worlds.

The category of play

in morality was somewhat different, for the moral ones did not realize
that they were only playing;
of the mediocre, the herd.

their game was the self-deceptive game
Through an analysis of human action in

relation to its knowability, purposefulness and foundation in free
will, it was possible to show that moral actions could be nothing but
play, but a play in which the player deceives himself into thinking
that he is doing something other than playing and in which he limits
his own power in favor of the mediocre, the suffering ones, the herd.
In considering the self as the interplay of affects, it became clear
that this play was even less under the control of a player than the
two previous forms.

These forces are still free, not bound to any

final goal or order of things in themselves, but the person is less
conscious of the dimensions of this interplay of affects.

Thus the

meaning of the category of play in these last three chapters has been
shifting steadily from human play to the play of forces beyond human
control.
The doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same completes
this movement insofar as play now becomes the play of forces which
is completely beyond human control--a cosmic play. 1

However, it is

lThe meaning of the category of play in this context corresponds in general to that elaborated by Ingeborg Heidemann in her
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possible to show that the movement does not stop here with the least
human level of play.

It will be argued that the eternal recurrence of

the same is not a doctrine which refers to things in themselves, but
itself is the expression of the play character of human existence which
creates this doctrine.

Cosmic play--as expressed in the doctrine of

the eternal recurrence--reveals itself to be the result of human play.
This argument, which will be developed in detail below, will
show that Nietzsche's philosophy is not, as Karl Lowith has maintained,
characterized by a fundamental contradiction. 2
this chapter that, when they

It will be shown in

are interpreted in terms of the category

of play, the main tenets of Nietzsche's philosophy do not lead to
fundamental contradictions.

The apparent contradictions in Nietzsche's

discussion of the four-fold definition of the concept of play in Kant:
" • . • das Spiel als die Anordnung, in der keine Absicht ist. Diese
Alternative konnte so aufgefaat werden, als ob sie der ersten terminologischen Festlegung widersprechen wilrde, nach der die Spielhandlung zwar zweckfrei oder zwecklos ist, aber eine Absicht hat.
Die Unterscheidung hangt jedoch ab von dem Standpunkt, unter dem
die Anordnung betrachtet wird: als Handlung, als Form, als bestinnnte Koordination, als Ordnung Uberhaupt; oder auch, im Aspekt
der Handlung: in bezug auf den Anfang oder das Ende, oder in bezug
auf den Verlauf. So wird an anderer Stelle das Spiel als 'Beschaftigung ohne Absicht' damit begrilndet, daa es nicht 'am Ende'
vergenilgt, sondern wahrend seiner Dauer gefallt."
Der Begriff des SpieZes, p. 161. Play here is used in the sense of a
free ordering of forces which is not intended to achieve any final
goal.
2

cf. Karl Lowith, Nietzsches PhiZosophie der Ewigen Wiederkehr
des GZeichen (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1956), p. 14, where Lowith main-

tains that, "ein wesentlicher und umfassender [Widerspruch], der einem
Grundkonflikt in Verhaltnis von Mensch und Welt--ohne Gott und gemeinsame Schopfungsordnung--entspringt
" characterizes Nietzsche's
philosophy.
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philosophy can be resolved in terms of the category of play, which
functions as the unifying insight of Nietzschean philosophy.
The argument of this final chapter is somewhat complex.

First,

the context for Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence will be
developed:

the problem of temporality.

Four problems face Nietzsche

in regard to temporality: how to affirm the past, the relationship
between being and becoming, the adequacy of traditional concepts of
time, and the possibility of creatively willing time.

The eternal

recurrence of the same is a response to these four areas of problems;
it culminates in the notion of creatively willing time through the
affirmation of the eternal recurrence of the same.
of the second part of this chapter:

This is the subject

the meaning of the eternal re-

currence and the modes in which it is affirmed.

It is necessary, in

particular, to consider what Nietzsche means by naming, thinking and
willing the eternal recurrence, for it is here that we see that the
eternal recurrence is the expression of the free spirit's--or at least
Nietzsche's--creative play.

In other words, it will be shown that the

eternal recurrence is play in two senses.

First, the picture of the

cosmos which it yields is basically that of a cosmos as the play of
forces.

Second, the creation of this picture is itself an act of play,

playful naming, thinking, and willing.
Having shown the two senses in which the eternal recurrence is
play, it will be shown how the notion of the eternal recurrence resolves the four areas of problems in regard to the question of temporality which were outlined at the beginning of this chapter.
chapter then concludes with a consideration of Nietzsche's final

The
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vision of the world as play, emphasizing the unity of the Nietzschean
position.
A.

The Framing of the Question of Temporality

The meditation on time arises out of four fundamental areas of
concern.

First, time is something to be overcome as time past, as the

"it was."

Second, time must be affirmed within the context of the

struggle between being and becoming.

Third, the ideas of time in

traditional interpretations of the world, both Christian and polytheistic, must be surpassed.

Finally, time must be willed in a radi-

cally new way if man is to be truly creative, and if life as continuous
self-transcendence is to become possible.

Time Past: The "It Was "
The first problem is posed most clearly in Zarathustra's speech
.

on re d emption.

3

Redemption can only be attained by a transf0rmation

of the "it was" into a "thus I willed it."
because the "it was" cannot be affirmed.
to revenge,

Time paralyzes the will
It is this which gives rise

the "will' s ill will against time and its 'it was'. 114

It

is revenge which leads to looking upon time as that which must devour
its children--indeed, it has even led us to positing this as the basic
.

.

.

.

1 aw o f time, its JUStice.

5

3z, II, "Von der ErlOsung;" VI/l, p. 175
tion," p. 139.

= Z, II, "On Redemp-

4Ibid., p. 176 =Ibid., p. 140. "Diess, ja diess allein ist
Bache selber: des Willens Widerwille gegen die Zeit und ihr 'Es war'."
5 Ibid.
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The will must be relieved of the folly of revenge;
taught to will even the frightful accident of the past.

it must be

Zarathustra

presents the creative will as the answer to the "it was," establishing
the context of a possible solution.

The past is transformed, brought

under our control, by willing it again in the future.
still leaves a problem:

However, this

"to work on the future and redeem with their

creation all that has been 116 is again to turn time against us, to
create a division between the moment and that which is yet to happen.
The final folly which we shall uncover here is not revenge, but the
will itself.

Insofar as man wills, he puts himself outside himself 1n

time, subjecting himself to the tyranny of time's control over events
beyond his reach.

Being and Becoming
Second, the problem of time is framed within the context of the
tension between being and becoming.

The difficulty to which the pre-

vious consideration leads--the impossibility of escaping the tyranny
of time while one is still willing something--exists on the level of
the individual.

The corresponding problem, on the level of the world

itself, is the impossibility of a final state of the world.

Zarathustra

has stated the need to praise all impermanence, 7and the notes in The

6z, III, "Von alten und neuen Tafeln," 3; VI/l, p. 245 = Z, III,
. an der Zukunft schaffen,
"
und Alles, das war--, schaffend zu erlosen."
"On the Old and New Tablets," 3, p. 198.

7z, II, "Auf den gli.ickseligen Inseln;" VI/l, p. 106 = Z, II,
"On the Blessed Isles," pp. 86-87.
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Will to Power shed more light on this.
Becoming must be explained without recourse to final intentions;
becoming must appear justified at every moment (or incapable of
being devalued; which amounts to the same thing); the present must
absolutely not be justified
reference to a future, nor the past
by reference to the present.

§Y

We must not admit of anything with being least the world of becoming
be devalued. 9

The primacy of the moment, which is also stressed in

Zarathustra, 10 implies a fundamental rejection of any final state.

All

moments are of equivalent value.
A rather unusual argument is advanced in support of the position
that the world has no final state or goal.

It, too, is to be found in

The Wi U to Power.
If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there were
for it some unintended final state, this also must have been
reached. If it were in any way capable of a pausing and becoming
fixed, of "being," if in the whole course of its becoming it
possessed even for .a moment this capability of "being," then all
becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all
thinking, all "spirit. nll

8WM, §708, p. 479 =WP, §708, p. 377 =NF, VIII/2, 11(72), p.
276. " . . • das Werden soll erklart werden, ohne zu solchen finalen
Absichten Zuflucht zu nehmen: das Werden muB gerechtfertigt erscheinen
in jedem Augenblick (oder unabwerthbar: was auf eins hinauslauft); es
darf absolut nicht das Gegenwartige um eines Zukilnf tigen wegen oder
das Vergangene um des Gegenwartigen willen gerechtfertigt werden."
9NF, VIII/2, 11(72), p. 277.
lOz, III, "Von Gesicht und Rathsel," 2; VI/l, p. 196 = Z, III,
"On the Vision and the Riddle," 2, p. 158.
11 WM, §1062, p. 692 = WP, §1062, p. 546. "Hatte die Welt ein
Ziel, so miiBte es erreicht sein. Gabe es fur sie einen unbeabsichtigten
Endzustand, so miiBte er ebenfalls erreicht sein. Ware sie iiberhaupt
eines Verharrens und Starrwerdens, eines 'Seins' fahig, hatte sie in
allem ihrem Werden nur Einen Augenblick diese Fahigkeit des 'Seins,' so
ware sie wiederum mit allem Werden langst zu Ende, also auch mit allem
Denken, mit allem 'Geiste'."
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These arguments, especially the first, could also be used against Nietzsche.' s idea of the eternal recurrence of the same, just as they could
be used against his concept of the overman. 12

If the same is taken in

the sense of some being, entity or stability which exists in itself
and recurs eternally, 13 then one can argue against Nietzsche that, if
the same is to recur over and over again, one would expect to have
found evidence of this--it must have done so by now.
not.

Yet what conclusion can we draw from that?

Clearly it has

It is possible to

say that this simply shows that Nietzsche is wrong--perhaps even a
fool to maintain such an obviously false doctrine.14

One could say

12cf. above, Chapter Five, pp. 168 f.
13Few of the English or American connnentators consider the question of what it is that returns eternally the same by also considering
Nietzsche's idea of sameness. Arthur Danto, for example, does not
really take up the question at all, but he considers such possibilities
as "the world," fossils and things in general, and states of energy-but without trying to discover precisely what it is that returns the
same. (Cf. Nietzsche as Philosopher, pp. 204 ff.) Walter Kaufmann
generally considers the eternal recurrence to refer to events, but at
times interprets it as the "doctrine of the eternal recurrence of all
things." (Cf. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, p.
320.) It is not things which recur, ,and in this chapter it will be
shown that the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is best understood
in relation to the Nietzschean notion of sameness, which will be elaborated below.
14connnenting on what he considers to be the three main theses in
Nietzsche's philosophy--which include the eternal recurrence--Walter
Brocker maintains: "Diese Lehre bleibt nicht nur ohne Beweis und ohne
Wahrheit, sie ist liberhaupt nicht ernst zu nehmen und insofern Narrheit. In diese Narrheit fallt aber Nietzsche nicht, weil er ein Narr
sein oder den Narren spielen will, sondern gegen seinen Willen, als
Opfer seiner philosophischen Unbildung." ("Nietzsches Narrenturn," in
Nietzsche Studien, Band I, p. 142.) As will be shown below, Nietzsche's
notion of the eternal recurrence of the same is not without proof or
truth, although the question of the foundation of this proof remains
to be determined.
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that Nietzsche meant something else by "the same" than the sense defined
above.

One could also say that his notions of thinking and proving

the eternal recurrence are radically different from what we usually
understand these notions to entail.
are true.

In fact, both these alternatives

First, Nietzsche does not mean that the same beings, en-

tities or stability continually recurs.

His notion of sameness, which

will be elaborated below, is quite different from this and far more
complex.

Second, his notions of naming, thinking and willing

eternal

recurrence introduce modes for affirming the eternal recurrence which
allow him to escape the criticisms made above.

The ways in which this

happens will be discussed below in the sections dealing with the concept of "the same" and with the naming, thinking and willing of the
eternal recurrence of the same.

Traditional Concepts of Time
The question of time emerges from two different traditions.
On

the one hand, there is the Christian tradition which has established

the question of time as one of eternity.

Christianity, by enlarging

the sinfulness of every individual to cosmic proportions, established
eternal perspectives around man, teaching him to see himself as something past. 15

The way in which we conceive of time will be in part

rooted in the tendency to see ourselves from afar, to put ourselves
in eternal perspectives.

In such a framework, it is easy to imagine

time as devouring her children.

15FW, II, §78, p. 93

JW, II, §78, p. llO.

182
Juxtaposed to this is the free-thinking which is rooted in polytheism.

It established the image of a free and ever-creative man for

whom there are no eternal horizons and perspectives. 16

The absence of

eternal horizons signals the dawn of a new world, an open sea that
never existed before. 17
Both traditions must be surpassed.

Insofar as the Christian

interpretation posits one meaning, devalues the world of becoming, and
emaciates the power of the individual, it must be set aside.

Insofar

as the multi-perspectivism of polytheism leads to a thinking of infinite possibilities (not simply unlimited time, but also unlimited
space and force), it posits a newness to which the eternal recurrence
is opposed.

These infinite horizons provide the background for the

creative play of the free spirits, which will give them shape and
meaning.

A new way of thinking about temporality, going beyond both

these traditions, is necessary.

Creative Willing of Time
The fourth aspect of the problematic of temporality is Nietzsche 1 s philosophy is his demand that creativity yield a new attitude
toward the problem of time.

It has been shown that the will was pre-

sented by Zarathustra as the great liberator.

Leaving aside for the

moment the question of who it is that does the liberating, we may
recall that it is not enough just for man to be free.

16FW, III, §143, p. 151 = JW, §143, p. 180.
17FW, V, §343, p. 236 = JW, V, §343, p. 276.

Zarathustra
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poses the question of freedom not in terms of that from which man is
free, but rather in terms of the much more important question:
for what? 18

free

As is clear from the preceding consideration of the will

to power, 19 the answer to this question is an increase in power.

The

question of freedom is then transformed into the issue of power and
its exercise.20
That the relationship between self-affirmation and the will
to power is a problematic one which seems to demand simultaneously
the affirmation and destruction of the self is clear from the preceding chapter.

The specifically temporal dimension of this problem

is to be found in the necessity for some sort of temporal distance
in willing between the moment in which something is willed and that
in which it is achieved.

This points to the more general problem

of the distance between the one willing and that which is willed.

The

possibility of complete self-affirmation becomes a real one only if
time is not only overcome--in the sense that the tyranny of the "it
was" is eliminated--but also reoconstituted.

Time must not simply

be escaped from, but must be affirmed in a radically new manner, in
terms of power and force.
The four-fold problem of time as it is outlined here will
find its overcoming within the thinking of the eternal recurrence of

18z, I, "Vom Wege des Schaffenden;" VI/l, p. 77
the Way of the Creator," p. 63.
19 see above, Chapter Four, pp. 129 ff.
20WM, §859, p. 582

= WP,

§859, p. 458.

Z, I, "On

r
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the same;

time will be given a new and positive affirmation in Nie-

tzsche's thinking about play.

The following sections will consider

the meaning of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence, the way in which
it allows man to escape the tyranny of time, and the reconstitution of
time through play.

Thus the following two parts give Nietzsche's

answer to the first three aspects of the problem of time, while the
fourth part of this chapter is concerned with the final aspect of the
problem.
B.

The Eternal Recurrence of the Same

In attempting to determine the meaning of the eternal recurrence of the same, I shall first consider some

oblique references to

the doctrine which establish the context and development of the problem.
Second, it will be shown that the eternal recurrence is not one that
involves a naive understanding of physical law as referring to the
order of things in themselves.

Third, the meaning of the eternal re-

currence will be considered within the context of force and power.
Fourth, the primacy of power will be shown to be fundamental to Nietzsche's position on the eternal recurrence.

Fifth, the meaning of

"the same" and its relation to willing and power will be explicated.
These considerations establish the necessary framework within which
the main theme can be considered:

the thinking and naming of the

eternal recurrence of the same and, following this, the willing of
the eternal recurrence.

The section will conclude with a considera-

tion of the primacy of praxis, showing how this enables us to understand the eternal recurrence as the most horrible and the most liberating of thoughts.
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Oblique References to the Eternal Recurrence
Before turning to a consideration of the doctrine of the eternal
recurrence itself, I shall discuss certain oblique references to this
idea.

First, it will be shown that Nietzsche's reflections on monu-

mental history contain a notion of sameness which anticipates the one
encountered in the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same;
moreover, these reflections imply a cosmological doctrine of recurrence.

Second, it will be shown that the eternal recurrence is pre-

sented as "a thought," a terrifying possibility, in "The Heaviest
Burden."

This early (1882) formulation of the doctrine of the eternal

recurrence reveals its terrifying character and raises the question-which will be answered in the sections on the naming, thinking and
willing of the eternal recurrence--of whether the eternal recurrence
is merely a

thought or whether it is something more.

In addition to

this, it suggests the first meaning of what it is that recurs eternally
the same: every aspect of one's life.

The last part of this section

considers some passages from Nietzsche's notebooks which suggest a
second hypothesis in regard to the question of what returns the same:
the continual creating of new worlds.
In his essay, "On the Use and Abuse of History," Nietzsche
takes up the problem of time within the context of forgetting,

It is

the power to forget which is the condition of overcoming becoming and
of the establishment of the primacy of the moment.

This power of

forgetting, or of feeling "unhistorically," is a necessary property
of all action, one which we see prevents man from losing himself in
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the stream of becoming.2 1
At this point in Nietzsche's development, there still remains
a greater emphasis on the individual.

Insofar as the individual is to

be maintained, becoming stands as a threat because the individual
demands permanence.

The thinking of monumental history 22 is a means

of giving sameness by showing the possibility of recurrence. 23

How-

ever, if monumental history is a means of overcoming time, it remains
at this stage a problematic means.
First, the notion of monumental history yields the courage for
such overcoming only at the expense of doing violence to the past.

It

is necessary to impose "sameness" on the past in order that comparisons
with the past can have binding-power.24

But this forces the individ-

uality of the past into general formulae, destroying its uniqueness.
Such an imposition is problematic for Nietzsche at this point, and
would remain so until the notion of sameness had been clarified, because it does do violence to the past, destroying some of its uniqueness.
Second, a cosmological position is already implied in the consideration of monumental history as the necessary condition of the

21 11 vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fur das Leben," §1, in
Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 1964), p.
103. Hereafter abbreviated as UB, II, followed by the section and
page numbers.
22 cf. UB, II, §2, p. 113 for Nietzsche's definition of monumental
history.

23Ib '{,,'d . ' p. 114.
24Ibid.' p. 115.
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attainment of the complete truth of monumental history.

This allows a

partial reconciliation of sameness and uniqueness.
Only if the earth always began its drama after the fifth act, and
it were certain that the same interaction of motives, the same deus
ex machina, the same catastrophe would recur at particular intervals, could the powerful desire monumental history in its full
archetypic truthfulness, i.e. each fact set out precisely in its
peculiarity and uniqueness . . • • Until then monumental history
will never be able to make use of complete truthfulness; it will
always bring together things that are not the same, generalize them,
and make them the same; it will always weaken the difference between motives and occasions in order to depict effects at the expense of causes--monumentally, i.e., as examples for imitation. It
disregards causes as much as possible, and might with less exaggeration be called a collection of "effects in themselves," than
of events that will have an effect on all ages.25
This passage is significant for two reasons.

It indicates the cosmo-

logical dimensions of the problem of sameness, and it also shows that
this endeavor involves the overcoming of the category of causality,
searching rather after "effects in themselves."

Nietzsche refers in

this same section to the Pythagorean view of the world as a presupposition of such a notion of history,

25 Ibid., p. llS.

26

and there is indeed evidence that

"Nur wenn die Erde ihr Theatersti.ick jedesmal
nach dem fi.inften Akt von neuem anfinge, wenn es feststlinde, daB dieselbe
Verknotung von Motiven, derselbe deus ex machina, dieselbe Katastrophe
in bestinnnten Zwischenraumen wiederkehrten, di.irfte der Machtige die
monumentale Historie in voller ikonischer Wahr>haftigkeit, daB heiBt
jedes Faktum in seiner genau geschilderten Eigenti.imlichkeit und Einzigkeit begehren . • • Bis dahin wird die monumentale Historie jene volle
Wahrhaftigkeit nicht brauchen konnen: innner wird sie das Ungleiche annahern, verallgemeinern und endlich gleichsetzen; innner wird sie die
Verschiedenheit der Motive und Anlasse abschwachen, um auf Kosten der
causae die effectus monumental, namlich vorbildlich und nachahmungswlirdig, hinzustellen: so daB man sie, weil sie moglichst von den Ursachen absieht, mit geringer Ubertreibung eine Sannnlung der 'Effekte an
sich' nennen konnte, als von Ereignissen, die zu allen Zeiten Effekt
machen werden."

26 Ibid.
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the Pythagoreans held a notion of the eternal recurrence of the same on
. h uman h"1story. 27
t h e 1eve 1 o f t h e cosmos as we 11 as 1n

The passage

is also of interest because it indicates another usage of play in
Nietzsche's philosophy:
theater play.

the understanding of history in terms of a

28

There is, then, in the consideration on monumental history the
beginning of a meditation upon the problem of time and the eternal recurrence.

Many of the essential components of later formulations of

the problem are already present:

the threat of becoming, the inade-

quacy of the categories of cause and effect, the primacy of interpretation, the problematic character of "the same," the need to frame the
eternal recurrence in terms which stretch beyond the individual to
human history itself and to the cosmos. ·The notion of play is already

27

cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume
One (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 279-80.
28

rn the first section of "On the Use and Abuse of History,"
the image of the playing child--reminiscent of the discussion of Heraclitus as well as of "On the Three Metamorphoses" in 'Zarathustra-recurs. Man with the burden of the past is compelled, as if looking
upon some lost paradise, "das Kind zu sehen, das noch nichts Vergangenes
zu verleugnen hat und zwischen den Zaunen der Vergangenheit und der
Zukunft in iiberseliger Blindheit spielt. Und doch muB ihm sein Spiel
gestort werden: nur zu zeitig wird es aus der Vergessenheit heraufgerufen." (UB, II, §1, p. 102.) Note that it is the imposition of
real time which brings about the destruction of the child's game ("real
time" here being "historical time"), while it was his ability to forget
history and its time which made such playing first possible.
The category of play in regard to history also arises as the
interplay of historical forces. For example, in his notebooks from
1875, Nietzsche writes of the interplay between Alexandrianism and
Christianity: " . • • das rhythmische Spiel der beiden Faktoren gegen
einander, an dem die Welt zu leiden hatte." (NF, IV/l, 11(22), p.
284.)
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present here, and the relation between play and temporality has already
been hinted at.

The central notion, that which will be used to over-

come many of the problems here, is still to be developed at this stage:
the will to power.
In the passage on "The Heaviest Burden," a theme is introduced
which will enlarge the notion of the eternal recurrence:
the "thought" of the eternal recurrence.

the power of

The demon introduces this

terrifying thought, suggesting that the eternal recurrence would be the
heaviest burden on one's activity, an

eternal sanctioning and sealing. 29

Two points should be noted here.
First, it :is the "unspeakably small and great" of life which
recurs.

This indicates that every aspect of one's life recurs. 30

Asking the question of what it is that recurs eternally, we have the
first possible answer:

every aspect of one's life, including the un-

speakably small and great.
Second, the theory is not presented as a "fact"--the meaning
of a "fact" will be discussed below--but rather as a "thought."

What

is significant at this point is the possibility of the eternal return,

29FW, IV, §341, p. 231

= JW, IV, §341, p. 270.

30cf. Ivan Soll, "Reflections on Recurrence: A Re-examination of
Nietzsche's Doctrine, Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen," in Nietzsche:
A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 340. This does not necessarily
entail the problem Soll poses when he states: "A person can have no
direct memories of earlier recurrences. If he did, the increment of
his mental life would make him different from his predecessors and
hence not an identical recurrence of them." While this is true in relation to the past, once one does have the thought, then it is clear that
in the future one will recur with the knowledge that one will recur in
the future again.
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the thinking of the eternal recurrence? 1 Again, this will be considered
in more detail below.

Suffice it to note the way in which the eternal

recurrence is advanced at this point.
Several other oblique references to the problem of the eternal
recurrence are to be found in the fragments collected in The Will to

P()U)er, and a short consideration of them will conclude this treatment
of indirect and preliminary statements of the eternal recurrence.
In discussing the contrast between Apollo and Dionysus in
1885-86, Nietzsche suggests that Apollo's deception is the eternity
of the beautiful form, while the enjoyment of Dionysus' life is rooted
in the continual creativity of productive and destructive force,32

A

similar contrast is developed later (Spring-Fall, 1887), and it is
clear that Nietzsche is not arguing specifically against eternity as
such, but rather against the value of eternally remaining the same, 33
In doing so, he is moving toward an affirmation of the transitory
character of continual creating as rooted in power.

3lsoll argues on this basis that the importance of any proof
of the eternal recurrence is less than central to Nietzsche's position,
"all that is really required is a demonstration of the doctrine's
possibility." (Ibid., p. 325.) Soll's arguments in this regard are
unconvincing for, even if it is the psychological impact of this doctrine
which is at stake, a proof would obviously lend it much greater import.
Moreover, Soll ignores the question of h()U) this could be proved--the
question which is discussed below in the sections on the naming,
thinking, and willing of the eternal recurrence.
32WM, §1049, p. 683 = WP, §1049, p. 539.
33WM, §577, p. 392 =WP, §577, p. 310 =NF, VIII/2, 9(26), p.
12.
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Although the relationship between eternity and the moment is
initially treated as an antithetical one, Nietzsche also argues that
all eternity is necessary to affirm the moment. 34
in two directions.

On the one hand, it is the moment which redeems

and affirms all of existence;
eternity.

His argument develops

one proceeds from the moment outward to

On the other hand, the argtnnent also proceeds from the in-

sufficiency of all things and selves inward toward the moment, the
necessary condition
tion by all eternity.

of the moment's completeness being its affirmaEternity is rejected only insofar as it re-

mains unmediated by the moment of creative action.
While the moment is characterized by creativity, it is necessary
to see the notion of the moment within the perspective of Nietzsche's
statement that nothing exists for itself.
of a "true world" is put into question.

One can say that the notion
In the search for a better

world, or at least a more tolerable one, man continually creates new
fictitious worlds. 35

It is a short step then to understanding the

"real" world as "the apparent world once again. 1136

The "once again"

34 WM, §1032, p. 675 = WP, §1032, pp. 532-33. As Joan Stambaugh
has pointed out, when the moment is thought to be "ein einmaliger Zustand," a "nunc stans . . • zeitlose Ewigkeit," then the moment excludes
all other moments. ("Das Gleiche in Nietzsche Gedanken der Ewigen
Wiederkunft des Gleichen," Revue International de PhiZosophie, Vol. 67,
No. 1 [1964), p. 111.) Clearly Nietzsche is not referring here to an
isolated moment, but to a dynamic one in the flow of time.
35WM, §586, p. 407 =WP, §586, p. 321 =NF, VIII/3, 14(168), p.
144.
36 WM, §566, p. 386 =WP, §566, p. 305 =NF, VIII/2, 11(50), p.
266. "Die 'wahre Welt', wie immer auch man sie bisher concipirt hat,-sie war immer die scheinbare Welt noch einmaZ."
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character of this creation points to a second way of understanding the
eternal recurrence:

what recurs again and again is the same act, the

act of creating new worlds.

Nothing exists for itself, but rather it

must be continually created in the moment.
This corresponds to Nietzsche's description of truth in terms
of an eternal, active creating which has its foundation in the will to
power. 37

The process of truth is an eternal making, and one puts out

of sight that which is false--just as one hides unused props and scenery
behind the stage in a play.

The eternal character of this process

corresponds to the eternal creating discussed above.

That out of which

one creates, if one may interpolate from an earlier text, is the great
and the small--that chaotic plurality which, as will be shown below,
is fundamentally force.

That which does the creating is the will to

power.
In descriptions of the physical world, it is therefore inadequate to speak of regularity or conformity to a law as if one were
dealing with a real law expressive of the nature of things themselves.
Such formulations are only metaphorica1. 38

Laws, rather than referring

to things in themselves, are themselves the results of creative acts.

The Law of the Eter>naZ Reaurrence of the Same
In this section I shall show that the doctrine of the eternal
recurrence of the same can be understood as a law--if law is taken in

37WM, §552, p. 377

WP, §552, p. 298.

38WM, §632, p. 426

WP, §632, p. 336.
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the

Nietzsche~n

sense.

First, laws for Nietzsche will be shown to be

the result of creative interpretations, not statements about things
in themselves.

Second, it will be shown that the basis of this inter-

pretation is power--laws are creative expressions of the will to power.
The eternal recurrence of the same is not based on an uncritical
understanding of physical law.

It is necessary to distinguish here

between two different conceptions of law:

(1) as descriptive of the

way things in the world behave, thus applicable to things in themselves, and (2) law as a creative extension or exercise of the will to
power.

Although it appears to be presented as such in several places

in Zarathustra and The Joyful Wisdom and in some of the discussions
in the secondary literature, the doctrine of the eternal recurrence
is clearly not meant to be a law in the first sense.
One finds in The Joyful Wisdom a clear rejection of any mechanistic view of the world.

One reason for such a rejection is that a

structure of explanation such as this, one which interprets the world
in terms of a machine, tends to posit a goal or end.

39

The same problem

is considered elsewhere, and there it is argued that the mechanistic
interpretation is worthless--and not in good taste--because it treats
only what can be counted. 40

In so doing, it is not only totally

ignoring the worth of that which is under consideration, but it is
also divesting existence of its ambiguous character, substituting one

39FW, III, §109, p. 126 = JW, III, §109, p. 151.
40FW, V, §373, p. 290

= JW, V, §373, p. 339.

194
interpretation for the multiplicity of possible perspectives.
When Nietzsche discusses the new "infinite" of the fearless
ones, he argues that the world may contain infinite interpretations,
especially in relation to time. 41

The possibility of perceiving time

differently is presented as a "hopeless curiosity," but this hopeless
curiosity will transform itself into "the most horrible and most
liberating of thoughts," the eternal recurrence of the same.
It seems, however, that this infinity of interpretations is
such that it excludes some interpretations.

Just as the world is not

to be viewed mechanistically, so too it is not to be viewed as a living
being. 42

Nietzsche also rejects the position that the world eternally

creates the new or that there are eternally enduring substances. 43

In

fact, much of his energy and writing was devoted to showing why some
interpretations are untenable.

If there is an infinity of interpre-

tations, some are considered to be much better than others--and presumably the eternal recurrence of the same is meant to be the best.
Rejecting the above interpretations, Nietzsche does recognize
the existence of necessity 44 and chaos.

Order, structure, form, beauty,

wisdom and other aesthetic elements of humanness are absent from the
world;

there is necessity, but it is not such that it can be termed

41FW, V, §374, p. 291 = JW, V, §374, pp. 340-41.
42FW, III, §109, p. 126 = JW, III, §109, p. 151.

·a

43Ib 'l,

• '

p. 127

=ibid., pp. 151-52.

44 Even this necessity
376 =WP, §552, p. 297.

is

an interpretation.

Cf, WM, §552, p,
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a law in nature itself. 45

Given this, it is clearly impossible to main-

tain that the eternal recurrence of the same is to be interpreted as
a physical law in the traditional sense of that term.
The problem is clarified somewhat if one considers the relation between law and power.

Law was rejected because it involved in

some way a reduction of the manifold character of existence, and an
imputation of purpose in that to which it refers or of a subject that
directs the movement of phenomena. 46

Events simply have a "thus and

not otherwise" character, and the foundation for this necessity is
power.

"There is no law: every power draws its ultimate consequence

at every moment.
middle term. 1147

Calculability exists precisely because there is no
Thus it is power which is the foundation of the neces-

sity which Nietzsche admits as legitimate, but it escapes treatment as
law because it exists fully in the moment, because there is no subject
directing the movement and on purpose toward which it is moving.
If every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment,
then it would appear that the eternal recurrence refers to power--since
it apparently cannot refer to any structure (such as order, beauty,
law, etc.) beyond or above power.

At this point it is necessary to

establish the relationship between the eternal recurrence and the will

45FW, III, §109, p. 127
46WM, §632, p. 426

= JW, III, §109,

p. 152.

WP , §6 3 2 , p • 33 7 .

47WM, §634, p. 427 =WP, §634, p. 337 =NF, VIII/3, 14(79), p.
50.
"Es giebt kein Gesetz: jede Macht zieht in jedem Augenblick ihre
letzte Consequenz. Gerade, daB es kein mezzo termine giebt, darauf
beruht die Berechenbarkei t." (The Kroner edition has "Anderskonnen"
for "mezzo termine.")
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to power and force,

The law of the eternal recurrence depends upon

whether or not the law can be expressive of force.

It cannot be ex-

pressive of force according to Nietzsche if this involves position a
notion of a subject directing the force, if it implies a purpose, if
it attempts to reach things in themselves, if it involves a reduction
of the richness of existence, or if it covers up a real ambiguity.
What we say about the relationship between the eternal recurrence and
power cannot have the status of a law if it involves these conditions.

The Relationship of the Eternal Recurrence and Power-Force
In this section, I shall outline the basic meaning of the terms
"force" and "power" within Nietzsche's philosophy and show how two
additional meanings of "that which recurs eternally" emerge from his
idea of force:

the eternal recurrence of a given combination of

centers of force and the eternal recurrence of given levels of energy.
In doing this, I shall also examine briefly Nietzsche's proof of the
eternal recurrence as developed in his notebooks.
The remarks on the problem of force and power are to be found
primarily in Nietzsche's notebooks.

The consideration here will be

based mainly on passages gathered together in The Will to Power.
First, force (Kraft) and power (Macht) are treated together
because in general they are related to each other as outer to inner.
Will to power is the inner organizing will of force, 48 force specified
as seeking to increase itself.

48WM, §619, p. 421

= WP,

§61§, pp. 332-33.
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Second, the substratum of force is absolute space.

In a passage

to which I shall return below, Nietzsche discusses space and time.
I believe in absolute space as the substratum of force: the latter
limits and forms. Time eternal. But space and time do not exist
in themselves. 49
This is not an argument for the absolute character of space, but rather
a statement of belief 1n it, a laying bare of presuppositions.

Perhaps

the reasoning behind this is that, were space infinite, then force would
be continually dispersing itself over this infinite space.

So force

must limit and form this absolute space which does not exist in itself.
Third, the force which exists in this manner must be a finite
quantum.

The idea of infinite force is clearly rejected as a contra-

diction in terms, presumably because it is the very nature of thinking
to impose some kind of limit;

thus unlimited force is unthinkable.SO

It is for this reason that eternal novelty is impossible.

Not only is

there a finite amount of force, but there is also only a finite number
of centers of force. 51

It is because of this that the "great dice game

of existence" must repeat itself--if there is infinite time.

Both

force and space must be finite and time must be unending if the eternal
recurrence is to be, not just possible, but necessary--and Nietzsche
asks us to think the world in this manner.

The eternal recurrence of

49 WM, §545, pp. 370-71 =WP, §545, p. 293. "Ich glaube an den
absoluten Raum, als Substrat der Kraft: diese begrenzt und gestaltet.
Die Zeit ewig. Aber an sich gibt es nicht Raum, nicht Zeit."
50wM, §1062, p. 693 =WP, §1062, p. 547.
51 WM, §1066, p. 696 =WP, §1066, p. 549 =NF, VIII/3, 14(188),
p. 168.
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the same is the result of understanding existence as a dice game: a
particular type of play with a finite number of pieces and limited
space, but played on through eternity.
A number of arguments have been arised against this notion of
the eternal recurrence, notably by Simme1 52 and Capek.53

Simmel's

argument is well summarized by Kaufmann:
Simmel has offered a very elegant refutation of Nietzsche's attempted
proof of the eternal recurrence of the same events. Even if there
were exceedingly few things in a finite space in an infinite time,
they would not have to repeat the same configurations. Suppose
there were three wheels of equal size, rotating on the same axis,
one point marked on the circumference of each wheel, and these
three points lined up in one straight line. If the second wheel
rotated twice as fast as the first, and if the speed of the third
wheel was l/n of the speed of the first, the initial line-up would
never recur. 54
While Simmel's argument is valid in itself, it should be noted that
there are two limitations to it.

First, it is only an argument against

the necessity of the eternal recurrence, not against its possibility.
Second, it does interpret Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence
as referring to things in themselves.

A more consistent interpretation

of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence as a creative expression of
the will to power allows one to maintain the doctrine of the eternal
recurrence in a sense other than Simmel has interpreted it, since
Simmel's argument is based on an understanding of eternal recurrence

52Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer und Nietzsche: Ein Vortragszyklus
(Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1907), pp. 250 f.
53
Milic Capek, "The Theory of the Eternal Recurrence in Modern
Philosophy," Journal of Philosophy, LVII, 9 (April, 1960), 289-95,
54 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p, 327.
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as a physical law referring to things in themselves,
Capek's criticisms are significant in that they show that the
eternal recurrence of the same can be shown to be necessary on the level
of the cosmos, "asswning, of coUPse, that the universe is Zike a pack

of cards. 1155

Such an assumption, in Capek's view, is clearly incon-

sistent with the results of contemporary physics, which does not deal
with a universe of things, but rather of events and dynamic quanta.
Insofar as Nietzsche also seeks to deal with the universe in these
terms, Capek's criticisms of the eternal recurrence appear to be quite
applicable to Nietzsche's position, suggesting that Nietzsche's proof
of the eternal recurrence is not consistent with his conception of
the universe as composed of dynamic quanta of force.

Further develop-

ment of the Nietzschean idea of a quantum of force is necessary here in
order to determine whether the eternal recurrence of the same quanta
of force can be consistently maintained within Nietzsche's framework,
For Nietzsche, a quantum of force is not to be conceived as an
"unfree will. 1156

It simply implies that things are "thus and thus, n57

Dynamic quanta remain, all of which are in relation to all the others.
What one might call their "essence" is their relation to all other
quanta, their "effect" upon them,58 although such language is at best

55 capek, "Eternal Recurrence," p. 291.
56WM, §552, p. 375 = WP, §552, p. 297.
57WM, §632, p. 426 = WP, §632, pp. 336-37.
p. 51.

58WM, §635' p. 429 = WP' §635, p. 339 =NF, VIII/3, 14 (79)'
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only metaphorical.

These quanta are referred to as power-will (Macht-

wiZZen) and as the will to power.
they produce.

They are designated by the effects

The eternal recurrence of the same is in this sense

merely an expression of the tautological character of force present in
its givenness as will to power, its being what it is and nothing more.
The absolute necessity of the same events occurring in the course
of one world, as in all others, is in eternity not a determinism
ruling events, merely the expression of the fact that the impossible
is not possible . . • that a certain force cannot be other than
this certain force; that it can react to a quantum of resisting
force only according to the measure of its strength; event and
necessary event is a tautoZogy.59
The tautological character of force, its being what it is in the moment
and nothing more, when placed within absolute space and when force is
seen as finite, serves as the basis of the eternal recurrence of the
same if time is infinite.

The eternal recurrence is not a law governing

events, but rather an expression of the tautologous character of force.
Thus the appropiateness of pathos, rather than becoming or effect, as
the most elementary starting-point: 60

pathos is the event of a multi-

plicity of centers of force being themselves by being in relation to
all other centers of force.

59WM, §639, p. 432 =WP, §639, p. 341 =NF, VIII/2, 10(138),
pp. 201-02. " . . . die absolute Necessitat des gleichen Geschehens in
einem Weltlauf wie in allen ilbrigen in Ewigkeit, nicht ein Determinismus
ilber dem Geschehen, sondern bloB der Ausdruck <lessen, daB das Unmogliche
nicht mogliche ist • . • daB eine bestimmte Kraft eben nichts anderes
sein kann als eben diese bestimmte Kraft; daB sie sich an einem Quantum
Kraft-Widerstand nicht anders auslaBt, als ihrer Starke gemaB ist-Geschehen und Nothwendig-Geschehen ist eine TautoZogie."
60wm, §635, p. 429 =WP, §635, p. 339 =NF, VIII/3, 14(79),
p. 51.
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Yet one must be careful about how this totality is conceptualized.

The totality does not remain the same; rather, existence is

first and foremost an event, and it is implied that it is developmental insofar as the energy rises and falls.
Regarded mechanistically, the energy of the totality of becoming
remains constant; regarded economically, it rises to a high point
and sinks down again in an eternal circle. This "will to power"
expresses itself in the interpretation, in the manner in which
force is used up; transformation of energy into life, and "life at
its highest potency," thus appears as the goal. The same quantum
of energy means different things at different stages of evolution. 61
Here then the notion of the eternal recurrence is presented with a
slightly different emphasis:

the rising and falling of the energy of

the totality in an eternal circle, in which what continually returns
is the same level of energy.

Such an interpretation is not subject

to the criticisms that Capek has levelled against the notion of the
eternal recurrence.

The will to power is the principle of motion in

this unending circle of expansion and contraction,

It is an inter-

preter in the original sense of the word: an agent, in this case the
agent of power.

This relationship will be explored in more detail

below.
Two preliminary meanings of the eternal recurrence have thus

61 WM, §639, p. 431 =WP, §639, p. 340 =NF, VIII/2, 10(138),
p. 201. "--mechanisch betrachtet, bleibt die Energie des Gesaromtwerdens constant; okonomisch betrachtet, steigt sie bis zu einem Hohepunkt und sinkt van ihm wieder herab in einem ewigen Kreislauf; dieser
'Wille zur Macht' drlickt sich in der Ausdeutung, in der Art des Kraftverbrauchs aus--Verwandlung der Energie in Leben und Leben in hochster
Potenz erscheint demnach als Ziel. Dasselbe Quantum Energie bedeutet
auf den verschiedenen Stufen der Entwicklung Verschiedenes • • • "
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far presented themselves in this section.

In the first, the eternal

recurrence is merely an expression of the tautological character of
power given the following conditions: limited space, a finite number of
centers of force, unending time.

That which returns then is the given

combination of centers of force.

In the second instance, the eternal

recurrence expresses the rising and sinking of the energy of the totality
of becoming, considered economically (rather than mechanistically), in
an eternal circulation.

In this case, that which returns is the same

level of energy as interpreted by the will to power.62

While it may

be possible to show that these are but two different ways of stating
the same general condition, it should be noted that there are important
differences, both in regard to the reasons given for them and in relation to their determinateness.

The first formulation, with its emphasis

on centers of force, is rather more specific than the second, which
is concerned with the level of energy.

That the will to power inter-

prets such energy and consequently defines centers of force is indeed
true for Nietzsche, but this formulation does not state that it is
these centers of force which return.
Before considering in more detail the ways in which force and
power are interpreted--through naming, willing, acting and the artistic
act--it is necessary to consider briefly the primacy of power, since
this provides the basis for the subsequent discussion of knowing the

62 These are the third and fourth possible meanings of "that
which retu!·ns eternally the same." The first two were (1) all aspects
of one's personal existence, including the unspeakably great and small 7
and (2) the act of continually creating new worlds,
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eternal recurrence.

The Primacy of Power-Force
The primacy of power and force, discussed above in relation to
the universe as

a

whole, is also found in the human world.

The concept

which provides the mediating link between the cosmological analysis and
the analysis of human behavior is that of the event.
event was something which occurred in the world.
necessary;

As used above,

All events are

event and necessary event is a tautology.

Events are

determinations of force, in respect to both degree and relation. 63
.
.
. a 1so a f unction
.
.
64
But t h e determination
o f f orce is
o f sensation.
Both the event and sensation are determinations of force.

Sensation

is a specific kind of event, retaining the general structure of interpreting power.

It is on this foundation that knowing stands--and that

will be of upmost importance when considering the possibility of knowing
the eternal recurrence.
The event then exists not only in the cosmological sense, but
also as the foundation of the human world and of knowing.

Insofar as

the event is rooted in force, then the foundation of both orders--the
reference to two orders here is not meant to imply that there are
necessarily two distinct orders existing in themselves--is the structure of the event, its determination of force, which is the will to
power.

This presents a fifth possible meaning of that which returns

63WM, §552, p. 378 =WP, §552, p. 297.
64 WM, §563, pp. 384-85
WP, §500, p. 273.

=

WP, §563, p. 304; WM, §500, p. 345

=
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eternally the same; the event as a determination of force.

The Meaning of ''the Same 11
At this point in the analysis, before considering how the
eternal recurrence is willed, it is necessary to inquire in more depth
into the meaning of "the same" in the doctrine of the eternal recurrence
of the same in order to show the foundation of sameness in power.

On

the basis of these considerations, I shall show that there are two
additional possible meanings of "that which recurs eternally": the
same apparent world, in either of two senses as (1) the specific content
of such a world, and (2) its character as being an appearance, i.e. its
falsity.

These constitute the sixth and seventh possible meanings of

that which eternally recurs the same.

In addition to this, it will be

shown that sameness is not given in the world, but rather that we
create sameness.

It is an expression of our power over the world.

In

this sense, the strongest will to power demands the greatest creation
of sameness--this is the creation of the eternal recurrence of the
same.

Finally, the following section establishes the framework within

which the modes of affirming the eternal recurrence--especially naming,
thinking, and willing as expressions of the will to power--can be considered.
One can begin such an investigation by recognizing that the
general character of the world is chaos.

65

If this is the case, then

a sixth possible meaning of that which eternally recurs the same is

65

Fw, III, §109, p. 127

= JW, III, §109, p. 152.
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chaos.

In his description of "the most dangerous point of view, 11 Nie-

tzsche sets the stage for such an interpretation,

"What I now do, or

neglect to do, is as important for all that is to come, as the greatest
event of the past: in this immense perspective of effects all actions
are equally great and small. 1166

·,... ;,.-- .: ·What are "the same" are all

actions--they are equally great and small.

If "great and small" is

taken to indicate an undifferentiated plurality, then the sameness in
which they share here is quite close to chaos.

What seems to happen in

this most dangerous of perspectives is that all measure disappears,
thus allowing all things to be equally great and small, significant
and insiginificant.

Chaos is just such an absence of measure.

ln this

case, the "same" which would recur eternally would be chaos 1 the realization in the end that there is no final measure in terms of which the
manifold of existence may be judged.
Yet such an explanation is insufficient as it stands, for the
notion of "the same" must be shown to be consonant with Nietzsche's
demand for a total affirmation of life in a creative manner.

Sameness

must be creatively affirmed, not simply given.
A first clue to the solution of this problem is found in Nietzsche's analysis of the function of logic.

Just as the world is

chaos, so one originally encounters a chaos of ideas. 67

The function

66FW, III, §233, p. 170 = JW, III, §233, p, 202, "Was ich jetzt
tue oder lasse, ist fur alles Kommende so wichtig als das groBte Ereignis
der Vergangenheit: in dieser ungeheuren Perspektive der Wirkung sind
alle Handlungen gleich groB und klein. 11
67WM, §508, p. 348

= WP, §508, p, 276.
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of logic is to impose order upon this chaos by seeing things as the
same.

On the natural level, there exists a movement toward "making the

same" what is appro{iated--the limits of this being usefulness and
harmfulness.

On the human level, the same movement of making--positing

and seeing--things as equal exists, and it is this which is the foundation of logic.68
The background out of which logic arises is then this original
chaos--again, existence as a form of play, but this time a lawless
play, hardly d~erving of the term.69

Logic uses this chaos as the

raw stuff out of which it seeks to establish identities by creating
fictitious worlds.

Only after this fundamental falsificiation of

events is assumed does logic become possible. 70
There is a distinction here between identity and sameness, but
Nietzsche hardly takes pains to make clear what it is.

It is important

in understanding the eternal recurrence to know whether Nietzsche means
that the same, the identical, or the self-identical eternally recurs.
One can begin by suggesting that identity has its foundation
in sameness, the appearance that things are the same. 71

It is this,

the creation of sameness, which allows us to comprehend the world, even
if the world which we comprehend is a falsification.

However, the

68
·WM, §510, p. 349 =WP, §510, p. 276.
69 we do, however, use the word in this sense when we speak, for
example, of "the play of reflections on the water."
70WM, §512, pp. 349-50 =WP, §512, p. 277.
71WM, §520, pp. 355-56

= WP,

§520, p. 281.

207
appearance of "same things" is open to question 1n a number of ways.
First, the foundation of these "same things" is located in our
belief in things--which is the precondition of our belief in logic. 72
But Nietzsche himself rejects such a belief73 insofar as it claims to
refer to anything but an apparent world.
Second, the notion is criticized from the standpoint of "sameness."

Sameness is not simply posited, it is made.

The process of

making things the same (ein Gleich-maehen) comes before that of positing
sameness (ein Gleichsetzen). 74

If the foundations of logic are seen

within this context, then logic can be interpreted as a creative act.
Third, Nietzsche criticizes the notion of sameness in terms of
its origins.

Logic grows out of the herd instinct, and is used to

achieve mutual agreement and domination.

The positing of sameness in

various events presupposes similar or same souls (gleiche Seele). 75
The effects of this drive toward sameness are powerful enough that
Nietzsche feels justified in saying that this changes the very way that
we sense things.

The compulsion to create a world of identical cases

reshapes our sense of reality.
This same compulsion exists in the sense activities which support
reason--by simplification, coarsening, emphasizing, and elaborating,
upon which all "recognition," all ability to make oneself intelligible rests. Our needs have made our senses so precise that the

72WM, §516, p. 353 =WP, §516, p. 279 =NF, VIII/2, 9(97), p. 53.

73Ibid.; WM, §553, p. 379 = WP, §553, p. 300.
74WM, §501, p. 345 =WP, §501, pp. 273-74.
75.WM, §509, p. 349

WP, §509, p. 276.
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"same apparent world" always reappears and thus has acquired the
semblance of reality.76
That "the same apparent world always reappears" would apparently be
rooted in these needs:

to construct concepts, species, forms, laws,

purposes, etc., which presumably are in turn rooted in more fundamental needs to live and to increase power.
ness is in the same sensations,
a function of something else.

77

but such sensations themselves are

At this point a seventh possible meaning

of the eternal recurrence appears:
recurs eternally.

The foundation of same-

it is the same apparent world that

The emphasis could be placed here on either the

content of that world or its formal characteristic as being "apparent."
In the latter case, whatever world occurs would be a falsification, in
which case, it is the falsity of one's world which eternally recurs.
Thus we encounter here the eternal recurrence of the same in two
senses:

the same characteristic of falseness keeps recurring, and

sameness is itself this process of falsification.
In attempting to discover what these needs for the recurrence
of the same apparent world are, we uncover several levels.

The Sich-

selbst-Gleiche is necessary for knowing. 78 The construction of

76 WM, §521, p. 357 =WP, §521, p. 282 =NF, VIII/2, 9(144), p.
82. " •• diese selbe Nothigung besteht in der Sinnen-Aktivitat,
welche der Verstand unterstiltzt,--diese Vereinfachen, Vergrobern, Unterstreichen und Ausdichten, auf dem alles 'Wiedererkennen,' alles Sichverstandlich-rnachen-konnen beruht. Unsre Bedurfnisse haben unsre Sinne
so pracisirt, daB die 'gleiche Erscheinungswelt' inuner wieder kehrt und
dadurch den Anschein der Wirklichkeit bekonunen hat."
77
78

WM, §532, p. 366 = WP, §532, p. 289.
WM, §574, p. 391 = WP, §574, p. 309.
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identical cases, of the appearance of sameness, is necessary for
thought.79

It is this, the construction of identical cases, which

is the foundation of reality.

"The 'reality' [of the phenomenal world]

lies in the continual recurrence of same, familiar, related things in
their logicized character, in the belief that here we are able to reckon
and calculate. 1180

Furthermore, the foundation of life itself is a

belief in regular and recurring things. 81

With this as the premise of

life, the more powerful life is characterized by a wider and more knowable world.

The most powerful life demands the most knowable world in

which in turn the most recurring things are demanded--thus the demand
for the eternal recurrence of the same arises out of an increase in
power.

In this sense, the foundation of the creation of sameness is

located 1n the fact that it is a necessary condition of the possibility
of life.
Moreover, sameness is a necessary condition of life, and the
creation of sameness involves the very idea of the eternal recurrence.
Insofar as creative life necessarily involves the creation of sameness,
it simultaneously creates the necessity of the eternal recurrence.

By

presenting sameness as a condition of life, Nietzsche moves toward

79 WM, §544, p. 370

WP, §544, p. 293 =NF, VIII/2, 10(159),

p. 216.

BOWM, §569, p. 388 =WP, §569, p. 307 =NF, VIII/2, 9(106),
pp. 59-60. "Die 'Realitat' liegt in dem bestandigen Wiederkonnnen
gleicher, bekannter, verwandter Dinge, in ihrem logisirten Charakter,
im Glauben, daB wir hier rechnen, berechnen konnen."
81WM, §552, p. 377 = WP, §552, p. 278.
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establishing a transcendental argument for the eternal recurrence of
the same.
Finally, it has been shown that Nietzsche argues against attributing sameness to any effective subject, and that he also argues against
positing a notion in which it resides.

In its fullness, the notion of

sameness refers neither to subject nor to object, but to event.82

Now

it has been shown above that the foundation of the event is power, and
its organizing principle the will to power.

Then sameness refers to

the tautological character of power which is present always and fully
and necessarily in the moment.

The foundation of sameness is thus

not in things or subjects, but rather in events.

The creation of same-

ness is simultaneously the creating of the eternal recurrence of the
same.

The foundation of the creation of sameness is located, on the

one hand, in the tautological character of power, and, on the other
hand, in the will to power.

In this sense, an eighth possible inter-

pretation of that which recurs eternally the same reveals itself:
force recurs eternally and is the foundation of all sameness.
There remains this problem:

can the eternal recurrence of the

same be affirmed (whether this involves willing, thinking, or some
other means) without introducing difference by the one who is doing
the affirming?

If difference were introduced, this would seem to

result in a different situation recurring--or occurring--and consequently destroying the sameness of the eternal recurrence.

In order

to avoid this, the affirmation of sameness must contain within it its

82WM, §552, p. 376 =WP, §552, p. 298.
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own ground in terms of sameness.

The act of affirming the same must

be a necessary consequence of sameness itself if we are to avoid introducing difference into the affirmation itself.
Now this is in fact the case for Nietzsche insofar as sameness
is always an expression of power:

when considered with a "cosmolog-

ical" perspective, sameness is expressive of the tautological character
of power;

when considered from the perspective of the individual, same-

ness is the will to power affirming the necessary character of events
which exist as q~a of power.

Sameness, as the expression of power,

involves the affirmation of itself on both the

cosmological and the

individual levels.
The primacy of power, which was established in the previous
section, is then reaffirmed by the notion of sameness.

It now remains.

to be shown that this is consistent with the various modes of affirmation of the eternal recurrence.

The Thinking and Naming of the Eternal Recurrence
The eternal recurrence does not refer as a doctrine to things
in themselves, nor can it be taken as a law descriptive of a mechanistic universe.

If it were, it would indeed be disproved by the

criticisms of Simmel and Capek discussed above;

but it is not.

The

eternal recurrence of the same is an expression of power which must
be affirmed in appropriate ways.

If we are to understand the funda-

mental meaning of the eternal recurrence, we must consider the ways
in which Nietzsche meant it to be affirmed.
not a statement about a mechanistic world.

The notion is clearly
Three of the modes of such

creative affirmation are naming, thinking, and willing.
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The naming and thinking of the eternal recurrence stand as two
ways, distinguishable but not separate, in which it is not simply
affirmed but created.
to create it.

To think and to name the eternal recurrence are

Let us examine the basis for such a statement, and then

explore some of its consequences.
As the comments on Nietzsche's treatment of logic have indicated, language is an expression of the will to power.

Poetry, for

example, is a form of power used to constrain the gods.83

Naming is

fundamental to this process, for naming suffices in the end to create
new things. 84

The demand to create anew can be seen in some senses

as a demand for the purification of language and feeling. 8 5

This

applies not only to the creation of language, but also to its interpretation. 86

The creative power of the individual is thus located in

his speaking--both naming and interpreting.
Treating naming and interpreting as creative acts is consonant
with Nietzsche's view of knowledge and its experimental character.

Both

life and knowledge are experiments, and the fundamental question is the
question of the degree to which truth can be embodied.87

Although

Nietzsche will maintain elsewhere that this is actually an experiment

83FW, II, §84, pp. 98-102

= JW, II, §84, pp. 116-20.

84FW, II, §58, p. 81 = JW, II, §58, p. 97.
85FW, IV, §335, p. 224

JW, IV, §335, p. 262.

86WM, §767, p. 512 =WP, §767, p. 403.
87FW, III, §110, p. 130 = JW, III, §110, p. 156.
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of the thinker,88 the fundamental ground of this experimenting, as has
been shown in Chapter Five, cannot be the self, but rather must be
power.

Even the conflict between truth and error is a conflict between

two powers.

Life is an experiment, but we are not cast solely in the

role of the experimenters, but rather are also part of the experiment
itself.

The degree to which we are experimenters depends upon the

degree to which we manifest the will to power;

the weaker we are, the

more we become the object of the experiment.89
Naming is also given as the basis of law, and this is again
directly related to power. 90

Naming by the powerful ~s the basis of

any law, and if the eternal recurrence of the same is taken in any
sense as expressive of a law, it must be seen within this context.

In

this sense, the law of the eternal recurrence of the same can be seen
to be expressive of a ~reative act rooted in power.91

88FW, IV, §324, p. 213

= JW, IV, §324, p. 250.

8 9This is a matter of degree and depends in part on the notion
of the self which was discussed in Chapter Five. Presuming that the
experimenter is the active one, then the experimenter is the one who
reaches out for power, while the passive one--the object of the experiment--is the one who (or which) is hindered from moving forward.
(This interpretation is based on the notions of "active" and "passive"
in WM, §657, p. 439 =WP, §657, pp. 346-47.) Again it should be noted
that this is a matter of degree, not an absolute dichotomy.
90WM, §513, p. 350 =WP, §513, p. 277.
91Jaspers indicates this in his treatment of the eternal recurrence and shows how even the mechanical view of the world involves
transforming a "lawless play" into a consistent one. Cf. his Nietzsche:
An Introduction to the Unders-tnading of his Philosophical Activity, p.
355.
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We can only comprehend a world which we create.92
tion of this creation is power.

The founda-

Knowledge itself is a tool of the

will to power, and it increases proportionately with every increase in
power.93

As already noted, this is a process which involves creating

a deception.

Thus there is in us a power (Macht, not Vermogen) that is

the basis of knowledge.94
and shaping its world.

Knowledge is the result of power creating

Insofar as we can say that we know the eternal

recurrence, we again do so as an expression of a creative power.
Not only does the structure of naming, thinking and knowing
reveal to us its foundation in power--and its consequent tautological
character as power affirming itself--but we find again that this involves also the affirmation of sameness.

We have already shown that

behind the principle of identity is the "appearance" that things are

the same.9 5 We construct sameness before we think it.96

Insofar as

we can be said to know the eternal recurrence'of the same, it would
appear that we are fully exercising knowing itself:

the fullness of

knowing demands sameness, but it also demands the creation of sameness.
Thus the continual creative recurrence of the same arises necessarily

p. 94.

92WM, §495, p. 433

WP, §495, P· 272.

93WM, §480, p. 336

WP' §480, p. 266 =NF, VIII/3, 14(122),

94WM, §517, p. 354 = WP, §517, p. 280 = NF, VIII/2, 9(89),
p. 46.
95 WM, §§ 520-21, pp. 355-58 =WP, §§ 520-21, pp. 281-83.
96WM, §544, p. 370 =WP, §544, pp. 292-93 =NF, VIII/2, 10(159),
p. 216.

215
as the basic presupposition--the foundation--of knowing as the creation
of sameness.
Before this consideration of knowing the eternal recurrence can
be complete, it is necessary to consider the relative impotence of
such knowing as it is confined to the strictly intellectual level,
le•st one think that the eternal recurrence is created merely through
Even as early as The Birth of Tragedy

an isolated act of thinking.

Nietzsche was conscious of the problem of the impotence of language
and thought divorced from feeling and will--commenting, for example,
on the inadequacy of language in regard to music.9 7

Zarathustra speaks

of the impotence of words--of the fool's words which, even if they
were right, were nevertheless wrong.98

What is necessary is to go to

that which is behind naming, thinking and knowing:
necessary to wiU to make all things thinkable. 9 9
meaning is will to power. 11100

willing.

It is

In this sense, "all

The thinking of the eternal recurrence

can be reduced to something more fundamental:

the willing of it.

The Willing of the Eternal Recurrence Through Power
In the previous discussions of the nature of the will and of
the will to power, it was established that all of existence was to be

97GT, VI; III/l, p. 47

= BT,

VI, p. 55.

98z, III, "Vom Vorilbergehen;" VI/l, p. 221
tates," p. 178.

= Z,

III, "On Apos-

99 z, II, "Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung;" VI/l, p. 142
"On Self-Overcoming," p. ll3.
lOOWM, §590, p. 410
zur Macht • • • 11

= WP, §590, p. 323.

Z, II,

"Aller Sinn ist Wille
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understood ultimately in terms of will to power and that the will to
power was basically one will which took on, or was specified, in the
many different centers of force in the world.

Willing, to express it

in language not quite suitable to it, must always have an object (a
something which is willed), and the basic nature of that "something"
is power.
The act of willing is then expressive of force or power bringing
itself into focus and seeking to extend its boundaries of influence.
Will as a free act of an independent individual gives way to the will
to power, which is the force which is at work within individuals.

This

leads finally to an identification of force and will in the notion of
the will to power, which one might express in un-Nietzschean terms
as force becoming conscious of itself, seeking to increase itself.
Will, emerging as the organizing principle of force, leads to the
self-grounding character of the will to power.

While justification

may be needed for willing anything but power, willing power is selfjustifying in that willing is power and what is thus willed is itself.
When one asks who interprets an event, the final answer one
receives is that the interpreting itself, which is will to power, does
the interpreting.101
wills power?

The same answer would apply to willing.

Who

The will to power wills itself--and in so doing creates

another meaning for the eternal recurrence of the same.

What recurs

eternally the same is the structure of all events as manifestations
or instances of the will to power and nothing more.

lOlWM, §556, p. 381 = WP, §556, p. 302.

This is the ninth
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and final possible meaning of the eternal recurrence of the same.
There follows from this a specific kind of primacy which is
given to "praxis" in Nietzsche's philosophy.

Referring to the fear-

less ones as &ensualists and representatives of the present and future
in philosophy according to praxis rather than theoretically,102 Nietzsche points toward the direction philosophy was supposed to take:
it should become a concrete activity, rather than a theoretical one
divorced from life and power!03But even this activity appears, in the
end, to be the will to power as thinking and interpreting;

to phil-

osophize about the will to power is at the same time to be will to
power.

Conclusion: the Meaning of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same
The interdependence among sameness, the plurality of events
which include the

unsp~akably

large and small, force, event, inter-

pretation, thinking and naming, and will has been shown by uncovering
their common foundation in force organizing itself as will to power.
The idea overarching these interpenetrating activities or events is
the eternal recurrence of the same.

It has been shown that the idea

of the eternal recurrence of the same arises out of this framework in
several ways.
In response to the question of what it is that recurs eternally

102

FW, V, §372, p. 288

= JW,

V, §372, p. 336.

l03Nietzsche's emphasis on the unity of theory and practice is
indicated, for example, in WM, §423, pp. 287 ff. =WP, §423, pp. 227
FF. =NF, VIII/2, 14(142), pp. 117 ff.; WM, §458, pp. 318 f. =WP,
§458, p. 251 =NF, VIII/3, 14(107), pp. 77-78.
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the same, there are a number of possible answers: (1) all aspects of
one's existence, including the unspeakably great and small; (2) the
act of continually creating new worlds; (3) all given combinations of
centers of force as in the dice game of existence; (4) the periodic
rising and sinking of the level of the energy of existence economically
considered; (5) the event as such, with the realization that all of
existence has in itself the character of an event and nothing more;
(6) chaos, whether in existence itself or in our ideas; (7) the same
apparent world, whether in terms of its specific content as such or
in respect to its being an appearance, i.e. its falsity; (8) power or
force,

le~ding

to the insight that beneath all appearance there is

only force or power; (9) the will to power, which leads to the realization that the world is will to power and nothing more.

In addition

to this it has been shown that the creation of sameness is the necessary result of a number of our activities: (1) living itself demands
the creation of sameness; (2) the activity of sensation involves making
things the same; (3) thinking logically continues this process; (4)
naming makes things the same; (5) thinking, (6) willing, and (7) willing
power all involve creating sameness.

These meanings are not contra-

dictory, but rather are quite complementary, being descriptive of
different aspects of the same phenomenon.
Moreover, these meanings help explain why the eternal recurrence
of the same is the most horrible and the most liberating of thoughts.
Its horribleness is to be found in the fact that it undercuts all previous concepts of the world.

The experience of existence as a bare

plurality, chaos, event, force, and appearance are constitutive of
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this horribleness;

they are all aspects of the nihilist's experience

of meaninglessness.

Yet, once the shock of this realization is over-

come, one begins to discover a certain kind of orderliness, the foundation of which is to be located in the will to power.
apparent worlds have something in connnon:

Thus the many

their created apparentness.

The chaos of events and ideas reveals itself to be of one fabric:
force.

These appearances in turn prove themselves to have a common

structure: they are all manifestations of force organizing and increasing itself, will to power.

A connnon element in the many ways

in which the will to power organizes force is this:
sameness.

the creation of

The will to power as the will to life creates sameness in

many ways: through sensation, logic, naming, thinking, and willing.
Insight into the nature of these activities yields the realization
of the eternal recurrence of the same, which is in the end equivalent
to the realization that the world is will to power and nothing more.
What was called the tautological character of power is fundamentally
this same thing:

there is only the will to power, and it exists fully

in the moment as an event, drawing its full consequences in each and
every moment.
This means that the world simply happens;
nor becoming, but simply an on-going event.

it is neither being

There is no justifica-

tion for measuring one moment in terms of another moment, for all
moments are of equal value;

they all simply happen.

Granting this,

one begins to see the way in which this is the most liberating of
thoughts:

the absence of measure allows each moment to happen in its

fullness.

Precisely this is the overcoming of time, for time was the
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ultimate measure of all events.

The "it was" had become the unchange-

able measure of the present and the future.

In willing the eternal

recurrence, one now affirms all moments, including the past.

Being

had become the measure of becoming, sentencing it to insignificance
by comparison.

Now each moment is its own measure, not to be judged

in terms of an absolute.

The Christian conception of time had measured

man in relation to eternity, putting a false weight on the individual's
actions, a false measure.

The eternal recurrence insures that nothing

is measured in terms of a final goal, an eternity.
view of time presented unlimited possibilities.

The polytheistic

The creation of the

eternal recurrence prevents man's actions from being reduced to insignificance in the face of this infinity--they are to recur over and
over again eternally.

It now remains to explore the relationship

between time and the eternal recurrence of the same.
C.

Time and the Eternal Recurrence of the Same

Let us review our progress so far.

The problem of time has

four major aspects for Nietzsche: (1) the "it was," which paralyzes
the will; (2) the tension between being and becoming; (3) the need to
overcome traditional concepts of time; and (4) the demand for a creative affirmation of time.

The doctrine of the eternal recurrence of

the same offers a solution to these problems.

The way in which it does

so for the first three aspects of the problem has been indicated at
the end of the preceding section.

I shall now expand on this position,

showing that time as the measure of appearances is overcome through
the willing of the eternal recurrence, through the will to power.

The
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result of this creative willing is a new experience of time.

This

interpretation lays the foundation for the final section, in which the
unity of the will to power and the eternal recurrence will be shown
to reside in Nietzsche's vision of existence as creative play.

The Nature of Time
We have already considered Zarathustra's exhortation to praise
all impermanence, and the general primacy of becoming (more precisely,
of the happening of the will to power) is evident at this point.

It

is within this context that the rejection of timelessness is to be
understood.
'Timelessness' is to be rejected. At any precise moment of a
force, the absolute conditionality of a new distribution of all
its forces is given: it cannot stand still. 'Change' belongs to
the essence, therefore also temporality: with this, however, the
necessity of change has only been once more posited conceptually.l04
This passage is significant not only in that it shows the necessity of
temporality, but also in that it shows this necessity to be only "conceptual."

When Nietzsche writes elsewhere during the same year about

this problem, he acknowledges that changes are only appearance. 105
But time is not an appearance;

it is the measure of appear-

ance, and it is for this reason that it must be overcome.

In Zara-

thustra, it is madness which preaches that the law of time demands

104WM, §1064, p. 694 =WP, §1064, p. 547. "'Zeitlos' abzuweisen.
In einem bestimmten Augenblick der Kraft ist die absolute Bedingtheit
einer neuen Verteilung aller ihrer Krafte gegeben: sie kann nicht
stillstehn. 'Veranderung' gehort ins Wesen hinein, also auch die
Zeitlichkeit: womit aber nur die Notwendigkeit der Veranderung noch
einmal begrifflich gesetzt wird."
105WM, §545, p. 371

= WP, §545, p. 293.
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that it must devour its own children.l06

The passage which should be

juxtaposed to this is in The WiZZ to Power, where Nietzsche indicates
that eternity must be given to everything in order to save it fully.

107

When eternity is given to everything, then nothing is measured in terms
of anything else.

Consequently, everything becomes the same in that

it is no longer measured in relation to anything else:

it is mean-

ingless to say that something is different from something else without
a common denominator, a basic measure.

Difference, insofar as that

depends upon measure of one thing in terms of another, is overcome.
In this sense, the eternity of time demands that everything be regarded as self-identical, which results in no final state.

Each moment

remains, but not as a measure of any other.
The notion of time is further connected with the imposition of
sameness insofar as knowledge of time and motion is dependent upon the
need to believe in something at rest.

108

This is in part attributed

to the fact that we think only in the form of language. 109

Part of

the problem of time is rooted specifically in the nature of language,
which transforms events into things, dynamic processes into eternal
truths.

110

The demand for sameness is at the root of logical thinking

106z, II, "Von der ErlOsung;" VI/l, p. 176
demption," p. 140.
107™· §1065, p. 694

WP, §1065, p. 548

p. 285.
108™ , §520, p. 355 = WP, §520, p. 281.
109wm , §522, p. 358
llOcf. Fink,

WP, §522, p. 283.

Nietzsches PhiZosophie, p. 87.

Z, II, "On ReNF, VIII/2, 11(94),
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and leads to an eternal stasis if there is not something to overcome
this.
The foundation of logic in power has already been noted.

The

solution to the problem of thinking time is to be found not simply in
a new conceptualization of the problem--Nietzsche has indicated the
insufficiency of this solution--but in changing the foundation of sensation itself.

The foundation of sensation is pleasure, and the basis

of pleasure is power, which in the case of intoxication involves an
altered sensation of space and time. 111

Time is to be overcome not

simply on a conceptual level, but rather it must be overcome fundamentally on the level of sensation, and the basis of such an overcoming is power.
Time as the measure of appearance is then overcome in the will
to power, and the consequence of this overcoming is the eternal recurrence of the same as the equality of appearance.
small are seen as equal. 112

The great and the

It is this equality of appearance which

allows the primacy of the moment, for everything to be a dance of the
gods. 113

It is at this point that appearance exists as sufficient in

its own right, no longer measured in terms of anything else.

Time

remains as expressive of the interconnectedness of all events as

lllWM, §800, p. 535

= WP,

§800, p. 421

NF, VIII/3, 14(117),

p. 86.

112 Fw, III, §233, p. 170 = JW, III, §233, p. 202; Z, III, "Der
Genesende," 2; VI/l, p. 272 = Z, III, "The Convalescent," p. 220.
113 z, III, "Von alten und neuen Tafeln," 2; VI/l, p. 243 = Z,
III, "On the Old and New Tablets," 2, p. 197.
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organized by our will to power, but in giving up its function as a
measure--imposed from outside--of those events, it is no longer experienced as an imposed measure.

There is just a continual happening

which we shape by our will to power.
Thus the first three aspects of the problem of time in Nietzsche's philosophy--the threat of the "it was," the tension between
being and becoming, and the overcoming of traditional concepts of
time--find their answer in his doctrine of the eternal recurrence of
the same. 114

The fourth aspect, the demand for a creative affirma-

tion of time, has also been confronted in the consideration of the
modes of affirming the eternal recurrence, modes which have been shown
to be reducible to the will to power.

The new experience of time is

the measure which our will to power creates: the eternal recurrence of
the same.

It now remains to consider the relationship of this to the

category of play.
D.

Play and the Eternal Recurrence

The relationship between play and the eternal recurrence of
the same has two basic aspects: the picture of the universe as a play
of forces which is implicit (and sometimes explicit) in Nietzsche's
descriptions of the universe, and the play character of the modes of
affirming the eternal recurrence.

The second aspect of this problem

has already been explored in detail in the preceding chapter, where
it was shown how thinking and willing were reducible in the end to the

114 see above, especially pp. 219-20.
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interplay of affects, centers of force.

In a similar manner, it was

shown that the will to power on its most basic level was but the expression of this same interplay of forces.

The modes of affirmation

of the eternal recurrence are, when considered in regard to their most
fundamental character, instances of the play of forces in which the
individual is, properly speaking, both the player and the plaything of
this world-play.

The more powerful and active he is, the more will

to power he has, the more he is a player.

The weaker he is, the more

he is a plaything.
In these concluding remarks on the eternal recurrence, I shall
show that, if this doctrine is interpreted in terms of the category of
play developed above, the unity and internal consistency of Nietzsche's
view of man and the world becomes clear.

The doctrine of the eternal

recurrence does not mean, as Kaufmann erroneously claims, "that all
events are repeated endlessly, that there is no plan [or] goal to give
meaning to history or life, and indeed that we are mere puppets in an
absolutely senseless play. 11115

Indeed, such a misinterpretation arises

precisely out of a failure to understand the true nature of play as
creative activity and the way in which play permeates Nietzsche's vision
of existence.
destroyed.

In play, plans and goals are continually created and then

If men are puppets, they can also pull some of the strings--

and their ability to do so is a mark of their will to power.

115

All events

walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-

christ, p. 327.
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are repeated
play.

116

endlessly~

but this repetition is itself characteristic of

Moreover, as has been shown in the preceding analysis of the

modes of affirming the eternal recurrence, it is a created recurrence,
the full expression of the will to power.

The compatibility of the will

to power and the eternal recurrence becomes apparent when these are seen
in relation to the category of play.

The Play of the World:

the Early Writings

The picture of the universe itself which is contained in the
doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same is best expressed in
those two fragments which have been placed at the end of The Will to

Power, but the theme itself was already present in Nietzsche's analysis
of Heraclitus in his lectures on philosophy in the tragic age of the
Greeks.

Although this earliest description occurs as a description of

Heraclitus's universe, it is clear from Nietzsche's remarks, both when
writing "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, 11117 and from a
later remark in Ecce Homo
. d eep 1y sympat h etic.
. 119
is

118

that he is describing a view to which he

The view itself has already been considered

11711 Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen," in
Nietzsche Werke, III/2, p. 329 = Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the
Greeks, translated by Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1962), p. 68. "Denn die Welt braucht ewig die Wahrheit, also braucht
sie ewig Heraklit . . . Das, was er schaute, die Lehre vom Gesetz im
Werden und vom Spiel in der Nothi.uendigkeit, mue von jetzt ab ewig
geschaut werden: er hat von diesem groeten Schauspiel den Vorhang
aufgezogen."
llSEH, "GT," 3; VI/3, p. 311 =EH, "BT," 3, pp. 273-74.
119

1n addition to this evidence, there are the similarities between this description and the final two fragments of The Will to
Power (§§1066, 1067).
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..ibove in relation to the will to power and play, 120 but some aspects
of the description given by Nietzsche are pertinent to the discussion
of the world as play and the eternal recurrence.
First, the world itself is a game which the aeon plays with
itself.

Thus when one asks questions about the ultimate nature of the

.
f or examp 1e, wh y f'ire is
. not a 1ways f.ire, 121
wor ld an d o f existence-or why

voD~

would impel a random material particle into a whirling

. 122--one receives
.
dance aroun d it
a c 1ear answer:

play.

it is all a game,

Play is the final category of explanation, beyond which one

cannot go, and the explanation it offers is this:
things are;

that is the way

they have no significance except within this particular

game, but insofar as we have been fellow-players, we have helped to
create this game.

The question ''why" presupposes a meta-game within

which the answer would be possible, but there is no such meta-game.
Second, the notion of the cosmos as play itself implies a notion
of recurrence.

Nietzsche's treatment of Heraclitus and Schopenhauer

tend to merge into oneness at this point. 12 3

Not only is the notion

of time as devouring its children present here, but also the idea that
this ceaseless coming-to-be, the impermanence of everything actual, is

120see above, Chapter Four.
12l"Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen, 11 7;
p. 326 = "Philosophy in Tragic Age of Greeks," p. 64.
122 Ibid., 19; III/2, p. 363

=ibid., 19, p. 112.

123Ibid., 5; III/2, p. 317 = ibid. , 5, p. 52.

III/2,
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a terrible, paralyzing thought, 124 a description strikingly similar
to Zarathustra's descriptions of the eternal recurrence.

The descrip-

tion of the play of the child and the aeon implies eternal recurrence:
the continual creating of worlds, their destruction, then the starting
anew with the creation of another world.

Here the continual creating

and destroying of worlds is what recurs, but it is not said that these
worlds are all the same in the sense that their specific content is
the same.

They are, however, all the same in that they are all crea-

tions of the will to power.

The Play of the World:

the Final Vision

The final two fragments of The Will to Power develop in more
detail Nietzsche's view of the world as play. 125

Fragment 1067, written

in 1885, begins with the question: "And do you know what 'the world'
is to me? 11 126

The Nietzschean world is a "monster of energy, without

beginning, without end," its definite quantum of force confined to a
finite space by the boundaries of nothingness.

The space of this world

124Ibid., 5; III/2, p. 318 =Ibid., 5, p. 54.
125 This analysis agrees with Eugen Fink's position (Nietzsches
PhiZosophie, p. 106), when he writes: "Im Wissen von der Ewigen Wiederkunft laBt sich das Dasein ganz ein in das Spiel der Welt, wird zum
Mitspieler des groBen Spiels, die Trennung zwischen Notwendigkeit und
Freiheit wird aufgehoben--und ahnlich, wie die Vergangenheit Zukunftscharaktere gewinnt und die Zukunft Vergangenehitscharaktere, so liegt
jetzt in der Freiheit Notwendigkeit und in der Notwendigkeit Freiheit."
The main difference between the two interpretations is that my position
puts more emphasis on the importance of the player.
126 WM, §106 7, p. 696 = WP, §106 7, p. 549.
was mir 'die Welt' ist?"

"Und wiBt ihr auch,
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is completely occupied by force:
• • . as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one
and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there;
a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing,
eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with
an ebb and flood of its forms.127
Just as Heraclitus' child creates regular worlds, which he then destroys, Nietzsche also creates order in his world, the order which is
a play of contradictions and of concord:
out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex,
out of the stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest,
most turbulent, most self-contradictory, and then again returning
home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of contradictions to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this
uniformity of its courses and its years, blessing itself as that
which must return eternally, as a becoming that knows no satiety,
no disgust, no weariness •
128
This is the world which is the will to power and nothing more: the will
to power is the interplay of forces described here.

The degree to

which we become the will to power determines the degree to which we
cease to be playthings and become players in the game of existence.

127WM, §1067, p. 697 =WP, §1067, p. 550. " • . • ·als Spiel von
Kraften und Kraftwellen zugleich eins und vieles, hier sich haufend und
zugleich dort sich mindernd, ein Meer in sich selber stilrmender und
flutender Krafte, ewig sich wandelnd, ewig zurilcklaufend, mit ungeheuren Jahren der Wiederkehr, mit einer Ebbe und Flut seiner GestaltII
ungen .

128Ibid. = ibid. ". . . aus den einfachs ten in die vielfal tigs ten hinaustreibend, aus dem Stillsten, Starrsten, Kaltesten hinaus
in das Glilhendste, Wildeste, Sich-selber-Widersprechendste, und dann
wieder aus der Fillle heimkehrend zum Einfachen, aus dem Spiel der Widersprilche zurilck bis zur Lust des Einklangs, sich selber bejahend noch
in dieser Gleichheit seiner Bahnen und Jahre, sich selber segnend als
Das, was ewig wiederkommen muB, als ein Werden, das kein Sattwerden,
keinen UberdruB, keine Miidigkeit kennt • • • "
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The same view of the world as play remained with Nietzsche
until the end of his active life.

In a fragment entitled "The New

World-Conception," dating from the spring of 1888, 129 Nietzsche again
presents a picture of the world as a ceaseless coming-to-be and passingaway, without beginning or end, living on itself, its own excrements.
But now he gives an argument for his conception of the universe which
is directed against all those who would posit some final state for
the world.

In it the final meaning of the eternal recurrence of the

same as play is presented, and the conditions of the possibility of
such a world-view are enumerated: the world must be thought of as (1)
a certain definite quantity of force, (2) with a certain definite
number of centers of force, (3) existing in infinite time, and (4)
finite space. 130

Given these conditions, the world, "in the great

dice game of its existence, 11 131 must eventually repeat itself--must,
in fact, repeat itself infinitely.
And since between every combination and its next recurrence all
other possible combinations would have to have taken place, and
each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of

12 9WM, §1066, pp. 694-96 II WP, §1066, pp. 548-49 =NF, VIII/3,
14(188), pp. 166-68. The Colli and Montinari text contains a number of
corrections, including the sub-title "Die ewige Wiederkunft. Philosophie" before the third paragraph. This is omitted in both the Kroner
and Kaufmann editions.
1 30This fourth necessary condition, finite space, is omitted
in §1066, but clearly indicated as necessary in §1067.
131

WM, §1066, p. 696 =WP, §1066, p. 549 =NF, VIII/3, 14(188),
p. 168. " . . . im groBen Wlirfelspiel ihres Daseins . . • " Kaufrnann's
translation omits "its" in this phrase, although the relative pronoun
is to be found in both the Kroner and Colli and Montinari texts.
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combinations in the same series, a circular movement of absolutely
identical series would thus be demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often
and plays its game in infinitum.132
The world in its most fundamental character is thus a game which, because of the finite number of pieces and its infinite duration, must
eternally repeat itself.
We play along in this game of existence, following either of
two paths.

We may affirm existence as a game, as play, thereby real-

izing the croeated character of all order and meaning, and transforming
the game as it is given to us by our own creative play.

To do this is

to become the free spirit, to overcome nihilism, to manifest one's
will to power.

The other possibility is that, instead of becoming

players, we become playthings.

We try to cover up the true character

of existence by creating little games--systems of morality--which we
then mistake for reality itself;

but in doing so, we deny reality,

the powerfulness of our passions and the like.
go away;

This does not make them

they remain and continue to be powerful.

to recognize them for what they are.

We simply refuse

This refusal makes us their

playthings--and our little games are exercises in self-deception.
Existence is indeed a game for both the strong and the weak, for the

132Ibid. = ibid. = ibid. "Und da zwischen jeder 'Combination'
und ihrer nachsten 'Wiederkehr' alle Uberhaupt noch moglichen Combinationen abgelaufen sein milBten und jede dieser Combinationen die ganze
Folge der Combinationen in derselben Reihe bedingt, so ware damit ein
Kreislauf von absolut identischen Reihen bewiesen: die Welt als Kreislauf der slch unendlich oft bereits wiederholt hat und der sein Spiel
in infinitum spielt." The sentence is in the subjective mood, which
Kaufmann's translation (e.g., "is thus demonstrated" instead of "would
thus be demonstrated") seems to ignore.
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innnoralists and the moralists, but the difference is that for the
strong--the immoralists, the free spirits, the overman--it is a game
that they play, while for the weak, the moralists and other "naysayers to life," it is a game in which they are but toys.

CONCLUSION
Three main objectives have directed this inquiry.

The first

was that of discovering whether Nietzsche's philosophy was a philosophy of play.

The second was to see if, by thinking through Nie-

tzsche's philosophy in terms of play, it would be possible to make
more sense out of his position than other commentators have done.

The

third and final objective was to think through the philosophy of play
itself.
The first objective has been fulfilled.

It has been estab-

lished, not only in terms of textual evidence, but more importantly in
terms of the meaning of his fundamental categories, that Nietzsche's
philosophy was indeed a philosophy of play.
In the writings centering around The Birth of Tragedy, we have
uncovered a five-fold meaning of the category of play:

two types of

Apollinian and Dionysian play respectively, and the tragic as the
interplay of these two sets.

Among the significant differences be-

tween Apollinian and Dionysian play was the one which centered around
the role of the player:

the Apollinian player was much more a player

and in control of his game of illusions than his Dionysian counterpart.

On the other hand, the Dionysian man was much closer to the

truth of existence than the Apollinian player.

When this opposition

was raised from the natural to the artistic level, the types of play
remained fundamentally the same, but the role of the player in both
233
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cases was strengthened.

The Dionysian artist has an independent ex-

istence outside the flux of primordial existence.

By reflecting that

flux, he was able to confront and play with it and yet not destroy
himself.

The Apollinian artist, on the other hand, did not mirror

this primordial contradiction, but rather sought to create a beautiful
illusion to cover up the ugliness of existence.

The notion of the

tragic was that of a coming together of these irreconcilable worlds
into a brief moment of synthesis, a synthesis to be understood as the
interplay of these two worlds.

This notion of play was seen, however,

to be founded fundamentally in slavery: the slavery of the many provided the basis for the creative freedom of the few.
The notion of play found in Nietzsche's later philosophy is a
development of that view already presented in the writings on the
Greeks, but the differences are highly significant.

There are two

basic types of play in Nietzsche's mature thought--although the word
"types" is misleading here.
is an order of rank in play.
play:

It is more precise to say

The lowest rank is formless, chaotic

the interplay of forces in the cosmos.

is again needed.

that there

However, qualification

It is a formless play of forces for those who lack

the power to create something more out of it.

The highest place in

this order of rank is occupied by the powerful, creative play which
gives order, form, meaning and value to the world.

This is the play

which, in Chapter Three, was seen as characteristic of the child, the
free

~irit,

and those highest in the order of rank.

In Chapter Five

it was shown that this was the proper activity of the overman, a
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category which unifies the previously developed images of the child,
free spirit and highest in the order of rank.
This order of rank of play also provided an order of rank of
players, stretching from the least powerful to the strongest.

The

least powerful were only minimally players, since they were least in
control of the games that they played.
scribed as playthings than players.

They are more adequately de-

The most powerful ones, epitomized

by the overman, were players in the fullest sense: not only were they
in control of the games they were playing, they were also the very
creators of those games.
These are not two separate orders of rank, one of which refers
to play in itself, the other of which refers to players.
there is only one order of rank of play:

Rather,

that which is founded in the

player.

Formless, chaotic play is a mark of the interpreter's lack of

power.

The stronger the will to power, the more the player will impose

his own order on that which, for the weaker ones, is chaos.
This interpretation brings together the central themes in Nietzsche' s position and shows the fundamental harmony among them. ·.''the
overman is the player par excellence, the notion of the will to power
expresses the nature of his activity as creative play, and the doctrine

,.

of the etenal recurrence of the same expresses the fundamental nature
of the game which he creates out of the lawless interplay of forces in
the cosmos.

Nietzsche's critique of morality and the lower orders of

rank flows from the order of rank of play:

the lower ranks are ex-

amples of less powerful playing, weaker instances of the will to power.
While the overman affirms all of existence in his creative play, he
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does so creatively.

This inv0lves, a.n10ng other things, making a new

order of rank in which the lower ranks are recognized for what they
are: less powerful instances of the will to power, often declining instances of it.

The notions of the eternal recurrence of the same, the

will to power and the overman are in fundamental harmony--and the basis
of that harmony is the category of play.

Moreover, there is no contra-

diction between Nietzsche's critical philosophy and his own positive
position.

The basis of his criticisms is clear: he contrasts less

powerful, less creative play to the more powerful, creative play of
the overman's will to power.

He criticizes the weaker forms of play

precisely because they are weaker and because they do not lead to
more powerful forms of play.
This position represents a development which goes beyond the
position presented in the writings from the period of The Birth of

Tragedy.

The overman is in control of his play in a way similar to

the Apollinian player, but he is also able to recognize the insights
of the Dionysian man into the chaotic character of primordial existence.
However, he goes beyond both by realizing that primordial existence is
chaotic only because of the absence of a creative will to power which
gives form, meaning and value.

There is no existence "in itself" which

is chaotic--there are, in the end, only interpretations which are
distinguished according to power.
In this view of play, there need be no difference between work
and play.

Play creates worlds, as does work.

The activity of the

overman is in this sense a synthesis of work and play.

However, a

distinction can be drawn between work and play in another sense,

What
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most people commonly regard as work is less powerful, less free, a
weaker form of play:

it is a plodding, weary, coerced participation

in creating a world.
Thus Nietzsche's mature philosophy of play goes beyond that
developed in his early writings on the Greeks and overcomes the tensions between the Apollinian and the Dionysian worldviews and between
work and play.
The first two objectives of this study have thus been achieved.
Nietzsche's philosophy is one of play and in its mature form a consistent one, overcoming the tensions in his earlier position and not
subject to the contradicitions some of his critics have claimed to
find there.
The third objective, however, has only been partially achieved.
Whileaphilosophy of play has been developed, the philosophy of play
certainly has not been exhausted.

There are other ways in which it

can be done, and I am not yet satisfied that Nietzsche's way of developing a philosophy of play is the best.

The reservations that I have in

regard to Nietzsche's position have already been stated in Chapter One,
and it would serve no purpose to repeat them here.

To develop them

fully would require another volume--hardly the thing to begin in a
conclusion.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations have been used when referring to Nietzsche's works. Where both the German and the English editions have
been cited, both abbreviations are given. The German is given first,
followed by the English. Where only one abbreviation appears, only
the German text has been cited. Full bibliographical information
about the editions cited in given in the Bibliography.
A= A

Der Antichrist

=The

=Ecce

Antichrist

EH

= EH

Ecce Homo

FW

= JW

Die frohliche Wissenschaft

GD

= TI

GM

= GM

=The Twilight of the Idols
Zur Genealogie der Moral =On the Genealogy of Morals
Die Geburt der Tragodie =The Birth of Tragedy
Jenseits von Gut und Bose =Beyond Good and Evil

GT = BT
JGB

= BGE

Homo

=The

Joyful Wisdom

Die Gotzen-DG:mmerung

M

Morgenrothe

MA

Menschliches, Allzwnenschliches

NF

Nachgelassene Fragmente

UB

Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen

WM= WP

Der Wille zur Macht

to Power

z=z

Also sprach

Spoke Zarathustra

=The Will
Zarathustra =Thus
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